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PREFACE
A number of readers may recall that in late January 1986, the Department 
of Political Science organised a two-day seminar on the theme ‘Democracy 
in Ghana: Retrospect and Prospect.’ The seminar papers were eventually 
published as a book with the title The Search for Democracy in Ghana: A  
Case Study o f Political Instability in Africa. We were then encouraged by the 
knowledge that we would be contributing to the country’s ‘search for a 
democratic system which ... will be free and just as well as provide a stable 
and peaceful environment for our country’s development ...’. In that 
exercise, we sought to provide a rather rounded perspective on the causes 
of instability in Ghana; and we were sincere in our belief that we could 
thereby influence trends towards the building of a constitutional 
democratic system.
Five years have passed since then; and the search still continues. With 
the passing by the Provisional National Defence Council (PNDC) of the 
Committee of Experts (Constitution) Law, 1991 (PNDCL 252) and the 
Consultative Assembly Law, 1991 (PNDCL 253), the Department felt that 
the time was opportune to make yet another modest contribution to the 
search. Hence on 21 June, 1991, in collaboration with the Friedrich Ebert 
Foundation of Germany, we held a one-day seminar on the theme ‘Ghana’s 
Transition to Constitutional Rule.’
This theme was explored under four major heads, namely, Ghana’s 
political past - a review, the consultative process, source of documents and 
relevant texts, and towards a new democratic order. In the event, thirteen 
papers were presented by members of the Department. In a significant 
sense, the direction of these papers was somewhat different from that of 
the 1986 seminar papers. For, instead of largely looking back, they looked 
forward to what could be done at this crucial juncture in our country’s 
history when we are valiantly trying to identify the norms and the building 
blocks that will constitute a solid foundation for constitutional democratic 
politics. Thus the papers went beyond the confines of academic debate 
both by addressing the practical difficulties inherent in the transitional 
process itself and by making a num ber of concrete proposals for 
consideration by the Committee of Experts and the Consultative Assembly 
- although this publication has appeared too late for the form er’s 
consideration.
We would like to believe that this volume will be received, studied, and 
assessed by Ghanaians as a whole in the spirit in which it has been offered, 
namely, to contribute to the creation of a public platform for a meaningful
and fruitful debate on a subject that must be very dear to our hearts, in an 
atmosphere of tolerance, give-and-take, fair play, and civilised behaviour. 
For, clearly, constitutional democracy means inter alia not only freedom of 
expression and association as well as mutual tolerance among contending 
individuals and social forces; it also imposes a moral and political obligation 
on government to listen to its people, respect their views, and generate 
opportunities for the expression of such views. This is the democratic pact 
between citizens and their government.
We trust that the PNDC will make earnest its determination to return 
Ghana to constitutional rule by respecting the terms of such a pact; and that 
subsequent governments will make the need to listen to the views, and 
a tte n d  to  th e  w e lfa re , o f th e  c itiz e n ry  a s a c re d  law  o f th e  
constitutional-democratic order we seek to establish. Then and then only 
will our dear country know peace in freedom, justice, and prosperity.
In conclusion, we are happy to state that the seminar and the publication 
of the proceedings would not have been possible without the considerable 
moral and financial support of the Friedrich Ebert Foundation and its 
D irector, Dr. G. Schirra. The constructive contribution they are 
unobtrusively making to ensure the success of our current search for an 
enduring constitutional democratic order cannot escape the notice of the 
careful observer. They highly deserve commendation for their foresight, 
courage, and support. Our heartfelt thanks also go to the audience for their 
active and lively participation in the seminar. The open and frank 
discussions were indeed a manifestation of the kind of democracy our 
country is yearning for. Finally, we are very grateful to the entire secretarial 
staff of the Department for helping with the seminar, and especially to 
Mr. Godfried Mantey, Ms. Selina Odame and Mohammed Osumanu for 
typing the seminar papers and preparing the typescripts for this book.
It can hardly be overemphasised that the Department of Political 
Science, Friedrich Ebert Foundation and the publishers are in no way 
responsible for the views expressed in this book. The responsibility lies 
squarely with the contributors.
K. A. NINSIN 
F .K . DRAH
Department of Political Science 
University of Ghana 
Legon
October, 1991
Part I
THE POLITICAL PAST - A REVIEW
CHAPTER 1
DECOLONISATION AND INDEPENDENCE 
THE PROBLEMS OF NATION-BUILDING
Yaw Manu
Introduction
In this paper, I intend to look at the emergence and achievements of the 
UGCC more particularly the appointment of the Coussey Committee and 
its report. I shall briefly examine the Constitution of 1954, taking into 
account its peculiarities. I shall then look at the crises of identity and 
integration, and subsequently the crisis of participation - all of which 
constitute problems of nation-building. I shall answer the question: How 
has the country fared in the programme of nation-building ?
Post-War Nationalism in the Gold Coast
Writing on Frantz Fanon, Rehata Zahar has suggested that Fanon’s interest 
in the colonial question centres mainly on an analysis of intellectual 
alienation. All colonial peoples have been subjected to the economic 
conditions of alienation.
In the Gold Coast, the question could well be asked: What was it that 
prompted the establishment of the first post-world war II nationalist 
organisation, the United Gold Coast Convention (UGCC)? The truth of 
the matter is that the intelligentsia were unhappy with the constitution 
which had just been promulgated by the colonial power for the country. 
And yet it was the acute economic problems facing the country that 
impelled Mr. George Grant, the timber merchant, to convene the meeting 
of 1947 which led to the formation of the UGCC.
The call m ade by the Convention that ‘by all legitim ate and 
constitutional means ... the control and direction of Government shall 
within the shortest time possible pass into the hands of the people and their 
chiefs...’ was a call for decolonisation. F ran tz Fanon asserts that 
‘decolonisation’ is simply the replacing of a certain ‘species’ of men by 
another ‘species’ of men. Decolonisation, which sets out to change the 
order of the world is, obviously, a programme of complete disorder. It is a 
historical process. Decolonisation is a meeting of two powers opposed to 
each other by their very nature. On the other hand ‘independence’ when
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operationalised implies the exercise of sovereignty by the people through 
their government representing the state.
Fanon’s definition of ‘decolonisation’ seems appropriate for our 
purposes; for the call of the Convention, as noted above, was no more than 
a demand for the replacement of the colonial government by the indigenous 
people and their leaders for the purposes of exercising independence and 
sovereignty.
In these brief introductory remarks, we have observed the emergence 
of the UGCC. It demanded self-government within the shortest time 
possible. Let me say here that this demand had some indefiniteness about 
it. And when smother party - the Convention Peoples Party (CPP) - 
emerged in June 1949, it shrewdly capitalised on this indefiniteness. The 
CPP, apparently more radical than the UGCC, sought ‘Self-government 
Notf\
The UGCC, from the outset, did not seem to make an impact. The 
Watson Commission - set up by the British Government to investigate the 
causes of the riots which occurred in February 1948 - observed that from 
the internal minutes of the Working Committee of the UGCC, actual work 
did not begin until the arrival of its permanent General Secretary, Dr. 
Kwame Nkrumah.
The Alan Burns Constitution, although an improvement on previous 
Gold Coast Constitutions, was described by Dr. J.B. D anquah as 
window-dressing. Obviously defective, it could not meet the requirements 
of the country. But were the people as a whole conscious of these defects 
and if so, were they concerned? Political observers point out that the 
ordinary people had little if any concern for the form of constitution for 
the country.
Happily, certain factors favoured the movement. For example, 
ex-servicemen, having returned from service abroad, needed security, 
shelter and material comfort. And because of monopolistic tendencies of 
the European firms, grouped into the Association of West African 
Merchants (AWAM), African traders did not fare well; school leavers 
were not being absorbed into the limited second cycle schools; and farmers 
were unhappy with colonial policy concerning agriculture and the cocoa 
industry. These trends seemed propitious for the success of the UGCC. 
On the 28 February, 1948, when an African trade boycott ended, riots 
ensued.
It is unnecessary here to examine thoroughly the approach of the 
Working Committee of the UGCC towards the crisis. Suffice it to say that 
it demanaded an inquiry into the riots and the transfer of political power 
by the colonial government to it. Of the wide-ranging observations and
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recommendations of the Watson Commission, the following comment by 
the Commission is instructive. ‘The Constitution and Government of the 
country must be so reshaped as to give every African of ability an 
opportunity to help to govern the country, so as not only to gain political 
experience but also to experience political power. We are firmly of the 
opinion that anything less than this will only stimulate national unrest.’
W hen the G old  C oast G overnm en t ap p o in ted  the C oussey 
Constitutional Committee to draw up a constitution for the country, it was 
responding to the recommendations of the Watson Commission. The 
composition of the Coussey Committee need not engage our attention. It 
is necessary, however, to note that its recommendations proferred partial 
self-government - a compromise type of constitution that saw to it that on 
the national level, traditional rulers would be represented in the legislature, 
while the masses of people would equally participate both in the voting and 
in matters of representation. Special interest groups like the mining and 
commercial interests as well as ex-officio members representing British 
interests would serve in the legislature, while the office of Governor would 
be retained.
The Crisis of Identity and of Integration
In the above pages, we have discussed the emergence of the UGCC and its 
impact on the society as reflected in the constitutional changes. We need 
to look at the Nkrumah constitution whose implementation was closely 
followed by the crises of identity and integration - both of which, in a way, 
suggested problems of nation-building.
Dr. Nkrumah, as the leader of the nationalist party the CPP had 
described the Coussey Constitution of 1951 as ‘bogus and fraudulent’; he 
added, however, that it was worth trying it. That he advocated a new 
constitution - the Nkrumah Constitution - shortly after 1951, indicated that 
his acceptance of the previous Constitution was tactical. Negotiated with 
the colonial authorities, the 1954 Constitution removed from membership 
of the cabinet all ex-officios who were British. The Governor, however, was 
to retain his post, presiding over cabinet meetings and exercising powers 
of veto and certification. No longer would the traditional lealders be 
privileged to sit in the national legislature simply on account of being 
traditional rulers - they could stand and be voted for in any elections in their 
own right.
T here  was hardly any doubt about an em ergent nationhood, 
considering particularly the fact that under the new Constitution, the 
nationlist party had swept the polls across the country, thereby suggesting 
a national consensus on the programme of ‘Self-government Now.’ Here
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it needs be said that if the outcome of the elections implied an emergent 
nationhood, the event was also the occasion for the eruption of the crises 
of identity and integration - which are problems of nation-building.
In a study on political development, Lucian Pye says that an identity 
crisis is one of achieving a common sense of identity on the part of a people. 
The people must come to recognise their territory as being their true 
homeland; they must feel as individuals that their own personal identities 
are in part defined by their identification with their territorially delimited 
country. Thus the existence of ethnic and tribal loyalties poses a grave 
problem for common identity which a people ought to claim within a 
common territory. In other words, competition tends to exist where tribal 
and ethnic loyalties co-exist within a nation.
What is required if a modern, stable, nation-state is to be fostered is that 
parochial loyalties and traditional forms of identity have to be submerged. 
Given this standard in the quest of nation-building, the claims posed by the 
new emergent political group - the National Liberation Movement (NLM)- 
in September 1954 seriously questioned the programme of nation-building.
Demanding a federal form of constitution backed by threats of 
secession, the movement advanced the following arguments. The fact of 
the existence of various ethnic and tribal groupings with their peculiar 
cultures which they had developed at their own pace and in keeping with 
their own peculiar circumstances supported the claim for a federal form of 
constitution. A further argument which was wide-ranging dwelt on the 
need for the social and economic development of each group to be 
determined by their own peculiar circumstances. And far more telling was 
the argument that each territory comprising present-day Ghana came 
under British jurisdiction at varying times. This crisis of identification, 
which was later resolved partially through the balot box, was decidedly a 
problem in nation-building.
Independence, which was won in 1957 in the wake of an identity crisis, 
was a point of departure in political development which is also a process of 
nation-building. Under the Nkrumah regime, what was the nature of 
‘political development or nation-building?’ How did the country fare?
Political Development - Nation-building under the Nkrumah Regime
The polls of 1956, which were partly intended to decide on the identity 
crisis, and in which the CPP under Dr. Nkrumah triumphed, ushered in the 
nation-state exercising national sovereignty - a triumph in decolonisation. 
The event, seemingly also an end to the crisis of participation - for the 
colonial governm ent had apparently  been com pelled to concede 
participation - marked the beginning of yet another participation crisis.
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From 1954 onwards, the CPP appeared to have augmented its strength 
in the legislature. Winning 71 seats in a legislature of 104 in 1954, the CPP 
repeated this victory in 1956 by winning 71 seats; by 1960, however, its 
strength had stood at 98 in a legislature of 114 members; and, according to 
Dennis Austin, the opposition groups had dwindled in numbers. A de facto 
one-party system emerged under a new Republican Constitution.
Briefly stated, that Constitution centralised political power. The 
executive and the legislature were linked, since the head of the former was 
the head of government and was entitled to a seat in the legislature where 
he served as head of the majority party. As Chief Executive, he was also 
the head of state - President of the Republic. Thus the Chief Executive was 
both the President and head of government. The de facto one-party system 
did not leave any room for a change of government.
It was argued that political participation was possible within the context 
of the single-party system, the purpose of which was to serve as a 
mobilising agent. According to Dr. Nkrumah, after independence, ‘the 
economic independence that should follow and maintain independence 
demands every effort from the people, a total mobilisation of brain and 
manpower resources.’ But, again, he stressed: ‘even a system based on 
social justice and a democratic constitution may need backing up, during 
the period following independence, by emergency m easures of a 
totalitarian kind. Without discipline, true freedom cannot survive’.
As an agent of mass mobilisation, the single party system would 
constitute the framework of political participation. This trend amounted 
to political development : that is nation-building. And, in Lucian Pye’s 
view, as an aspect of political development, political participation involves 
primarily the role of the citizenry and new standards of loyalty and 
invo lvem ent: ‘T he invo lvem ent m an ife sts  so m etim es in m ass 
demonstrations which are viewed as evidences of political awakening ... 
historically, the process of popular participation has varied.’
The process of particpation under the one-party system is not coupled 
with the processes of election on the pattern of the Western countries. This 
notwithstanding, it is believed to play a role in nation-building; for, it 
represents a means of creating new loyalties and a new national identity. 
Criticised on the grounds that as an aspect of political development it can 
sometimes be fraught with sterile emotionalisms which can sap the strength 
of the nation, the one-party system has haboured the crises of participation, 
legitimacy, and authority. Commenting on the legitimacy crisis, Pye has said 
that it connotes ‘the absence within a state of an agreement on the legitimate 
nature of authority..’ For instance, although the CPP government had been
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popularly elected earlier on, the single-party system did not seem to allow 
for elections on liberal-democratic principles. Thus the architects of the 
coup d ’ etat against Dr. Nkrumah and the CPP in February, 1966, argued 
that the single-party system was a denial of political participation; and that 
an avenue for a change of leadership did not exist other than a coup d'etat.
In the process of nation-building, which is the same as political 
development, the country’s journey has been tortuous. But relying on 
Lucian Pye, once again, I will use two criteria of political development to 
offer evidences of political development attained by the country:
Political Development as the operation o f a nation-state. This view seeks 
to assess the nation-state from the point of view of organised political life 
and how far the performance of political functions is in accordance with 
the standards expected of the modern nation-state. The modern state is 
organised along a set of requirements. To perform as a modern state, the 
political institutions and practices must adjust to the requirements of state 
performance. ‘Political development is the capacity to maintain a certain 
level of public order, to mobilize resources for a specific range of collective 
enterprises and to make and effectively uphold types of international 
commitments...’
Political Development as Administrative and Legal Development. This is 
the belief that organised political com m unities need a legal and 
adm inistrative o rd er. The trad itio n  which advocates legal and 
administrative order has ied  to theories concerning the establishment of 
effective bureaucracies for the development process. On this view, 
administrative development is associated with the spread of rationality, the 
strenthening of sectllar and legal institutions, and the elevation of technical 
and specialised knowledge in the direction of human affairs. No state can 
presume to be ‘developed’ if it lacks completely the capacity to manage 
public affairs effectively.
How far has the country fared in the matter of nation-building or 
political development? It does not seem to require hard data but political 
observation to conclude that the country has travelled far in the matter of 
nation-building. It is, however, necessary to observe that crises of 
participation, legitimacy, and authority continue to constitute major 
problems of nation-building for the country.
Decolonisation, apparently consummated piece-meal by 1957, has 
been followed by nation-building, that is, political development. And yet, 
unavoidably, the country still expriences crises of participation, legitimacy 
and authority.
8
Conclusions
A necessary reaction to colonialism, nationalism manifested effectively only 
after the second world war. The emergence of the UGCC apparently was 
occasioned by the weakness of the Burns Constitution but no less by the 
severe economic difficulties of the post- war era.
In its aims, the UGCC desired a transfer of political power by the 
British government at the shortest time possible to the chiefs and people of 
the Gold Coast. But it was with the arrival from abroad of the General 
Secretary - Dr. Kwame Nkrumah - that the movement began in earnest to 
advance its cause. To the credit of the movement, the British Government 
consented to send a Commission to the Gold Coast.
The Watson Commission no doubt was persuaded by the genuineness 
of the claims of the nationalists. The British Government’s acceptanceof 
the recommendations of Watson led to the appointment of the Coussey 
Constitutional Committee and the promulgation of the 1951 Constitution.
At best this Constitution was a compromise one - ensuring that while 
the masses would participate in the electoral processes, traditional rulers 
would also be accorded a role in such processes. But the Constitution of 
1954, designed to give full scope to universal adult suffrage, eradicated the 
concessionary privileges previously accorded traditional rulers.
It is easy to see why traditionalists would be averse to a system that gave 
a seemingly total recognition to the role of the masses. Perhaps, it was this 
element of concern that gave rise to the crisis of identity of 1954. But 
however one looks at it, the crisis was one of nation-building and political 
development.
As we have noted already, the period of Nkrumah’s rule, the 
post-independence era, which was charac terised  by single-party  
dominance created a new awareness. Participation, in the context of the 
mass party, facilitated political development because it created national 
awareness -notwithstanding its shortcomings.
Ignoring the electoral processes of the liberal-democratic kind led to a 
crisis of participation. Such a crisis was compounded by the crises of 
legitimacy and authority. The very fact that the single-party system did not 
allow for a change of government led to a legitimacy crisis. Undoubtedly, 
there has been a measure of political development and nation-building; 
for although crises of participation, legitimacy, and authority prevail in the 
nation, the tests of a modern nation - state appear to have been met.
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CHAPTER 2
PARTY AND NO-PARTY POLITICS IN A 
NEW CONSTITUTIONAL ORDER
Mike Oquaye
Introduction
An inevitable pronouncement that has accompanied all coups d’etat in 
Ghana has been the dissolution of political parties. Where the military 
government happens to be a moderator type, merely stepping in briefly to 
restore freedom, such as the National Liberation Council (NLC), or to 
clean the stables and call back the politicians, such as the Armed Forces 
Revolutionary Council (AFRC), political parties per se are not attacked. 
However, the military junta, such as the National Redemption Council 
(NRC), or the institutionalised military government, like the Supreme 
Military Council (SMC), as well as the military regime that seeks a total, 
revolutionary transformation of society like the Provisional National 
Defence Council (PNDC), have no set datelines. They basically have come 
to stay. They have messianic visions of their transformation role. They seek 
to erect new structures that would perpetuate their rule. In the process, it 
is inevitable that political parties which have been the bastions of the 
governments overthrown must be condemned. In the quest for legitimacy, 
there is the strong temptation to establish other vehicles of political 
participation and selection of rulers, almost invariably with a veiw to 
retaining power. The road to party politics, in such a situation, should be 
blocked. Party politics presupposes that there is a possible alternative 
leader to the ruler who is being hailed for having done so much for the 
fatherland. The party system also assumes that an organised group of 
people with an alternative programme is available to lead the nation - an 
assumption which is as unacceptable as it is unimaginable to any messianic 
leader.
It is in this light that we should appreciate why there was a bitter cry 
against party politics during General Acheampong’s desperate quest to 
legitimise his authority and transform, by the clever ruse of Union 
government (Unigov), the de facto power he had seized by the gun into a 
de jure and respectable government. The pattern has been common 
throughout Africa.
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Critique of the Argument against Multi-Party Politics
In the first place, the argument against party politics maintains that the state 
apparatus, through the political party system, has become the monopoly of 
a few rich and influential people. As a result, the poor have been deprived 
of meaningful political participation. It has been maintained that in 1979 
the People’s National Party (PNP), for example, became the property of 
financiers such as Okutwer Bekoe, Ayeh Kumi, Imoru Egala and Krobo 
Edusei - to the extent that President Limann was reduced to a puppet on 
the economic strings of the party financiers. It soon became manifest that 
the party financiers were anxious to reap dividends on their ‘investment.’
As Adu Boaheh has pointed out, soon after the PNP’s assumption of 
office, ‘an increasingly bitter fight for power and access to state patronage 
and contracts ensued....’ These internecine struggles worsened when 
accusation of corruption and embezzlement of public funds were made 
against many of the party leaders. One of them involved a bribe of 5.2 
million cedis said to have been collected from a currency printing firm in 
London. This ‘money politics’ stemming from the unbridled influence of 
money in party politics had so corrupted the body-politic that, in Adu 
Boahen’s considered opinion, ‘by December 1981 the PNP was on the verge 
of disintegration while Limann looked on helplessly, much to the disgust of 
his own suppoters, the joy of his opponents and the dismay of the hungry 
workers, farmers, students and public servants.’
In this connection, party politics is seen as a corrupting influence. It is 
opined that there is, therefore, the need to evolve a simpler system of 
representation without the funfair, expense and attendant corruption of the 
system of party politics. We cannot gloss over the undesirable effects of the 
power of money in party politics. In the USA ‘money power’ has attained 
such huge proportions as to assail the virtue of officials and demoralise 
some state legislatures. Bryce in his study on modern democracies ascribes 
this to the prodigious fortunes which the swift development of a new 
country5s resources created, and the possession of which made it possible 
for people to buy favours from politicians who had them to sell. Bryce then 
lists some of the consequences of ‘money power’ as follows:
(i) the power of money to pervert administration or legislation
(ii) the tendency to make politics a gainful profession
(iii) extravagance in administration
(iv) the abuse of the doctrine of equality and failure to appreciate the 
value of administrative skill
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(v) the undue power of party organisation
(vi) the tendency of legislators and political officials to play for votes 
in the passing of laws and in tolerating breaches of order.
What we advocate at this stage, however, is that the area of 
participation within the party context should be broadened and political 
parties should not be subject to individual caprice. The problems relating 
to the manipulation of the party system by individuals are not unknown in 
the U.S.A. As Judge Parker said in a test case (Rice v. Elmore, 1947), 
American primaries were not the prerogative of party bosses. The system 
must operate within the state laws; party officials were state officers de facto 
if not de jure and were bound by the constitution. He made these 
observations in a case involving some Southern States including South 
Carolina which tried to divest parties of their official character but were 
rebuffed. It was held that the attempt by individuals to make nominations 
excluding negroes was unconstitutional, and that a party could not act in an 
‘illegal conspiracy.’ Judge Parker, whose ruling in the Circuit Court was 
upheld by the U.S. Supreme Court, said further that ‘the fundamental error 
in the defendant’s position consists in the premise that a political party is a 
mere private aggregation of individuals,’ like a country club, and that the 
primary is a mere piece of party machinery. The party may, indeed, have 
been a mere private aggregation of individuals in the early days of the 
Republic, but with the passage of the years, political parties have become, 
in effect, state institutions, governmental agencies through which sovereign 
power is exercised by the people.
Regarding the issue of money, it is significant to note that in its Report 
presented to the PNDC on a future constitution, the National Commission 
for Democracy (NCD) advocated state funding of elections and the 
abolition of deposits by candidates. One may note with concern the NCD’s 
prescription that an ‘innovation in the District Level Elections which the 
overriding majority of contributors wanted to have institutionalised at the 
national level was the creation of a common platform for all candidates to 
present themselves and their programmes to the electorate and to respond 
to questions and queries.’ To say the least, it is repugnant to good 
conscience to restrict a free association in this manner. Parties should be 
free to conduct their campaigns without the undue control and supervision 
of regime officialdom, whose partiality can never be completely ruled out. 
Freedom of association cannot be given with one hand and taken away by 
the other. Indeed, the state should not establish a patron/client relationship 
with political parties in the next constitution.
The second main argument against party politics is that it is 
acrimonious. In advocating Unigov - a system of government comprising
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soldiers, policemen and civilians and in which there would be no political 
parties - General Acheampong called upon Ghanaians to remember the 
arson, violence, general insecurity and ethnic animosity engendered by the 
contesting parties during the days of the Convention People’s Party (CPP) 
and the National Liberation Movement (NLM) between 1954 and 1956. 
Unigov, it was asserted, would remove strife, factional hostilities, bitterness 
and rancour.
And in the words of Fit. Lt. Rawlings in volume two of his collected 
speeches, ‘rivalries and animosities among political parties sharpened as 
the country grew older. These were not in the form of healthy competition 
in which one-party in power strove to do its best so that the electorate might 
re-elect it. Rather, while building its own funds by some dubious means, a 
political party also bought support by providing opportunities for bribery, 
theft, embezzlement and trade malpractices. Gradually these were 
becoming the vogue in our political and social life, while rewards for 
honesty turned out to be a self-inflicted punishement.’
Those who disagree to this point of view argue that military regimes have 
their share of corruption; that party politics per se is not corrupt; and that 
the acrimony conjured up is unfortunate. The political crisis of 1954-56 had 
to do with a multiplicity of factors including a call for federation by some 
significant sections of the Ghanaian population on one hand and total 
secession on the other.
Thirdly, it is argued that non-party politics would eliminate ethnic 
differences and foster national unity. Party politics is described as a system 
that exploits tribal sentiments as a basis for mobilising support. Another 
school of thought is quick to point out that the military governments 
thoughout all the years have also had to confront the ‘problem of tribalism’ 
as a bane of our politics; what we must do is to acknowledge the reality of 
the problem and tackle it constructively.
A fourth argument against party politics is that the system of resorting 
to the ballot box once very four or five years is not the essence of democracy. 
Undue emphasis has been placed on the ballot box and the role of the 
citizen in putting a piece of paper therein and electing people who quickly 
isolate themselves from the electorate. The emphasis should, therefore, be 
on active participation in various aspects of government by the people. 
Chairman Rawlings in a broadcast on 31 December, 1983, echoed these 
sentiments when he said that ‘some regard democracy as the process of 
choosing between a restricted group of people by means of the ballot box. 
The process of this kind of democracy ends when the voter puts his piece 
of paper inside the box. The winners are then free to manage or mismanage 
the nation’s wealth, and we are all witness to the callous mismanagement
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which has resulted from this type of democracy. At present, when 
consultations and debates go on at grassroots level and every individual has 
a greater opportunity than ever before to participate in the formulation of 
policies, the participants must be aware of all the issues involved. Asking 
people to take decisions when they do not know all the factors which should 
be weighted is to invite superficial and dangerous decisions.’
In this connection, Rawlings found it necessary to explain the handover 
to civilians through party politics in 1979. He said in an intereview on 
Ghana Broadcasting Corporation in May 1989 that ‘we all knew that the 
people were sick and tired of the military misrule of Acheampong and were 
hungry for elections of a civilian government, believing that party politics 
and parliamentary procedures would bring them relief. We had to let the 
elections go ahead for the people to discover for themselves that the empty 
forms of alien democratic procedures cannot in themselves guarantee real 
democracy. It was costly and probably necessary.’
Chairman Rawlings saw the salvation of the people in a party-less 
grassroots involvement, and in a decentralized administration. In his 
speech of 31 December, 1986, he said that ‘decentralisation will mean that 
throughout the country, we all acknowledge and live up to our 
responsibilities for nation-building, in particular for making a contribution 
to the national economic recovery effort.’
The call for spontaneous mass participation saw the emergence of 
People’s Defence Committees (PDCs) and Workers Defence Committees 
(WDCs). They constituted a twin system to ensure geographical as well as 
work-place participation. Observers point out that the system crumbled 
under its own weight as the Defence Committees bit more than they could 
chew, for they attempted to become an empire within an empire.
The fifth argument against political parties may flow from the fourth. It 
is that politicians, when elected into office, quickly isolate themselves from 
the people. This problem can be laid to rest by the exercise of the timely 
and welcome power of re-call recommended in section 5.4.4 of the NCD 
Report to the effect that it should be possible for the electorate to recall a 
member of parliament before the end of his tenure on grounds, and with 
procedures, that should be clearly spelt out in the constitution. Of course, 
an M.P. must come from or reside in the area he represents to make the 
right of recall meaningful.
Sixthly, it is opined that the multi-party system is alien to our 
cultural/traditional system. Acheampong said Unigov sprang from the 
traditional African system and was therefore autochthonous to the people 
of Ghana and Africa. As I pointed out in 1980, Unigov was likened to a 
meeting of the village elders presided over by the chief where affairs of the
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village were discussed and decisions arrived at by means of consensus and 
implemented by the chief and his elders. The obvious answer to this 
argument is that the old order must yield place to the new in the face of the 
complexity of modern society, rapid population growth, widespread 
urbanisation, and industrialisation. If we seek a festishistic invocation of 
our past and tradition, why do we not hand over political power to our 
chiefs?
A seventh argument against the multi-party system in our country stems 
from the socialist - one-party school, championed by men such as Kwame 
Nkrumah. It is an argument to the effect that the multi-party system is 
imperialist as well as alien. In his work on revolutionary warfare, Nkrumah 
saw the multi-party system as a neo-colonialist weapon to perpetuate the 
subjugation and economic exploitation of the developing countries. He 
wrote that ‘a state can be said to be neo-colonialist or client state if it is 
independent de jure and dependent de facto. It is a state where political 
power lies in the conservative forces of the former colony and where 
economic power remains under the control of independent finance capital.’ 
Furthermore, imperialism usually resorts to all types of propaganda in 
order to highlight and exploit differences of religion, culture, race, outlook 
and of political ideology among the oppressed masses, or between regions 
which share a long history of mutual commerical and cultural exchange. In 
the last resort neo*colonialism can set up a bogus ‘progressive party* or 
organisation using local agents. Nkrumah added that ‘the main sphere in 
which we must strive to defeat neo-colonialist intrigues is within the 
movement for true independence; that is, with the progressive political 
party which forms the government. ’
Nkrumah’s argument, which amounts to a rationalisation of his concept 
of one-party as against multi-party politics, holds that the problem of 
neo-co lon ialism  is so g igan tic  th a t ‘the only way to e rad ica te  
neo-colonialism is through a revolutionary movement springing from a 
direct confrontation with the imperialists and drawing its strength from the 
exploited and d isinherited  masses. Independence must never be 
considered as an end in itself but a stage, the very first stage of the people’s 
revolutionary struggle’. To Nkrumah, we are in a state of war and it is only 
under the umbrella of the one-party that we can achieve nationalism, 
Pan-Africanism and socialism: ‘only under Socialism can we reliably 
accumulate the capital we need for our development, ensure that the gains 
of environment are applied in the general welfare and achieve our goal of 
a free and united continent.’
Mussolini who preferred the one monolithic national movement which 
had no room for competition, once said that ‘fascism has never attempted
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to clothe its complicated and powerful mental attitude with a definite 
programme, but has succeeded by following its ever-changing individual 
intuition... We fascists have always expressed our complete indifference 
towards all theories; we have had the courage to discard all traditional, 
political theories. It is sufficient to have a single viewpoint, the nation.’ 
Goerring, who suscribed to this school of thought, also said: And if abroad, 
it is believed today that chaos threatens Germany, the German people 
respond with the single cry: “We all approve always of what our leader does 
.... I do not become the follower of a leader because I have tested his 
political or economic progress .... Where real leadership exists, I have 
trusted myself to a leader whose purpose I only see in part. I give him whole 
trust. He has captured me. He may lead me now, either to death or to life.” 
Those who envisage party politics in this perspective have a pessimistic 
view of multi-party politics which, to them, is inconsitent with ‘progressive’ 
nation buidling.
The eighth argum ent is that m ulti-party  politics engenders a 
proliferation of parties, which militates against political stability. This is a 
strong argument. Even in France, before de Gaulle, the dozen political 
parties that littered the political scene led to political instability until 
General de Gaulle seized power by a coup d’etat. Upon the lifting of the 
ban on political parties in 1969 and 1979, Ghana experienced the 
mushrooming of a dozen political parties. Apart from Limann and Victor 
Owusu, the eight other presidential candidates in the 1979 elections lost 
their deposits, including Mr. William Ofori-Atta, Col. Bernasko, Dr. 
Bilson. Mr. Alhaji Mahama, Dr. R.P. Baffour, Mr. Kwame Nyanteh, Mr. 
Diamond Addy and Alhaji Imoro Ayarna.
We advocate here a strong two- or three-party system because, although 
a multi-party system may exist bona fide, unbridled multiplication of parties 
has an inherent weakness - no party is able to obtain a workable majority 
in the legislature, and the formulation of public policy lacks finality and 
sustainability. In this connection, a major problem that confronts the 
operation of our preferred system is the simple majority voting system 
which the NCD addressed in its Report on ‘Evolving a True Democracy.’ 
It identified the problems attendant to the winner-takes-all system as 
against the advantages of proportional representation. It argued that 
proportional representation will engender a greater feeling of participation 
and achieve a just and equitable representation of groups who under the 
simple majority system fail to obtain seats that correspond with votes 
obtained. But we must caution against a real danger here. Our study of the 
German experience, for instance, shows that the system brought in its trail 
such a wide array of parties that at one stage, midwives threatened the
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Ministry of Interior that they would set up a political party of their own 
unless certain demands of theirs were met!
As a ninth argument, it is stated that in Africa, the organised opposition 
has been irresponsible, divisive and destructive and that the idea of an 
official opposition, which is an integral part of the multi-party system, has 
proved disastrous in Africa. But the real point is that we should all learn 
to cultivate tolerance.
The tenth argument is that we cannot ignore the military factor in a 
future political arrangement; and since soldiers cannot leave their barracks 
and engage in party politics while remaining soldiers, a way must be found 
to provide for them. Suffice it to say that a soldier who wants to enter 
politics and stand for election to a political office could be given leave of 
absence and return when he loses the election or when he completes his 
term of office. Furthermore, our soldiers will surely not want to give the 
impression that they are holding the nation to ransom by virtue of their 
monopolistic hold on the coercive instruments of the state. In fact it is better 
for a soldier who wants to do politics to retire altogether.
Further Argument in Favour of Party Politics
The arguments above indicate the need for political parties, to which we 
may add the following:
(i) Parties make politics meaningful. Lord Bryce once said that ‘they 
bring order out of the chaos of a multitude of voters. It is a clearing 
house of ideas. The party system may be regarded as an institution, 
supplementary to the government, aiding the electorate in the 
selection of official personnel, in the determination of public policy 
and in the larger task of operating or criticising the government. In 
this sense the party may be regarded as a part of the government 
itself, an extension of officialism shading out from very definite 
responsibility for official acts to the less definite responsibility for 
shaping and building the course of public opinion.’ As a connecting 
link in the political edifice, the party was described by Burke as ‘an 
organic convention with all the processes of thoughts and feelings 
which pertain to human nature, and is subject to the play of their 
influence.’
Herring also observed that ‘the task of leadership is to bring the diversity 
of our society into a working harmony. Our system of political parties is 
designed to implement this purpose. Through such organisation, the 
politicians can contribute to the process of adjustment.’
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By being schooled in this manner, harmony and political stability will 
be achieved. We should learn from what Herring states further: ‘Our party 
system tries to reconcile conservative elements with the forces making for 
change. Such reconciliation is achieved not by debate alone. Common 
loyalty to an organisation is no small factor in bringing men of contrary 
interests together. This straddle presumably can stretch only so far; but 
before the breaking point is reached, concessions are often made out of 
loyalty to the organisation which both sides value... ’
(ii) The party acts as an educator by way of persuading a person to vote 
for Party A as against Party B. The method is: argument and 
counter-argum ent. The resultant effect is the making of a 
calculated, feasoned choice based on persuasion, not force and 
blood. As one writer once put it, parties help to preserve the serious 
and objective approach to politics, the mistrust of generalisations 
and extremist points of view and the respect for the freedom of the 
citizen regardless of his opinions.
(iii)The party is both an organiser and insurance of discipline. 
Non-organisation means inaction or chaos. Maclver made the most 
succinct statement in this regard when he observed that ‘public 
opinion is too varied and discursive to be effective unless it is 
organised. It must be canalised on a broad line of some major 
division of opinion. Party focuses the issues, sharpens the 
differences between the contending sides, and eliminates confusing 
cross-currents of opinion. Each party formulates its platform, 
grooms and elects its candidates, enables the public to make its 
choice between sufficiently distinct alternatives.’ Most constitutions 
rest heavily upon a probability theory to the effect that someone will 
contest for and accept a public office. The party makes an effort to 
reduce randomness of choice and to ensure that the voluntary 
method of filling public offices marches on. This certainly 
underscores the importance of political parties in the democratic 
political system.
(iv)Parties are catalysts that stimulate political activity. They do not 
only present programmes and people, but also whip up enthusiasm, 
counselling the citizen on his civic responsibility to partake in the 
political process, not only by studying the issues at stake but also by 
casting a vote to influence decisions on the issues.
(v) The party system provides the most effective means of orderly 
change of government. And without parties, responsibility and
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accountability are empty slogans. Parties promote accountability in 
the sense that in the first place, a party comes to power with a 
manifesto and it can be queried if its actions are at variance with its 
avowed and known programme. Secondly, there is a clearly 
identified group in office who are not m ere ‘invitees’ nor 
‘appointees’ but members of a party who can be held responsible for 
all misfeasances.
Conclusion
In conclusion, we may say that political parties have not failed this nation. 
The system has not been given a chance to work not only by politicians who 
have abused the process but also by soldiers who have raped it. By learning 
from the lessons of history - home and abroad - and ensuring the 
consitutionalization and proper operation of political parties, we shall 
enrich the political .system, ensure stability, and promote the progress and 
liberty of us all.
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CHAPTER 3 
ONE-PARTY AND MILITARY REGIMES
Kwame A. Ninsin
Introduction
The problem of democratic politics and government in a developing 
country could be explained by a number of factors. In this paper I argue 
that the problem, as it has prevailed in Ghana since the 1960s, may be 
explained partly in terms of the country’s experiences of one-party and 
military regimes; that the emergence of these two regime-types has violated 
the most elementary but primary tenets of democracy - namely, the freedom 
of association and expression. The logic of such regimes has impeded the 
full realisation by individuals and groups of the fundamental right to 
organise for purposes of defending and advancing the whole bundle of 
rights to which they are entitled. This has meant retarding the growth of a 
plethora of independent political organisations, representing various social 
forces, which could collectively articulate and defend the sum total of social 
interests against the claims of the state.
The Premise of Politics
In all societies the struggle between the prevailing social forces of opposing 
interests with the intent of securing control over the state or influencing it 
and getting their respective interests embodied in public policy is the engine 
of politics. For such struggles social forces do organise, in one way or 
another; and pursue their political objectives either in collaboration with 
others or alone, but normally in opposition to one another. Politics is 
therefore characterised by group action, and by dissent, dispute, opposition 
- in short, by conflict of interests.
An equally important feature of politics is the constant drive for 
compromises, and coalition building in order to gain advantage over one 
another. Ultimately, the goal of political struggles is the attainment of 
consensus and a stable political life so that social progress would be 
achieved. Groups provide the means for attaining such ends.
But it is not any group! It is groups formed on the basis of objective 
and/or assumed interests and ideas determined by one’s class position. 
Class-based groups spring up to express the interests and ideas of their class
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in the sphere of public life - that is, in politics. Normally the articulation of 
such interests and ideas is aimed at achieving objectives that are specific 
to, or consistent with, the interests of the groups concerned. Political groups 
are, however, careful to avoid pursuing interests that are diametrically 
opposed to the interests of the larger society. Where there are fundamental 
differences between the interests expressed by a political group or groups 
and that of the larger society the prospects for destabilising the political 
order become quite high.
Though interests and ideas are determined by one’s class position, other 
social tendencies also shape individual and group interests and ideas. There 
are, for example, religious, tribal, ethnic, and regional tendencies which 
often shape the way people see social facts and define their interests. 
Nonetheless, such non-class interests often subsume diffuse material or 
economic interersts. At any rate, the emergence of a political group to 
articulate a body of interests is sufficient evidence that the social force 
whose in terests it expresses has atta ined  a m easure of political 
consciousness and is, above all, determined to defend its interests. Interests 
are normally expressed as social and economic rights; and public policy is 
the medium by which interests or rights are pursued.
Since society comprises a variety of social forces - howebeit, at different 
levels of development and self-assertion - the political action of one political 
group is matched by the actions of several other political groups. The 
struggle among political groups to shape public policy is the stuff of politics. 
Any attempt to restrict or stifle this logic of politics is a violation of the rights 
of citizens and creates potential grounds for civil disobedience.
The right of all social groups to organise themselves freely to pursue set 
goals in the political arena is therefore necessary if a stable political 
environment for the pursuit of peace and progress is to be assured. The 
freedom to organise for political purposes is also a precondition by which 
all social forces could be assured of the opportunities for achieving social 
justice. For the nature of the prevailing social structure is such that some 
social forces are more powerful than others and are therefore able to 
appropriate a larger share of the social wealth at the expence of others. The 
right to organise and engage freely in political actions guarantees all 
aggrieved social groups reasonable possibilities for securing redress 
through open and legitimate political action.
Contrary to this premise of politics, the country’s political history shows 
that the single-party and military regimes have persistently violated the 
right of Ghanaians to organise in defence of their rights. Accordingly, the 
social and economic rights which were conceded in our constitutions have 
remained mere formal rights. This criticism applies equally to the 1979
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constitution which provided (in Chapter 4) for Directive Principles o f State 
Policy. It is noteworthy that the retention of this provision in PNDC Law 
42 (Section 1) has not mitigated the severe socio-economic disadvantages 
suffered by large sections of the population.
The One-Party Regime and the Limits of Freedom
At independence in 1957, Ghanaians enjoyed a multi-party system of 
politics and government. There were parties other than the Convention 
Peoples’s Party (CPP). This meant that people were free to express their 
views whether or not these ran contrary to those of the ruling party and 
government. Similarly, people were free to form political associations other 
than the CPP. The freedom to hold and express contrary views and organise 
meant that essentially people could take on public officers for acts deemed 
to be violations of fundamental rights. It also meant that at elections people 
could choose between candidates in accordance with their perception of 
candidates, parties and programmes.
By 1960 it was evident that politics was taking a different turn. This was 
due mainly to the fact that the social forces which could operate the system 
were least developed, and the emergent groups who thought they could 
operate a democratic political arrangement could not sufficiently shoulder 
the discipline and responsibilities imposed by the norms of democratic life. 
Both government and opposition groups misunderstood their role in a 
democracy and abused the freedoms conferred by democratic politics. The 
anarchy that characterised the politics of the 1954-65 period as well as the 
challenges of nation-building totally discredited the freedoms that derived 
from democratic politics. The result was the one-party regime of the CPP 
that reigned from 1960 to February 1966.
The emergence of the one-party regime meant, in fact and in law, the 
imposition of limits on basic freedoms of speech or expression and 
association. This restriction was manifested in the subordination of all 
existing political organisations, representing key social forces in the 
country, to the hegemony of the party. I should simply recall that the 
organisations of workers, farmers, women, artisans and even asafo 
companies became auxiliaries of the CPP. Accordingly, people could form 
political organisations only if they were prepared to submit to the hegemony 
of the party. That i§, the formation of independent political organisations 
was impossible. If we consider the fact that it is through such organisations 
that people could articulate their interests and aspirations effectively in 
politics, then that limitation was tantamount to a serious violation of 
democratic rights.
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The emergence of the single party meant further that public discussion 
of national issues was possible only within the parameters set by the ruling 
party. The single party substituted diversity of thought and practice with 
uniformity. A monolithic political ideology also replaced freedom of ideas. 
Hence opposition, criticism and dissent were considered divisive and 
subversive. Their suppression could not be any better justified. In the end 
the politics of the single party regime destroyed the very foundations of 
democracy by denying independent organisations the opportunity to 
flourish, and Ghanaians the experience of democratic practice.
Military Regimes and the End of Politics
The one-party regime of the CPP attempted to limit the freedom of action 
and expression entailed in democratic politics by reducing social diversity 
to uniformity. The politics of the single party took this form because it had 
to cultivate the support of its political constituency whose consent, support 
and interests could not be ignored. The government of a military regime, 
on the other hand, is not based on the stated consent of an identifiable 
political constituency. It derives its right to rule mainly from the power of 
the gun, and by appropriating genuine social discontent for its own 
advantage. It therefore does not worry too much about its legitimacy, and 
can decide to abolish independent political organisations in disregard of 
social reality. In pursuit of this, it exposes its essentially undemocratic 
character by governing in total disregard of cherished democratic norms 
and rights.
An early indication of this tendency among Ghana’s military regimes is 
the 1966 decree which proscribed the CPP and its ancillary organs. In effect, 
that decree suppressed the legitimate right of a section of Ghanaians to 
freely form political associations. This tendency has persisted ever since.
The National Liberation Council (NLC), which pioneered this practice, 
moved several steps further by disqualifying a large number of CPP activists 
from engaging in open political activity and holding public office. The 
Elections and Public Offices Disqualification Decree, 1969 NLCD 332 
(which repealed NLCD 223 of 1968, NLCD 251 of 1968 and NLCD 273 of 
1968) an d  th e  Prohibited Organisations Decree 1969 NLCD 358 
disenfranchised all Ghanaians who were affected by them. In effect, that 
military regime could deprive fellow Ghanaians of their democratic right 
to participate in choosing and changing the governments of this country.
The Union Government (Unigov) proposal of the Supreme Military 
Council (SMCI) government was the boldest attempt to proscribe party 
politics in the social life of Ghanaians. It was premised on a kind of social 
pact that would fuse the interests of members of the key organs of state
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(viz., the security organs) with those of the key social forces. Politics was to 
be reduced to conspiratorial actions among the few powerful cliques who 
could claim to represent the political trinity of army, police and civilians. If 
the Unigov idea had succeeded, the military regime would have become 
the supreme leviathan, instead of the single party of the one-party regime, 
mediating directly between state and society; and democratic politics would 
have been outlawed.
Even though that innovation failed, the eight-year rule of that military 
regime was sufficient to stifle the growth of independent political 
organisations. Accordingly, it was only the handful of organisations - 
including the Ghana Bar Association (GBA) and other professional 
bodies,the National Union of Ghana Students (NUGS), sections of 
organised labour and the churches - which had been able, in the face of 
severe difficulties, to maintain their independence from the encroaching 
power of the state that could lead the rest of society to forestall the 
perpetuation of military dictatorship.
Equally significant is the fact that the suppression of independent 
political organisations and activities deprived Ghanaian society of the 
means for orderly change of government and policy. Hence, the transition 
from military rule to constitutional democracy was violent. The lessons of 
this period should therefore stress the need for free and independent 
political organisations as the mechanism for securing dem ocratic 
government. We shall return to this subject shortly.
Another outcome of military rule was the emergence of radical political 
organisations. Admittedly, the abortion of open political activities is not the 
primary, let alone the sole factor that induced the growth of such radical 
po litica l o rg an isa tio n s. The p rim ary  ca ta lyst was the seeth ing  
contradictions in the relations of production as the distribution of the 
economic surplus became increasingly skewed against the underclass in our 
society. The denial of the right to organise in the political sphere in order 
to secure the alleviation of those inequities made radical, often covert, 
political activities the only option for the aggrieved underclass elements. 
More significantly,, it also engendered the belief that the existing state 
institutions are undemocratic, and should be rejected.
By the time the Provisional National Defence Council (PNDC) took 
power, the People’s National Party (PNP) government had not had 
sufficient time to consolidate the institutional and normative basis for 
resolving political conflict, especially the sharp social contradictions that 
had produced radical political organisations and actions. Certainly, 
twenty-seven m onths was too short for the institutionalisation of 
democratic political practice, attitudes and norms. Besides, the economy
25
had not recovered from those conditions that contributed to  the deepening 
of social inequalities. The PNDC’s success in seizing power was facilitated 
by this radicalisation of politics and by the fact that the institutional and 
normative basis of the newly established democratic order was still fragile.
The PNDC and folitics
The PNDC seized power by exploiting the vigorous and radical politics of 
the fledgling democratic order. But its own political practice seems to have 
further undermined the slender institutional basis of that order. On the one 
hand, it has proscribed existing political parties and suppressed others of 
both the left and right. It has also disallowed new ones from coming into 
being for fear of opposition. In so doing it has stalled once more the gradual 
process of building democratic institutions and a culture of democratic 
politics. On the other hand, it has built its own political organisations and 
promoted a form of political practice towards its goal of establishing 
grassroots democracy.
Compared to previous military regimes, the PNDC government’s 
approach to politics is similar to that of the one-party regime. The 
establishment of the Committees for the Defence of the Revolution (CDRs) 
and other political as well as quasi-political organisations, while denying 
others the right to form similar organisations, is an attempt to impose a 
single-party kind of structure on politics in the country. The only omission 
is a clear articulation of a monist ideology. Even so one could discern from 
the government’s notion of grassroots democracy, signs of attempts to 
define a particular way of understanding politics and social development. 
Ultimately, the proscription of alternative political organisations has meant 
denying people the right to express alternative view- points and engage in 
open debate, the right of dissent and opposition, and the right to 
information.
All these have had a negative effect on the growth of the necessary 
political infrastructure for democratic politics and government. It has 
meant that Ghanaians have to start all over again to construct and nurture 
the political scaffold for democratic politics and government as well as instil 
the norms and attitudes consistent with them.
The current politics surrounding the transition to a democratic order is 
chilling in this respect - especially, the atmosphere of confrontation and 
statements of threat and condemnation that fill the air almost daily. This 
intolerance and acrimony is a sure sign of immaturity which could have been 
overcome if the country had been allowed to learn to govern itself in a 
democratic manner.
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Furthermore, the composition of the consultative assembly illustrates 
the poverty of society’s in fra s tru c tu re  for establishing even the 
constitutional basis for democratic politics and government. I am, indeed, 
referring to the extent government had to go to discover organisations that 
would represent a cross-section of Ghanaian society. It would not be unkind 
to suggest that some of the organisations do not have a coherent 
organisational structure. Some either may have a questionable claim to be 
mass organisations by any measure, or cannot articulate their interests; 
while others have just been cajoled by the state into existence for purposes 
of tax collection.
I should emphasise that the social class of members of some of these 
organisations is not the issue at stake here. I wish merely to raise a query 
about whether such organisations have demonstrated adequate levels of 
political consciousness to represent even the interests of their own 
members, let alonethe rest of society.
On the question of social consciousness one’s level of education or 
social class/status does not matter at all. It is whether or not members of a 
particular organisation are socially aware of their interests as well as 
fundamental rights as citizens of our country, and whether they are 
therefore able,and indeed determined, to articulate such rights as well as 
defend them. In politics the social forces which have attained fairly high 
levels of social consciousness are the ones who produce their own 
organisations - i.e. organisations that are independent of the state (or 
government). They are also the ones who are found engaged in constant 
struggles against attempts to violate their rights - and often by extension the 
rights of the rest of society.
In our history, wage and salaried workers are a good example of social 
groups who have shown an appreciab ly  high level of po litical 
consciousness. Others who have demonstrated sufficiently high levels of 
this, and hence a high degree of political independence, are the business 
class, the professional strata of the middle class, farmers and students. The 
rest - like petty traders, artisans and craftsmen (small scale producers in 
general) and chiefs - have acted like the windmill: they have usually moved 
with the political wind. Birds of fortune indeed! I am not saying they have 
no interests. But have they demonstrated sufficient awareness of their own 
interests and rights to be able to relate them to those of society as a whole? 
Will they not easily flounder and, in the end, compromise the general 
interests and fundamental liberties of society if they should be confronted 
by the ominous stick and carrot of the state? Our country’s history of the 
1970s shows that such social elements are the raw materials for potential 
dictators.
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In this regard, I should merely recall that the adamant advocates of the 
Union Government proposal had suddenly sprung from the class of small 
property owners, and almost took this country political captive. The heart 
of the matter is that by the time of the Unigov scare, Ghanaian society had 
not been allowed adequate time to nurture a sufficient network of 
independent political organisations which would be capable of defending 
society against the arbitrariness of their governments. It was only the 
militant sacrifices of students and workers supported by middle class 
professionals that saved this country from the scourge of Unigov. It is most 
likely that if the single-party and military regimes had not interrupted the 
normal growth of politics, such organisations that today raise doubts in our 
minds about their political maturity could have emerged as independent 
political organisations to take their legitimate place in the search for a 
democratic order.
Conclusions and Recommendations
Clearly the single-party and military regimes have either destroyed nascent 
political organisations, which could have grown into independent and 
formidable bodies, or retarded the growth of such organisations. The 
growth of institutions like the press was also adversely affected by the 
em ergence of the single-party and m ilitary regim es. They either 
undermined or destroyed the independent press in the same vein as they 
stifled free, independent and critical opinion. It is in this respect that we 
should understand the contribution of the one-party and military regimes 
to the destruction of the democratic order that we have been trying to build.
The significance of this history for all strata of society should be clear. 
The violation of the freedom of association, speech and the press deprived 
both the rich and the poor - the worker, farmer, manager, lawyer, 
businessman, et. al. - of the right to engage in open political struggle to 
defend and advance their respective rights.
It is important that as we make a fresh start in democratic politics, we 
should ensure that no government would be able to make a law that would 
take away any of our fundamental rights as citizens of this country. I will 
single out three of such rights for priority consideration. I regard these as 
central to the other rights. The first is the right to form political associations 
and engage in open political activity. In affirmation of this right, we should 
enshrine in our constitution a clause that prohibits the enactment of any 
law that seeks to register political parties, define the parameters of political 
practice, or recognise their existence. The right to organise political 
associations and engage in political activity should be absolute and
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unlimited. The only certificate of registration should be the people of this 
country. That is, the extent of a political organisation’s popularity or 
support should be the only basis for its existence. It should not matter 
whether a political organisation has one member or a million members. If 
the right to organise political associations is a fundamental right, then our 
constitution should further prohibit the passage of any law that seeks, even 
remotely, to disqualify a section of Ghanaians from engaging in any form 
of organised political activities.
The same prohibition should apply to laws affecting political activities 
- viz., political rallies, processions, protests, etc. The freedom of assembly 
is a logical part of the freedom of association for political purposes. We 
should therefore have the unlimited right to engage in political activities 
even if it would mean a lonely protest marcher bearing a placard critical of 
a certain public policy. I am drawing attention to the fact that the law on 
the statute books that oblige any person or group that intends to hold a 
public meeting, rally or procession to obtain police permit is a clear 
violation of the freedom of assembly. This law should be scrapped. The 
next constitution should prohibit its restoration. This will ensure that all 
alleged excesses in the exercise of this freedom would be settled only by the 
law courts.
If we should be able to imbibe the culture of building independent 
political organisations and engaging in democratic political practice, then 
the right to form political associations should extend to the smallest village 
or community, and to the contest for every political office from the village 
to the national assembly. I am proposing that people should be free to form 
their own village or community political parties to contest, for example, 
seats on unit committees, town and village councils or district assemblies; 
and to contest offices like district secretary, town mayor, chairman of the 
town development committee etc. In fact, we should demand the right to 
form our own ‘farmers or greens’ party; ‘anti-drugs’ party; ‘anti-smugglers’ 
party, ‘anti-corruption’ party, etc. Every group or individual should be free 
to form a political association to advance a chosen political course. This 
means that those who want to form or retain the CDRs, the 31st December 
Women’s Movement, the June 4 Party, the Young Pioneers Party etc should 
be free to do so, and be free to contest elections at local and other levels of 
the polity if they have a political programme to push through.
The urgency of securing unlimited right to form political associations 
stems from the following: The proliferation of independent political 
organisations that will span district and national politics will promote 
structural decentralisation of power. The development of independent 
political bases in the districts, where partisan politics should be vigorously
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pursued, will enable the elctorate to secure a more effective control over, 
and participation in the formation and running of such organisations. The 
local and grassroots contro l that will be enhanced through the 
decentralisation of political organisations will further ensure that such 
organisations become the media for articulating the interests of citizens and 
influencing public policy. It is through such proliferation of centres of 
political power throughout society that we could secure our collective 
freedom against the authoritarian tendencies that are inherent in modern 
government.
Such democratic expressions should be manifested also in regional and 
national level politics. Thus settler farmers in the country should be able to 
organise their own political party. In such instances it should not matter 
whether such farmers are based in a particular region of the country. In so 
far as they would organise around specific economic interests, without any 
irredentist motives, this aggrieved group should be free to organise 
independently to elect parliamentary representatives with the mandate to 
fight for a law or laws that would address the land question in our country. 
They need not affiliate with either a PNP or UNC or PFP or ACP.
If we could secure such free and open local political activities, we could 
boast of a truly grassroots democracy. But more especially, such free 
political activity will enhance the growth of democratic culture and practice 
- of debate, tolerance, respect for the moral and legal rights of others, open 
political competition etc. It is through the experience, practice and 
enjoyment of such freedoms that we could build a truly national democratic 
culture and government.
The second is the freedom of speech and of the press. It is true that 
freedom of speech or expression cannot be as absolute and unlimited as 
the freedom of association and political action. Yet it should be possible to 
secure a protected institutional framework within which we could enjoy 
freedom of speech. Freedom of the press is a prerequsite in this regard. 
Hence, a newspaper licensing law is fundamentally a threat to our liberties. 
The constitution shbuld therefore prohibit the enactment of any law which 
seeks to limit the freedom of the press. Everybody or company should be 
free to start a newspaper. The continued existence of a newspaper should 
be determined by the free market - just like everything else in this country. 
Second, the right to publish should be subject only to the laws of libel. In 
other words, the laws of the democratic state, as interpreted by the law 
courts, should constitute the sole limitation on the exercise of the freedom 
of speech; and they should also be the sole determinant of who is a 
misguided element, dissident, subversionist, etc. No government or group
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of persons should ever arrogate to themselves the right to define who are 
the enemies or friends of state and society.
The third is freedom of information. In order to remove the scourge of 
state interference in the media, once and for all, we should create 
conditions for the jree flow of information. This requires entrenching a 
clause that will safeguard the freedom of information. In furtherance of this, 
the state-owned newspapers should be privatised and the state restricted 
to its ownership of the Ghana Broadcasting Corporation. But even in the 
area of broadcasting a private Ghanaian company should be able to invest 
to compete with the state. The state will not lose much: it has the ministry 
of information - a formidable propaganda apparatus- to disseminate its 
views.
This proposal is not aimed at liberating the Ghanaian journalist. Rather, 
it is intended to remove the temptation which the state has always welcomed 
to destroy the private press simply because it has its own media by which it 
could monopolise and manipulate the dissemination of information. 
Without the advantage of a state-owned mass circulation newspaper, any 
attempt to destroy the private press would surely create an embarrassing 
vacuum.
Admittedly we cannot conjure these democratic conditions into 
existence just as we cannot banish the threat of military intervention. We 
can nonetheless make a resolute beginning in defence of our liberties. To 
this end, we only have to remember that fine constitutional provisions are 
not the panacea. WE, the PEOPLE of this coutry, have it within our power 
to invoke our latent sovereign right to remove dictators through civil 
disobedience whenever and wherever they bare their awesome fangs.
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Part II
THE CONSULTATIVE PROCESS - 
TENSIONS AND CONSTRAINTS
CHAPTER 4
TENSIONS IN GHANA’S TRANSITION TO 
CONSTITUTIONAL RULE
E. Gyimah-Boadi
Introduction
The anxieties surrounding a country’s political future are put into sharper 
relief during periods of political transition. Ghana’s record of conceiving, 
framing and especially working out constitutions - the real goals of a 
meaningful transition - has been rather chequered. Heady expectations for 
a stable and democratic- constitutional order have been rapidly replaced 
by bitter disappointments as constitutions have been perverted in practice, 
regimes operating under them have been mired in immobilism and worse 
still, coup-d’etats have been staged to subvert institutions. There is every 
reason to be sceptical about the prospects of another transition.
A further cause for scepticism arises from the fact that the Provisional 
National Defence Council (PNDC) has only reluctantly conceded the 
possibility and desirability of returning the country to constitutional rule. 
This belated concession has been made, largely, in reaction to the 
world-wide pro-democracy trend: to pre-empt the contagious effect of the 
political liberalisation pressures spreading throughout western and central 
Africa, respond to the political conditionalities imposed by the World 
Bank, IMF and western donors and, to a limited extent, to respond to 
domestic pressures. At the same time many countervailing factors are 
present; and they combine to cast a shadow of doubt over the PNDCs 
commitment to relinquishing political power and working out a meaningful 
transition to constitutional rule. Furthermore, the regime which inherently 
evinces a considerable amount of intellectual arrogance may also have 
genuine fears for its physical security once it surrendered power. Thus the 
current programme of transition had started off on a rather sceptical note 
and would take a lot of effort, ordinarily, to reduce the anxieties 
surrounding the enterprise.
This paper examines the character of Ghana’s current transition 
programme and highlights the tension created by the government’s tight 
management of the process and the requirements for fairness and equity 
on the part of civil society in general and opposition elements in particular. 
I argue for the need to give equity of process as much prominence as the
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need to maintain control over it; for the legitimacy of the transitional 
process and its outcome (a fourth republican Constitution) may well 
depend on the perception among Ghana’s articulate public that the 
process would be fair.
A Hesitant Government
Unlike the National Liberation Council (NLC), the Armed Forces 
Revolutionary Council (AFRC) and even the Supreme Military Council 
(SMC) military regimes, the PNDC has, almost from the beginning, given 
strong indications of wanting to stay much longer in power. Even though 
it designated itself as ‘provisional’ it doggedly refused to bind itself to time, 
choosing to refer to itself and its actions as part of an indefinite political 
‘process’. Pressed on when it planned to hand over the reins of government 
to an elected group, the answer was ‘hand over to whom?’ The issue of a 
transfer of political power continued to be treated with utmost coyness as 
Rawlings and key spokesmen talked vaguely of the PNDC working towards 
the creation of conditions necessary for its own ‘redundancy’ or withering 
away.
The political programme of transition, once it was begun, has been 
characterised by deliberate slowness, foot-dragging and evasiveness. A 
considerable amount of precious national time and other resources were 
spent in the mid 1980s on a government sponsored public education 
program m e, under the auspices of the N ational Commission for 
Democracy (NCD). This was followed in 1988 by dubious elections for 
district assemblies. The new assemblies, originally touted as local 
government bodies, were later to be presented as the first building block of 
an undefined constitutional edifice. Once the assemblies had been put in 
place, the government fended off demands for a return to constitutional 
rule with the claim that, that was a matter better left to the assemblies (as 
if the district level structures were designed to be constituent assemblies) 
and that such issues had to wait until the assemblies had found their feet.
Then in mid-1990 came the regional fora and consultations during 
which the future political arrangements for the country were to be debated. 
But those debates were often presided over by PNDC strongmen and 
packed with PNDC partisans who, for the most part, used the fora to 
canvass positions known to be favoured by the government. They attacked 
the evils of the multi-party system, cited the failure of past politicians, and 
asserted the sanctity of the June 4, 1979, and December 31, 1981, coups 
d ’etat. The occasion was also used to unveil the PNDC’s peculiar definition 
of the concept of ‘identifiable bodies’ whose views must be taken into
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account in the deliberations on Ghana’s political future. The definition 
tended to favour the so-called organs of the revolution and other 
pro-PNDC organisations such as the June 4 movement, 31 December 
Women’s Movement, the District Assemblies, Committees for the Defence 
of the Revolution (CDRs), the Ghana Private Road Transport Union of the 
TUC (GRPTU) etc.
In March 1991, the NCD’s report on the regional fora and consultations 
was presented to the government. It was followed in May by a rather 
tendentious government response which provided for a Consultative 
Assembly and a body of constitutional experts that was to formulate 
constitutional proposals. A Constitution that would be produced by a 
Consultative Assembly was to be submitted to the public in a national 
referendum at an unspecified date.
Tens! ns in the Process
A cursory look at the organisations selected to choose representatives to 
the Consultative Assembly (C A ) reveals a disguised attempt to pack it with 
pro-government elements and to exclude as much as possible those known 
to harbour anti-government views or too independent to be controlled by 
the government. The government’s definition of ‘identifiable bodies’ 
provides it with maximum scope for playing populist political games at the 
expense of intelligent, mature and professional input into the constitution- 
making process. Thus the district assemblies, most of whom had declared 
their support for the position favoured by the government, have been given 
117 out of a total 260 seats in the Consultative Assembly. Bodies that never 
expressed any interest in a return to constitutional rule, even though they 
never lacked opportunity to do so, such as the CDRs, have been given the 
same number or more seats in the assembly than bodies like the Ghana Bar 
Association, the Christian Council of Ghana, the National Union of Ghana 
Students and the University Teachers Association of Ghana which have 
been persistent in their demands for constitutional rule. Admittedly, the 
definition o f‘identifiable bodies’ in Ghanaian political practice has always 
been fuzzy. But this time, it is almost bizzare. The current definition does 
not seem to make functional or numerical sense. Besides, some of the 
bodies do not possess a truly national character.
Foot Dragging
Implicit in the refusal of the government to spell out a clear time table for 
the transition is further evidence of a lack of or low-level commitment to 
the transitional process. Apart from the requirement that the Consultative
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Assembly present its report by December 31 1991, no deadline has been 
set for concluding the transitional process. There is no date for the 
presentation of a government white paper after the draft constitution has 
been submitted; nor for the referendum. The critical issue of what would 
happen in the event that the draft constitution was rejected in the proposed 
referendum remains fuzzy. On the whole, the transitional programme has 
been left open-ended and vague enough for the supporters of the 
government to impute different interpretations to official motive and to 
repose blind faith in the process, while its opponents remain stuck in 
unremitting scepticism.
Scepticism over the intentions of the PNDC is further reinforced by the 
tendency on the part of the government to send confusing signals on the 
kinds of political arrangements and dispensations it envisages for the 
country. While the government appeared to have conceded that party- 
political competition must be a part of the future political arrangement, the 
PNDC leader has publicly declared his reservations about that system; and 
the state media continue to drum up anti multi-party sentiments. For 
example, Rawlings, who had said in his New Year speech to the nation that 
the eyes of his government were firmly fixed on a return to constitutional 
rule, has never lost a chance to show irritation at those within and without 
the country who advocate a return to civilian and constitutional rule. He 
was reported to have defiantly told a meeting of cadres in Cape Coast last 
March that his government has always composed its own tune, and that was 
the only tune it could dance to!
The refusal to grant general political amnesty and or to release political 
detainees, or to repeal repressive laws (such as PNDC Law 4 which allows 
indefinite detention without trial, Law 91 which limits the application of 
habeas corpus, and Law 78 which permits the execution of political 
offenders) thoroughly intimidate the general public and renders opposition 
to the PNDC regime too risky. Such laws restrict opposition-politics to the 
highly intrepid or the occasionally mad person. In general, the refusal to 
liberalise the political environment, the government’s monopoly over the 
print and electronic media, the hugging of the political microphones and 
the use of state-media to canvass pro-government positions and, at times, 
to pour invectives on opposition elements and actions are not politically 
enabling.
Hie Impartial Transition
The government appears to seek a tight control on the transitional process 
by refusing to place it in the hands of a body other than the PNDC’s own 
NCD. Keeping the details of the transitional programme unspecified
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provides the government with maximum room for political manoeuvre and 
an ability to call the shots, and thereby confuse its opponents. It can always 
be made to appear that the government was doing something to return the 
country to consttutional rule. Yet it is also evident that the transitional 
process is being controlled to ensure that the PNDC reproduces itself - in 
terms of policies and personnel in the next constitution and government, 
respectively, and to secure an indemnity for its actions.
Politics of Altruism
Ail this is altruistic. The leSsons from Ghanaian political history, especially 
the bitter political conflicts in the years immediately before the country 
became independent and the political turmoil that engulfed the country in 
late 1970s - notably during the Union Government debacle - have created 
a lasting impression on the PNDC and its functionaries of the possibilities 
entailed in the transition from an authoritarian to a liberal political order. 
The fragility of liberal political transitions has been further underscored, 
in recent years, by the political upheavals that have occurred in Eastern and 
Central Europe, (e.g. Poland, Bulgaria, Romania, Albania the Soviet Union 
etc) and in parts of Africa (eg. Cote I’voire, Benin, Togo, Mali, Cameroon 
etc.) In many of these cases, the transitional process has been accompanied 
by, or engendered, a revival of ethnic sub-nationalism, irredentism and 
other old animosities. The PNDC seems therefore to be acting to protect 
itself against such occurrences.
Furthermore, against the background of the economic decline and 
stagnation of the years preceding the Economic Recovery Programme, the 
government can claim some cred it for the im provem ents in the 
management of the economy. The increase in the production of export 
commodities, increases in producer prices, increased external assistance, 
rehabilitation of infrastructure etc. have created a strong temptation within 
the PNDC to entrench the regime that has presided over these economic 
improvements, and to ensure their continuation in the next republic. Hence 
the dem and by some pro-governm ent bodies that the S tructural 
Adjustment Programme or a version of it be written into the next 
constitution.
The PNDC has further insisted that it must entrench probity, 
accountability and other tenets of the June 4 1979 political and social 
upheavals in the next constitution and republic. But the operationalisation 
and practice of such precepts have remained rather vague and altruistic. 
Furthermore, the government has asserted a need to deepen democracy 
in Ghana by enhancing opportunities for mass participation in national 
decision-making. The inclusion of the CDRs, blue-collar occupational
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groups and guilds (butchers, hairdressers, drinking bar operators etc) in 
the Consultative Assembly may be seen as an attempt to increase the range 
of organisations and groups able to participate in the political process and 
to weaken the dom inance of G hanaian politics by the G hanaian 
establishment. However, the control imperative has given rise to a 
perception among many articulate Ghanaians and oppostion elements that 
the management of the transitional process has been unfair. Such feeling 
has encouraged scepticism over the PNDCs commitment to an impartial 
political transition.
Conclusion
The inconsistencies, biases and uncertainties which characterise the 
transitional process threaten to make the transition rather conflictful and 
to deny legitimacy to its outcome or outcomes. Therefore, it may be 
necessary for the PNDC to give as much attention to concerns of civil 
society in general and opposition elements in particular for equity and 
fairness as has been given to the government’s need for controlling the 
process. It is difficult to see how else a peaceful transition to a stable and 
constitutional rule can take place.
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CHAPTER 5
PRELUDE TO CONSTITUTIONAL RULE: 
AN ASSESSMENT OF THE PROCESS
Kwame Boafo-Arthur
Introduction
Ghana has had two transitions from military to civilian or constitutional 
administration. The first was in 1969 when the National Liberation Council 
(NLC) handed over power to the democratically elected government of the 
Progress Party (PP) led by Dr. Kofi Abrefa Busia. The second instance was 
in 1979 when the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC) which was 
under the chairmanship of Fit. Lt. Rawlings handed over power to the 
government of the People’s National Party (PNP) under the leadership of 
Dr. Hilla Limann. Incidentally, the AFRC itself seized power from the 
Supreme Military Council (SMC) which had then initiated a return to 
civilian rule.
It is a sad commentary on the politics of the nation that none of the 
regimes that succeeded the military completed its term of office. They were 
all jettisoned  from power by the military under various pretexts. 
Paradoxically, the ruling Provisional National Defence Council (PNDC) 
seized power from the very government to which it had handed over power.
It is almost ten years now since the PNDC seized power. In spite of 
notable achievements in its efforts to revive the national economy, the 
important issue of when it should hand over power to a constitutional 
authority has not been subjected to serious debate until quite recently. For 
reasons which will be briefly discussed below, encouraging signals have 
emerged and a process has been initiated to return the country to 
constitutional rule.
Under the auspices of the National Commission for Democracy (NCD), 
the government has organized regional sem inars on the evolving 
democratic process. The NCD report on the outcome of the seminars was 
submitted to the government in March (1991). A Committee of Experts 
on Constitutions has also been constituted to make proposals for the 
consideration of a Consultative Assembly. To all intents and purposes, 
therefore, the government has set in motion a process for a transition to 
constitutional government. It must be underscored, however, that these are 
being done against the background of uncertainties as to the real motives
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or intentions of the government. The crux of the matter is that the PNDC 
has not as yet committed itself to a definite, irrevocable and binding 
timetable or programme for a return to constitutional rule. This situation 
and the manner in which the process is being undertaken has generated 
mistrust and misgivings among some people. In fact, by the initial conduct 
of the NCD, the fairness of the whole exercise has been called into question. 
The mode of its organization has not only alienated a significant and 
articulate sections of the society. It has also engendered suspicion, distrust 
and apathy in some cases. The key question is whether the PNDC is being 
fair in its efforts to return the country to constitutional rule.
This paper is concerned with the first stage in the transition process, 
that is, the regional seminars and the issues arising after that. The paper is 
in four parts. Part I examines the dilemma that faces the PNDC 
government in the transition process. Part II is a critique of the way the 
regional seminars were organized; while Part III draws attention to some 
pitfalls in the constitution-making process. The final part provides a 
conclusion and some suggestions.
Dilemmas of the Constitution
There is no gainsaying the fact that every military regime wishing to 
disengage is immediately faced with very complex problems. These 
disengagement ‘blues’, to a large extent, account for the rarity of military 
transitions to constitutional rule.
Claude E. Welch argues that military withdrawal from politics is 
underpinned by two main factors. First, a strong desire on the part of the 
military to hand over power to civilians; and second, popular civilian 
agitations for a return to constitutional government. The first factor — 
voluntary withdrawal — is rare because of the problems of disengagement. 
For our purpose, the question raised by this option is whether the PNDC’s 
decision to transfer power to a constitutional government is voluntary or 
not.
In most cases, transitions from military to civilian rule is dictated by the 
second factor; that is, civilian agitation for a change. However, the two 
factors are complementary. Indisputably, the general mood of a nation, 
openly and dispassionately expressed, can set limits on the prerogatives of 
any government. Agitations by citizens, no matter the form they take, can 
affect the military’s desire to divest itself of political responsibilities. 
Recent events in Liberia, Somalia, Zaire, Ethiopia, Togo, and Ghana under 
the SMC are very good pointers.
The PNDC’s decision to transfer power was not immune to such 
pressures For example, there have been feeble but persistent calls by the
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Ghana Bar Association (GBA) on the PNDC to return the country to 
constitutional rule. Similar pronouncements on the same issue have come 
from the Christian Council, the Ashanti Youth Association, the National 
Union of Ghana Students (NUGS), the Democratic League of Ghana, 
Kwame Nkrumah Revolutionary Guards (KNRG), etc. These calls were 
not backed by any sustained public agitations (reminiscent of the UNIGOV 
era)strong enough to compel the PNDC to concede the need to usher in 
constitutional rule.
An element in the current transitional process syndrome which was not 
present in earlier instances in the country is the pressure from the external 
environment. The nature of global interdependence and the enervating 
structural dependence of most Third World countries on the western world 
enable Western powers to exert influence on the processes of not only 
military transitions, but generally the system of governance in the Third 
World countries. A clear example is the persistent calls by African leaders 
on the West not to lift sanctions imposed on apartheid South Africa. It is 
because the West is presumed to be capable of influencing the mode of 
governance through sanctions and other means that the calls are always 
directed at them. In fact, what used to be covert external policies - aimed 
at effecting changes in the system of governance in most developing 
countries - are now being openly canvassed by the western world. A case 
in point is the current rumblings in certain quarters that external assistance 
should be linked to a recipient government’s commitment to generally 
acceptable democratic forms and norms of government. Sub-Saharan 
Africa (SSA) is a net recipient of external aid. Since most SSA countries 
are under military, quasi-military or civillian dictatorships, they are highly 
vulnerable to such external pressures.
Even though the PNDC has officially denied coming under any form 
of external pressure, the revolutionary leadership’s initial aversion to a 
return to constitutional rule makes the denial questionable. I would 
therefore argue that a combination of the three factors outlined above 
underpin the politics of transition currently unfolding in the country.
One should also not forget the potential demonstration effect of current 
changes elsewhere in Africa on events in the country. In short, the current 
spate of agitation on the African political scene against authoritarian 
regimes provides objective lessons for other political leaders.
Whether the transition to constitutional rule is voluntary or not, its 
speed will, nevertheless, be dictated by the pace at which the ruling 
government finds solutions to the dilemmas inherent in the decision to 
withdraw from politics. A military government must, among other things, 
be clear on the ‘scope of its political objectives’ and the ‘relative “fit” with
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successor groups.’ It is trite, in this regard, to state that the presence of a 
group of acceptable successor politicians hastened the withdrawal of the 
NLC from the political scene. More important, however, was the desire of 
that government to keep faith with the people by fulfilling its pledge made, 
four days after seizing political power, to withdraw from politics. The junta 
was emphatic on its desire to hand over power to a duly constituted civilian 
government as soon as possible. Plans for the promulgation of a 
constitution, ‘in which the sovereign powers of the state will be firmly and 
judiciously shared between the principal organs of the state...’ were also 
announced. It declared its commitment also to the conduct of genuine and 
fair elections.
Similarly, the AFRC whose chairman was Flt.Lt. Rawlings gave 
unqualified assurance that the election campaigns for the June 18, 1979 
elections which were then in progress would continue, and power would be 
handed to a civilian government as planned. In the circumstances of 1979, 
even though a successor group was not assured, the transfer of power was 
imperative. The process towards a return to civilian rule was too far 
advanced to be aborted; and clearly any deviation by the AFRC from the 
process would have engendered a more serious opposition than what had 
paved the way for the junta’s seizure of power.
These precedents stand in sharp contrast with the PNDC’s position. It 
is remarkable that the PNDC did not make any explicit pledge to return the 
country to civilian rule when it seized power. It seems to me that this was 
due to the circumstances surrounding Rawlings’ second intervention and 
the motive behind it. He termed it a revolution which aimed at the 
transformation of the socio-economic and political conditions of the 
country. The problem is that a time frame cannot be set on a revolution 
because there will always be social contradictions that will call for radical 
solutions. Thus, from the outset, the PNDC wanted to rule in perpetuity. It 
is evident that the PNDC’s flirtation with constitutional rule is the result of 
multiple pressures, the holding of the district level elections was the first 
indication of a conversion to it.
The most difficult problem confronting the government is the role of 
the army in the Fourth Republic. With the military’s assumption of civilian 
responsibilities for the umpteenth time and its politicisation through the 
activities of the Committees for the Defence of the Revolution (CDRs), 
the military can no longer be apolitical or ignored as a force. Nobody 
knows for sure to what extent the military’s vaunted professionalism, 
discipline and command structure, which were dented on account of the 
events of 1979 and 1981-82, have been restored. The fact is, if military 
solidarity and discipline are suspect, then any precipitate transition to
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civilian rule will pose problems for both the outgoing and the incoming 
governments. In our peculiar situation where the military command 
structure appears to have been brutalized by frequent military insurrections 
led by very junior officers and men, the portents are ominous. Many 
questions therefore arise: how should the highly politicised army be treated 
when the PNDC makes its exit? Is the army prepared to accept its 
traditional role in society? How can the commitment of the security forces 
to the disengagement process be assured? These are some of the puzzling 
questions the PNDC government must be grappling with in its late effort 
to withdraw from politics. For the incoming government the portents are 
equally disquieting if these issues are not satisfactorily addressed 
beforehand.
These concerns are compounded by the view within the military that 
they are marginalised in the decision-making process when civilians are in 
power. Chairman Rawlings has contributed to this thinking. For example, 
in his maiden broadcast to the nation following his seizure of power in 1981, 
he stated: T h e  military is not in to take over. We simply want to be a part o f 
the decision making process in the country. ’ (My emphasis.) He re-stated this 
in January 1991 when he asserted that;
...the security services must be seen as a part of the larger community
and not relegated to some artificial vacuum.
Given the history of military interventions in the civilian administration 
of the country, these statements could be taken as a summary of the 
corporate expectations of the military. It implies that the military wants to 
abandon its traditional role because it seeks a direct say in the government 
of this country. The current attempts to find a viable system of government 
must not lose sight of this hidden agenda of the military.
The Regional Seminars
On 1 July 1990, the NCD in conjunction with the Ministry of Local 
Government announced plans for the holding of regional seminars under 
the theme, ‘The District Assemblies and the Evolving Democractic 
Process.’ The major aim of the seminars, as implied by the theme, was to 
discuss the place and role of the District Assemblies (DAs) in the 
democratic process.
As a major step in the transition process, the mode of organization of 
the seminars was flawed. First, the generality of the people did not know 
the sort of democratic process that was assumed to be evolving apart from
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the familiar DAs, contrary to what was done in the case of Unigov under 
General Acheampong. In fact, since the motivating factor for the seminars 
was to provide a platform for the assessment of the DAs, other issues crucial 
to the survival of any future civilian government were perfunctorily dealt 
with. The Chairman of the PNDC’s opening address at the first seminar at 
Sunyani on 5 July, 1990 did not clarify the situation either. Throughout his 
address, Chairman Rawlings did not indicate that the seminars were meant 
to raise a debate on the modalities for a return to constitutionalism. In line 
with its theme, the Chairman of the PNDC and, in fact, many Ghanaians 
saw the seminars only as an evaluation of the DAs. That the seminars 
metamorphosed into a debate on the future governance of this country was 
due to external and internal pressures as well as the government’s desire to 
give its end-product some form of respectability.
Second, since the main focus was on the relevance of the DAs to 
grassroots governance, weightier issues of national concern received little 
attention. The worse offenders were the representatives of the DAs. Most 
of their submissions were mere exercises in self-glorification and support 
of the government’s position that the DAs should be the basis of a national 
representative body.
Third, the mode of presentation at the seminars was questionable as it 
did not conform to democratic norms, even of the ‘grassroots’ type. The 
debates were deliberately restricted to individuals and groups that 
espoused the official positions on the future system of governance as 
purveyed by the PNDC. As portrayed by the title and contents of the 
Chairman’s address at the first seminar held at Sunyani on 5 July , 1990, 
those who were officially expected to attend the seminars were the 
presiding members and assemblymen and women, district secretaries, 
CDRs and other revolutionary cadres.
Admittedly, sofne known opponents of government positions had the 
chance to make presentations; but these were few because of the 
restrictions on participation. Obstacles were consciously placed in the way 
of those suspected of having contrary views to those of the PNDC and to 
what the future system of government should be. Attempts were made in 
some cases to either prevent or edit the presentations of distrustful 
elements. A case in point was the seizure of papers to be presented by 
NUGS in Kumasi by security personnel on the grounds that they were 
seditious. The fact that the NUGS’ papers were returned after scrutiny did 
not allay the fears of those who had reasons to doubt the government’s 
sincerity in the whole exercise. It is equally remarkable that the forum was 
policed in such a way as to intimidate non-government supporters. The
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presence of high level government officials and the fact that the whole 
exercise was organised under the auspices of the NCD, whose chairman is 
the Deputy Chairman of the PNDC, also impugned its impartiality.
Finally, the existence of certain obnoxious laws on the statute books - 
such as the Newspaper Licensing Law, 1989, (PNDCL 211), and the 
Preventive Custody Law, 1982 (PNDCL 4) gagged Ghanaians. PNDCL 
211, for example, gives unlimited powers to the government over the 
printing, publishing and circulation of any newspaper in the country. This 
law nailed the coffin of notable newspapers such as the Catholic Standard 
and the Legon Observer. For, even though these papers were forced to stop 
publication soon after the coup of 31 December, 1981, any hopes of the 
proprietors to revive publication were put to rest by PNDCL 211.
Under PNDCL 4 any person could be arrested and detained in ‘the 
interest of national security.’ What constitutes a threat to the national 
interest or security is not defined by the law. It implies that its application 
was mostly dictated by what those in authority defined as acts serious 
enough to undermine the security of government. Since the government 
could justify the arrest and detention of any individual, the law effectively 
stifled opposition to the government. Most articulate Ghanaians chose to 
live by ‘the culture of silence.’ In the light of the foregoing, the position of 
the government that it has given an open forum for fair and free discussions 
on the political future of this country is contentious. The fact that the 
seminars Iraversed the regions is not an indication of its fairness.
To compound these, the utterances of government functionaries do not 
engender confidence in current politics. Indirectly, some of these 
utterances remind some people of the existence of PNDCL 4 and the 
potentially adverse implications of their actions. Directly they inhibit the 
free expression of views and ideas; they create fear, and engender suspicion 
and mistrust. Two examples will suffice. Quite recently, Brigadier Akafia, 
the Army Commander, made the following intimidating statement while 
addressing officers and men of the Ghana army:
The transformation process (embarked upon by the PNDC) has a vision 
and the armed forces, as part of the security services, the bedrock of the 
process are prepared to defend it.. A n y  provocations and temptations o f  the 
PNDC are provocations and temptations o f the Armed Forces. (My 
emphasis.)
One may infer from this that the PNDC and the armed forces are
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synonymous. The implications of such a linkage or equation are simply 
dangerous. In another instance, the Force Sergeant Major, Warrant Officer 
Class One, Isaac Frimpong ,declared that no disgruntled politicians have 
the right to tell the PNDC to hand over power.
It is apparent that the inalienable rights of Ghanaians to criticise and 
determine their government are under siege. The government operates on 
the spread of fear; and many Ghanaians are inhibited by it. Many 
Ghanaians have not forgotten the hubbub that followed the Dr. J.B. 
Danquah Memorial Lectures which were delivered in 1988 by Professor A. 
Adu Boahen. The former Army Commander and member of the PNDC, 
General Arnold Quainoo, rained insults on the eminent guest lecturer for 
speaking his mind, and threatened that there would be conflagration in the 
country if the ruling government was not left in peace. In another vein, the 
state-owned newspapers spent weeks editorialising on what was supposed 
to be the ‘sins’ of Professor Adu Boahen.
Towards a New Constitution
The next important phase in the process was the appointment of a 
Committee of Constitutional Experts to make proposals based on the NCD 
rep o rt subm itted  in M arch, and the 1957, 1960, 1969, and 1979 
constitutions. At the time of presenting this paper, the committee which, 
according to the law establishing it (PNDCL 253), was to submit its 
proposals to the government on 2 July , 1991 has had its duration extended 
to 31 July, 1991 because of the volume of work confronting it. The 
proposals it was expected to submit were to be commented upon by the 
governm ent before being sent to the C onsultative Assem bly for 
consideration. As the paper by Dr. E. Gyimah- Boadi in this volume 
indicates, the composition of the Consultative Assembly has added to the 
mistrust of government intentions by a significant and informed segment of 
the Ghanaian populace. No wonder the Ghana Bar Association and the 
National Union of Ghana Students have refused to send representatives to 
the Consultative Assembly.
Like the organisation of the seminars, there was nothing to indicate that 
members of the Consultative Assembly would be free to express themselves 
in a manner deemed fit. The Consultative Assembly Law, 1991 (PNDCL 
253), does not grant total immunity to the members. Whereas article 14 (1) 
and (2) grants some form of immunity as was accorded parliamentarians 
before 31 D ecem ber, 1981, sub-section (3) states that nothing in 
sub-sections (1) and (2)
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...shall be deem ed to relieve any person from any action or 
proceedings to which he would otherwise have been liable if this 
section had not been enacted, in respect of anything said or done by 
him against the Head of State and Chairman of Council or any 
member of the Council or a PNDC Secretary.
It is clear that no member can safely criticise the deeds or actions of any 
PNDC member or Secretary during the deliberations of the Consultative 
Assembly.
Conclusion
We have to stress that nation-building is an onerous task, especially in a 
country like ours which has stagnated economically for many years. The 
PNDC therefore deserves commendation for its modest achievements in 
the area of economic development. At the same time, it must not pretend 
to be oblivious of the pitfalls along the way to constitutional government.
The fears harboured by the military of its being marginalised by civilian 
governments can be assuaged. One way out is to extend the democratic 
right to engage in politics to all military personnel; so that those who would 
like to engage in partisan politics should simply resign from active service 
or commission in order to do so.
Of course, the panacea for military coups generally is good government. 
Nevertheless, the major source of fear for those who wish to see a politically 
stable country is the spectre that the military now regards coups as the 
quickest way to economic paradise or self-aggrandisement. Hence, no 
amount of good government is likely to prevent the ambitious soldier from 
interferring in the civilian administration of the country. What we need is 
a strong political culture that can resist such unwarranted interventions 
mainly through spontaneous and protracted acts of civil disobedience.
Disdain of those with opposing views will not help the country. A 
gagged opposition is like an active vulcano which has become dormant. 
When it suddenly erupts, it brings massive destruction in its trail. The 
PNDC is capable of preventing this by making sincere efforts to remove 
seeds of mistrust which have been sown over the years.
Suggestions
In order to keep faith with the people of Ghana, the following suggestions 
are offered for consideration: (i) an unambiguous time table for a return to 
constitutional rule must be announced; (ii) the government and its
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functionaries should stop the practice of making intimidating statements;
(iii) existing laws which violate the norms of democratic government and 
undermine the fundamental rights of Ghanaians must be replaced without 
further delay; (iv) the government and its functionaries, as well as those 
with opposing viewpoints must demonstrate mutual tolerance in order to 
create a conducive political atmosphere for fruitful dialogue and a peaceful 
transition.
Surely, the government has a clear advantage over other groups, 
organised or not; because it can employ state resources to suppress other 
forms of opposition. The deliberate and determined deployment of these 
resources against other groups will not engender confidence in the 
transition process. Nor will it enhance peace and democracy. The PNDC 
has to lift the ban on party politics, stop the harassment of those with 
contrary views and allow other groups like the Movement for Freedom and 
Justice (MFJ) access to the media if it is sincerely commited to transition 
to a democratic government. In the same vein, those with opposing views 
must find an acceptable means of putting their cases across and avoid 
provocation and innuendos. The task ahead is enormous. It is fairness, 
sincerity and openness in politics that can secure a stable and democratic 
future for our country.
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CHAPTER 6
THE POLITICS OF GHANA’S SEARCH 
FOR A DEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTIONAL ORDER 
1957-1991
A. Essuman-Johnson
The Colonial Legacy
On 6 March, 1957, Ghana became independent from Britain after a six-year 
period of dyarchy in which the Convention People’s Party (CPP) and 
Nkrumah shared power with the British from 1951 to 1957. That was one 
of the periods in which the British were said to be tutoring Africans to take 
over and run the political institutions they had set up. This tutoring runs 
through the history of all British colonies when the British, as part of the 
crown colony system of administration, set up legislative and executive 
councils. The learning processes started in the legislative council where 
Africans were first nominated to serve. Later, Africans were nominated to 
the executive council until it assumed cabinet status, and members were 
chosen from the majority party in parliament.
The participation of Africans in the political institutions established by 
the British was considered to offer the Africans some training in how to run 
the British parliamentary system of government. That system operates on 
political parties; and the party that wins the majority of seats in a general 
election forms the government with the leader of the majority party 
becoming the Prime Minister. The party with the next largest number of 
seats in parliament becomes the opposition party; and its leader becomes 
the opposition leader. The opposition party forms the shadow cabinet, and 
together with the other parties in the opposition offer constructive 
criticisms of the way the ruling party handles the affairs of the state. The 
opposition, as it were, puts the government on its toes, thereby ensuring 
that the government does not get away with bad government. It is this sytem 
of government that Ghana inherited from the British at independence. This 
sytem of government and the practices that go with it were embodied in the 
Independence Constitution of 1957. It was a constitution that aimed at 
democratic rule along British traditions which the Ghanaian politicians 
who took over from the British at independence were supposed to have
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learnt during the period of colonial rule; and they were expected to operate 
the system successfully.
The hopes and aspirations of the makers of the Independence 
Constitution, namely, that Ghana would follow in the British political 
tradition of constitutional-democratic politics, have been dashed over the 
past 34 years of independence during which the country has been searching 
for a dem ocratic-constitutional order appropriate to the G hanaian 
tradition. Whether Ghana will succeed in this search is yet to be seen. It 
is the politics of this search that this paper examines, with a view to assessing 
the current search led by the Provisional National Defence Council 
(PNDC).
The Search: A Periodisation
One may identify three periods since independence during which Ghana 
has been searching for a system of government different from that inherited 
from the British. The first was the Nkrumah period, 1957-1966, when the 
search culminated in the one-party system in 1964. The second was the Kutu 
Acheampong era, 1972-1979, when a non-party system of government 
called Union Government was advocated by the Supreme Military Council 
(SMC I). The third is the PNDC period which started from 31 December, 
1981. In this period the country is said to be going through a revolution, and 
there is talk of ‘participatory democracy’ and ‘power to the people.’
The Nkrumah Search
Questions about the inherited British traditions were soon to come into 
sharp focus after independence. According to Dennis Austin, the 1957 
constitution had rested on the assumption that it was possible for the major 
political parties to co-operate with one another within mutually acceptable 
limits. But, as he put it: ‘It was on this basis... that it foundered, for 
compromise required caution and prudence - qualities essential to the 1957 
constitution if it was to function effectively. The reasons for its failure were 
... a profound dislike by Nkrumah of any open criticism of his rule, the 
nationalist zeal of a recently formed People’s Party which sought to identify 
itself with the state and the rash behaviour of the opposition which 
supported every group and cause that it thought might overthrow the 
government.’ And within six months of independence, the CPP had begun 
to repeat the argument that since the party’s opponents were ‘violent, 
waspish and malignant’ there was need for a ‘temporary benevolent 
dictatorship.’ On the basis of arguments of this kind, the CPP leaders began 
to augment and consolidate the power of the party by whatever means they
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could devise. For their part - in the face of such pressures - the opposition 
hastened to support every outbreak of discontent with CPP rule, confident 
of bringing about its downfall. It was a disastrous policy for the simple 
reason that the ruling party was far better placed and armed for an all-out 
struggle with the opposition.
The CPP and Nkrumah thus adopted certain measures to deal with the 
opposition. First, the Avoidance of Discrimination Act was passed in 
December 1957 which forbade the existence of parties on a regional, tribal, 
or religious basis. Pressure also began to be exerted through the use of 
administrative powers to regulate the status and functions of chiefs and 
their state councils. Pro-opposition chiefs were destooled, while pro-CPP 
candidates were enstooled as chiefs. Other measures sought to centralise 
the authority of the government which involved the systematic dismantling 
of the 1957 constitution. Steps were taken to abolish the Regional 
Assemblies and by March 1959, the Constitution (Amendment) Act had 
abolished the Regional Assemblies. Other measures were taken against 
individual members of the opposition by use of a succession of repressive 
acts, namely, the Deportation Act of August 1957, the Emergency Powers 
Act of December 1957, and the Preventive Detention Act (PDA) of 1958 
under which it was possible to detain a person for five years (without trial) 
for conduct allegedly prejudicial to the security and defence of the state 
and its foreign relations.
These measures eroded the understandings and the spirit of the 
inherited British political system. It will be recalled that the system 
required the acknowledgement of the need for opposition by the ruling 
party and the need for the opposition to adopt a constitutional way of 
removing the government from power. In the light of this situation, the stage 
was set for the inherited British parliamentary system of government to be 
thrown overboard. First, a new constitution was promulgated for the 
country in the form of the 1960 Republican Constitution which attempted 
to weld features of the British, American, French and African political 
traditions. From 1962, there existed a de facto one-party system in the 
country, given the fact that either members of the opposition had been 
enticed to cross the carpet to join the ruling CPP, or had gone into exile, or 
had been detained. It came as no surprise that the 1964 Constitutional 
Amendment made the CPP the only legal party in the country. One 
argument, among others, for the one-party sytem was that, given the 
development needs of the country, there was need for all hands to be on 
deck. From 1962, Nkrumah embarked on building a socialist state.
This left the CPP torn apart between the ‘socialists’ and the ‘old 
commrades in arms’. With no opposition, dissenting views were treated
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with scorn, and stifled through the use of the PDA. For example, a 
prominent CPP member of Parliament, Mr. P.K.K. Quaidoo, was detained 
for his critical views. The opposition made assassination attempts on 
Nkrumah’s life and embarked on campaigns outside the country against the 
government in order to bring it down. The story of the events culminating 
in the fall of Nkrumah and the CPP is too well known to be repeated here.
With the downfall of the Nkrumah regime went Ghana’s first search for 
an alternative political system to the British parliamentary system. That 
search was ended by the first incursion of the Ghana military into Ghanaian 
politics on 24February, 1966. The aims of the National Liberation Council 
(NLC), among others, was to restore the democratic order inherited from 
the British. The NLC supervised a restoration of civilian rule, and in 1969 
a democratic-constitutional order was established. Under the 1969 
constitution, the country was returned to the parliamentary traditions of 
the British. The opponents of the CPP since 1951 now came to power as 
the Progress Party (PP) government led by Dr. K.A. Busia. However, some 
of the PP government’s own supporters soon began to cast doubts on its 
ability to maintain the traditions of the British parliamentary system of 
government. The regime soon struck at the very heart of the system - the 
rule of law - with the infamous ‘no court’ speech by the Prime Minister in 
which he flatly refused to accept the judgment of the Supreme Court on the 
E.K. Sallah affair. In a similar vein the speed with which the Trades Union 
Congress (TUC) was dissolved by the PP government smacked of the 
regime’s fear of opposition from the workers’ front.
The Second Search
This attempt at going back to the British parliamentary political system was 
short-lived, and on 13 February, 1972, the Ghana military reasserted itself 
in Ghanaian politics. The new military regime argued that the PP 
government had led the country into an economic mess, and it was 
necessary to put things right. It was this military regime, the Supreme 
Military Council (SMC I) under Col. I.K. Acheampong, which led the 
country on a second attempt at searching for a new system of government. 
That was in 1976 when the SMC made an attempt to move away from the 
Westminster system. The SMC proposed a novel system of government it 
called Union Government (Unigov). This was a plea for a non-party system 
of government which would unite the military, police and civilians in 
politics. It was an attempt to fashion a system of government without 
opposition, which, it was spuriously argued, was demanded by Ghana’s 
political tradition - very much like Nkrumah’s one-party system. The SMC 
had its own supporters - especially the chiefs and some politicians; but it
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was obvious that the majority of Ghanaians - especially the professional 
bodies and students - were opposed to it. It has to be pointed out that 
despite the SMC government’s efforts at selling Unigov to Ghanaians, it 
allowed those opposed to the proposal to campaign against it; and the 
students as well as the professional bodies did campaign against it. When 
the proposal was put to popular vote in the referendum, it was by all 
accounts rejected. A further military action on June 4,1979, raised issues 
not only about politicians and corruption but also about the basis of politics 
in a Westminster sotting. The June 4 military action was short-lived as the 
A rm ed  F o rces  R evo lu tio n ary  C ouncil (A F R C ) was fo rced  by 
circumstances to supervise a transition to constitutional rule in September 
1979.
The 1979 Constitution returned the country to a third civilian attempt 
at democratic-constitutional rule. And during the Third Republic, an 
attempt was made to run an American type of presidential political system. 
But it is arguable that the People’s National Party (PNP) was ill-prepared 
to run such a system. Perhaps one might argue that the political, 
institutional framework was right; but the people who operated the system 
did not have what it takes the Americans, for example, to make their system 
work. It would seem that politics in the third Republic was mainly about 
how to make money out of the system: those who financed the PNP to win 
the 1979 elections were out to recoup their investment. Apparently, a great 
many of the politicians had lost their way.
The Third Search
The Third Republic, like the Second, was short-lived. It lasted from 24 
September, 1979 to 31 December, 1981. On 31 December, 1981, there was 
another coup led by Fit. Lt. J J .  Rawlings (who had been retired from the 
armed forces by the PNP government). The PNDC has been in power since 
then. For a priod of time, the PNDC government has mainly been 
concerned with reforming the national economy with the assistance of the 
World Bank, the IMF, and Western donor countries. The government has 
thus far made some headway in this effort, although at great cost to the 
country. The cost has been two-fold: socio-economic and political. The 
socio-economic cost is summed up in the PNDC’s own Programme of 
Action to Mitigate the Social Cost of Adjustment (PAMSCAD). However, 
it is the second cost - the political - that this paper is concerned with. 
Briefly, the current attempt to return the country to constitutional rule 
constitutes what may be called a programme of action to mitigate the 
political cost of adjustment (PAMPCAD). To the extent that one can talk 
of some economic'recovery, it has been at a great political cost to the
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country. That is to say, economic recovery has been at the expense of 
political freedom and political recovery. And it may be argued that it was 
the absence of a political democratisation process that has induced the 
PNDC to embark on a search for a new political order for the country.
Since the PNDC forcibly took over power, it has been talking of leading 
the country through a revolution to a new political order. It is clear that 
the regime wants to lead the country to a new political system the nature of 
which is not, however, clear. To the extent that the PNDC has come 
anywhere near what the CPP and the SMC proposed, that is to say, 
one-party socialist state and Unigov respectively, its philosphy of a new 
form of political system’ for G hana revolves around what it calls 
‘participatory dem ocracy’ or ‘power to the people’ or ‘grassroots 
democracy.’ The government has not been sufficiently transparent in its 
search for a new democratic order. Despite this, the regime seems to want 
Ghana to adopt a non-party system of government as exemplified by the 
mode of election to the District Assemblies. The District Assemblies are, 
however, novel only in the sense that elections to the assemblies were held 
on a non-party basis with the state footing the cost of the campaigns. But 
local government has been with this country since the colonial era, and 
various attempts have been made to reform it. Owing to its belief in the 
non-party system of government, the regime did not allow any opposition 
group to contest the elections to the District Assemblies.
The problem of what should follow the establishment of the district 
assemblies stared the PNDC in the face; and little wonder it took the 
government some time to make its next move in the search for a new 
political system. Such a move came in the form of the regional seminars 
held under the auspices of the National Commission for Democracy (NCD) 
and the Ministries of Local Government and Information. Given the way 
the regional seminars were conducted, it would seem that the government 
was uncomfortable about the issue of the return to party politics, especially 
in view of the comments of some government functionaries against party 
politics at some of the seminars. The point is, even though the PNDC itself 
did not openly propose a non-party system of government at these seminars, 
nearly all the District Assemblies in their proposals advocated a non-party 
system for the country, and the way some supporters went about the whole 
business was very reminiscent of the Unigov days. The regional seminars, 
therefore, degenerated into a party vrs non-party debate, with the PNDC 
officially keeping quiet over the issue.
The NCD Report and Government Reaction
On 25 March , 1991, the NCD presented its report on ‘Evolving a True 
Democracy,’ whidh is a summary of the NCD’s work towards the
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establishment of a new democratic order, to the PNDC. On the crucial 
issue of what national political institutions should be established next after 
the District Assemblies, the report summarises the conclusions of the 
regional seminars as follows:
(a) a clear consensus on the District Assembly concept.
(b) a consensus on a National Assembly and an Executive Presidency
(c) a division of opinion on whether entry into the National Assembly 
should be through the District Assembly or through the direct 
election system
(d) a divergence of views on whether the new constitutional order 
should be partisan or non-partisan.
The NCD report thus left the crucial decision regarding a return to 
party politics to the PNDC to decide. In a statement on the NDC’s report, 
the PNDC accepted the various views expressed as the embodiment of the 
aspirations of Ghanaians on the future constitutional order. The statement 
went on further to indicate that: ‘The Constitutional proposals will make 
provisions for freedom of association, inlcuding the formation of political 
parties.’ The statement also indicated the government’s decision to set up 
a Committee of Constitutional Experts to formulate a new constitution for 
the country. Furtherm ore, the PNDC has outlined an ambiguous 
transitional programme. A part from the Committee of Experts, a 
Consultative Assembly is in the process of being formed to discuss the 
proposals of the former. The Consultative Assembly’s new Constitution will 
be presented to the PNDC, and then put to popular vote in a referendum. 
However, the government has so far refused to set an unambiguous time 
table for a return to constitutional rule as the Nigerian military authorities 
have done.
While this has set Ghanaians wondering, a further twist has been added 
to this rather nebulous transitional process. This consists in the remarks 
attributed to the PNDC Chairman, Flt.Lt. J J .  Rawlings, that he still has 
his personal misgivings about party politics in view of the danger of its 
misuse. He is reported to have said: ‘I have my reservations and doubts but 
I am bound by the collective decision of my colleagues.’ Taking the two 
issues together, that is to say, the lack of a clear-cut timetable of transition 
to constitutional rule and the remarks of Flt.Lt. J.J. Rawlings, the present 
writer is of the view that the search for a new constitutional order in the 
Fourth Republic might well be still-born. There is no guarantee that those 
who are opposed to partisan politics will not try to make things difficult. It
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is obvious that the PNDC Chairman prefers a non-party system. If the 
PNDC Chairman is being only bound by a collective decision but has gone 
public about his reservations, then he should not be expected to be a part 
of a party political system; but he has not given any hint that he is ready to 
bow out of the political scene.
People are operating under the assumption that the PNDC is under 
pressure to steer the course of the transition to constitutional rule, given 
the wind of democratisation blowing all over Africa. But one does not see 
any massive pressure in the country on the PNDC, if one compares the 
current situation to the kind of internal pressure mounted against the 
Acheampong Union Government proposition in 1976-1979. At best, one 
might speak of pressure from outside the country, mainly from the Western 
donor group that has been the mainstay of the PNDC’s economic recovery 
programme. Nothing prevents the PNDC from stage-managing the 
transition to legitimise its rule as a result of its unwillingness to allow the 
opposition to operate freely. If the PNDC chairman changes his mind 
about party politics, then the PNDC and the CDRS will in all probability 
transform themselves into a party to contest elections to the Fourth 
Republic. If that turns out to be the case, there is a good chance that the 
PNDC-led party will win the elections; in which case the opposition to the 
PNDC-led party and government will only have begun. On the other hand, 
if the PNDC decides to step down, then it will have to negotiate its exit. But 
this regime, unlike the NLC, does not appear to have a political group it is 
willing to hand over to. That is, a group that will assure the PNDC that no 
questions will be raised about its ten years or so in power. It is this that 
makes the process of transition rather uncertain.
Conclusion
In conclusion, this writer is of the view that the search for a new 
constitutional order is far from over. If the PNDC is interested in forming 
a party, then it has to allow an interim administration to oversee the 
transition to constitutional rule. But the signs do not point in that direction. 
It would be a great act of statesmanship if the PNDC would follow the 
example of the AFRC. Then, and then only, would it have the moral 
authority to supervise the transition to a new constitutional order. On the 
other hand, if the PNDC chairman, Flt.Lt. Jerry John Rawlings, succeeds 
in legitimising himself in the style of Mobutu, Eyadema, Kerekou and 
Mengistu, then the country might well not have seen the dawn of the era of 
democratic constitutional rule, in which governments would come and go,
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while, the constitution endures - as the experience of India shows. It is not 
yet certain whether Ghana will turn out to be the India of Africa.
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CHAPTER 7
OBSTACLES TO AN ORDERLY TRANSITION 
TO CONSTITUTIONAL RULE UNDER THE PNDC
Gilbert K. Bhiwey
Introduction
In general, the notion of a transition to constitutional rule implies that there 
has been a period - no matter how long or short -in the life of a nation when 
government was in the hands of a group that ruled on an ad hoc, or 
provisional basis and which period is about to be replaced by a formal 
constitutional order. In particular, the idea of a transition to constitutional 
rule is associated with the process whereby a military regime abdicates 
power to a successor civilian government through a carefully planned and 
systematically executed programme of military disengagement from the 
political arena.
In the circumstances of contemporary Ghana, this scenario began with 
the successful overthrow of a constitutional regime on 31 D ecem ber, 1981 
by a combined group of military and civilian dissidents. The group then 
inaugurated the Provisional National Defence Council (PNDC) which has 
since then ruled Ghana. At its inception, the PNDC proclaimed an 
undefined revolution, implying that it has come to stay permanently. 
Consequently, it moved quickly to set up a number of institutions and 
structures - under the name of revolutionary organs - meant to carry out its 
policies as well as to perpetuate its rule. The first of these structures were 
the Defence Committees which were of two types: the Workers Defence 
Committees (WDCs) and the People’s Defence Committee (PDCs). The 
defence committees were to be part of the decision-making process. 
(These have been renamed the Committees for the Defence of the 
Revolution - CDRs.). O ther im portant structures were: the Public 
Tribunals, the National Investigation Committee (NIC), the Citizen’s 
Vetting Committee (CVC), the National Youth Organising Commission, 
the Student Thsk Force and the 31st December Women’s Movement. 
Professor A.A. Boahen, that intrepid defender of constitutional rule in 
Ghana, wrote that ‘They were envisaged as the institutions of radical 
change, or as instruments for popular participation, political education,
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channels of communication to and from the leadership, and political 
control, and they were regarded as the basis for the future revolutionary 
party that was to be formed.’
In spite of this unmistakable resolve to maintain a permanent hold over 
the nation, the PNDC began to explore the possibilities of a transition to 
constitutional rule around the middle of 1987. It has since last December 
taken a number of steps which could be interpreted as a commitment to a 
transition to constitutional rule. However, unlike its predecessor military 
regimes (for example the National Liberation Council - NLC - and the 
Armed Forces Revolutionary Council - AFRC), the PNDC has stubbornly 
refused to declare its neutrality from the envisaged contest between rival 
political groups for the succession. Indeed, the signals since December last 
year are that the PNDC is resolved to succeed itself. This posture clearly 
runs counter to the expectations of Ghanaians because it is obviously 
inconsistent with their political experience. In the two previous transitions, 
a constitution was promulgated after due consultation with the people; 
elections were held on multi-party basis and the duly elected party was 
inducted into office. Again, in neither case was the incumbent military 
government an interested party in the elections. The PNDC has thus 
become the basic obstacle to an orderly transition.
Preparation to Succeed Self
It is, perhaps, imperative that the evidence for the conclusion that the 
PNDC is resolved to succeed itself be laid bare if only to keep the records 
straight. The PNDC chairman’s New Year address to soldiers at the Elwak 
Stadium is the first pointer to this resolve. In that address, the chairman 
queried whether it was just to deny a person his/her constitutional right to 
seek public office simply because that person happened to be a citizen in 
uniform. Between January and early June this year, the PNDC chairman, 
and other high-ranking functionaries of the government embarked upon 
high profile tours of the country, making speeches and exhibiting such 
common touch as would leave no doubt that they were on the campaign 
trail. At the same time, the only declared anti-PNDC group in the country, 
the Movement for Freedom and Justice (MFJ) could not secure a hall for 
which it had paid to hold a press conference because of ‘orders from above.’ 
Secondly, Mr. Kodjo Tsikata, the PNDC member responsible for 
security had issued a dire warning to presumed opponents of the PNDC in 
a speech to a gathering of CDR representatives in Cape Coast on 24 March, 
1991. Among other things, he said: ‘There is a tide of speculation on the 
country’s political future with some people whistling and whispering in the 
dark... No one should imagine that the developments of the past nine years
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can be wished away simply as a bad dream and that there will be a return 
to business as usual.’ This point was reiterated in almost the same words 
by a certain Mr. Of eng Boateng in one of the June 4 Memorial Lectures 
organised this year in selected regional capitals, and which were given wide 
coverage by the national television, radio and state-owned newspapers. 
There had also been numerous CDR rallies particularly in the Ashanti, 
Brong-Ahafo and Western Regions at which Nana Akuoku Sarpong, 
Paramount Chief of Agogo and PNDC Secretary for the Interior had been 
the principal speaker lauding the ‘great achievements’ of the PNDC.
These are, however, not entirely new developments. As far back as 
February 1986, Professor A.A. Boahen had drawn attention to them in his 
J.B. Danquah Memorial Lectures of that year. Said he: T he  PNDC is 
using all sorts of means and tactics to form a political party and thereby 
legalise and perpetuate itself. This business of wives of PNDC members 
gallivanting and forming movements and of numerous organisers 
establishing CDRs, militias, mobisquads, etc. at public expense is palpably 
deceitful and unfair and should be stopped.’ The escalation of campaign 
activities is therefore a sure preparation for a PNDC government in 
constitutional/civilian clothes.
The PNDC’s resolve to succeed itself has been manifested in other, less 
subtle ways. First, the entire transition process has been tailored to suit 
PNDC perceptions of the nature of politics and the modes of political 
participation in Ghana. The PNDC began by organising ‘open’ seminars 
at the various regional centres to discover modalities for ‘establishing true 
democracy5 in Ghana. It commissioned another state organ, the National 
Commission for Democracy (NCD), to compile a report which was then 
handed to a ‘Committee of Experts’ whose mandate was to produce a draft 
proposal for a constitution. Instead of a Constituent Assembly, the PNDC 
has decided to submit the draft constitution to a Consultative Assembly 
which would review the draft and produce a Final version to be ratified in a 
referendum. Enlightened experience in this country, as indeed in all 
democracies, is that an elected constituent assembly produce the final 
version of the constitution which is then promulgated without amendment 
by the incumbent regime. The fear of the public was that by designating 
the body which would deliberate on a draft constitution for the country, 
‘consultative,’ the PNDC has reserved to itself the prerogative to say the 
last word on the content of the next constitution for the country.
But more disturbing is the compositon of the assembly which leaves the 
impression on the public mind that the constitution would resemble those 
of the moribund people’s democracies of the defunct Mandst-Leninist 
world of pre-perestroika eastern Europe. These have given rise to
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widespread distrust of the intentions of the PNDC in enlightened circles in 
Ghana.
Another way in which the PNDC is either deliberately or inadventently 
sowing the seeds of instab ility  in the tran sitio n  p rocess is the 
encouragement it continues to give the military, police and civil service 
personnel of all ranks to denounce publicly the cherished tradition of 
political neutrality. There is, to hand, enough reason for us to be anxious 
about whether or not the military, police and civil service would submit to 
civilian authority after a decade of pre-eminence in public affairs. In this 
regard, we are reminded of the failure of the Progress Party to hold the 
reins of authority over the stubborn resistance of the three establishments, 
which accounts for that government’s overthrow by the military in less than 
three years of its inception. Thus, to keep hammering on the pre-eminence 
of these personnel in public affairs on the eve of the transition, is to prepare 
the ground for the early demise of the new order.
Finally, the PNDC has been the source of the widespread belief in 
alleged difficulties in the operation of democracy in Ghana. In a bid to 
legitimise what it considers to be ‘true democracy,’ the PNDC has distorted 
political concepts and maligned democratic political institutions and 
practice in the public mind. The result is that one can hardly distinguish 
between what is a genuine representative government fashioned through 
democratic processes for democratic politics, and what is a caricature of 
the ideal.
It is these facts, coupled with the rigid press censorship in force and the 
retention of special decrees that intimidate the public that leave no doubt 
that the PNDC wishes not only to succeed itself, but also to do so through 
patently undemocratic means.
Politics of Self-Preservation
But why would the PNDC wish to succeed itself at all costs? The answer 
is as simple as it is obvious. The imperative is the personal safety of the 
members of the PhfDC along with those of their militant adherents in the 
post-transition era. The PNDC had dealt out brutal revolutionary justice 
to several Ghanaians so that on the eve of its abdication of power, the fear 
of restitution has obviously gripped its leadership. For example, the PNDC 
which claims affinity with the AFRC, which had executed several former 
public officials or imprisoned them for abuse of public office, has not been 
able to ensure that its members and top operatives declare their assets. The 
country is naturally rife with rumours about the illegally acquired wealth of 
some government revolutionaries. Certainly, the thought that they might 
be subjected to the same type of swift justice should be a matter of concern 
to them.
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A second source of fear is the fate of the revolutionary cadres in 
post-PNDC Ghana. Some members of the revolutionary organs which have 
been instrumental yi the perpetration of the PNDC’s rule are not likely to 
feel secure under any future regime other than the PNDC because any new 
set of elected leaders are likely to be under pressure to avenge certain 
exceses perpetrated against individuals and groups in the hey days of the 
PNDC revolution. It is likely that such cadres, who have been trained in 
Cuba, Libya and Bulgaria in sophisticated security operations, may strike 
at their leaders before they could be sacrificed. All these dangers, should 
be averted  by securing the m etam orphosis of the PND C into a 
constitutional regime of sorts. Indeed the logic of self-preservation is the 
application of undemocratic means to exercise or remain in power.
Conclusion and Recommendations
The problems and dilemmas confronting the PNDC are of its own making. 
They emanate from its Machiavellian view of politics, and hence the 
reliance on crude, authoritarian and short-cut methods to resolve political 
issues. As such they are not insurmountable. I wish therefore to suggest 
the following solutions for the consideration of the PNDC, the consultative 
assembly and the people of Ghana as a whole:
First, the PNDC should resolve to disengage absolutely from the 
political arena before the end of the transition. This will not only give 
credibility to the transition but will also reduce the level of acrimony 
engendered by its clandestine methods of politics. The PNDC must accept 
that a decade in office in a country’s history is enough - especially where it 
did not come to power on the consent of the people; it is not given to any 
man or group either to immortalise itself, or arrogate to itself the right to 
solve all the problems of society. Indeed, Professor Adu Boahen was 
absolutely right in saying that the PNDC has outlived its usefulness because 
it has apparently run out of ideas.
A pre-condition for this is the removal of all repressive and 
self-preserving decrees which would inhibit the free play of ideas in the 
country. There should be free and unfettered access to the public media 
as well as the freedom of journalists to publish any piece of information 
for public consumption subject only to the ethics of their profession and of 
the law.
Thirdly, the Consultative Assembly should address the issue of the 
rehabilitation of the personnel of all the revolutionary organs. It should be 
recalled that at the termination of the first Republic, the personnel of the 
Ghana Young Pioneer Movement, the W orkers’ Brigade, the CPP 
bureaucracy and the staff, students and graduates of the Kwame Nkrumah
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Ideological Institute were callously thrown into the streets. At the collapse 
of the Second Republic, more hands were laid idle from parliament, the 
bureaucracies of the various political parties and from the National Youth 
Service Corps. In time, all these crystalised into a solid army of idle hands 
and hungry mouths which every military dictator since 1972 has used to 
obstruct our political development. We should therefore be instructed by 
the adverse social and political impact of those actions. Mr. Kodjo 
Tsikata’s instruction referred to earlier, is that such cannot be the case again 
because this time, the cadres are armed. I should urge, therefore, that the 
security imperatives of the PNDC and our national security concerns 
should find common cause in the rehabilitation of the revolutionary cadres. 
In this regard, a rehabilitation (retraining, re-education and absorption into 
regular employment, programme, should be initiated as part of the 
progress. This would ensure that the new administration is not saddled with 
a dirty job it cannot do tidily.
Finally, the consultative assembly should further address the issues of 
military, police and civil service neutrality in politics and administration 
along with the more thorny issue of barracks life in post-PNDC Ghana. 
Certainly, the doctrine of active military, police and civil service 
partisanship is a recipe for instability, and requires serious attention.
In addressing the issue of barracks life in the post-PNDC era, we should 
be reminded that the failure of past transition programmes to deal with this 
issue contributed to the abrupt curtailment of the tenure of the two 
successor regimes. In both instances, it was naively assumed that once the 
military retired to barracks, the lure of the perquisites of political office 
would also give way to a renewed longing for military professionalism. It 
would certainly be in the national interest to draw a lesson from 
Acheampong’s ‘few social amenities’ coup.
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Part III
PAST DOCUMENTS, TEXTS AND 
EXPERIENCES AS A MODEL
CHAPTER 8 
A ‘DEVELOPMENT-ORIENTED’ CONSTITUTION?
J.S. Pepera (Mrs)
Introduction
The focus of this paper has been suggested by a number of statements made 
by members of the Provisional National Defence Council (PNDC), with 
regard to Ghana’s proposed return to constitutional rule and issues of 
economic management. These statements seem to suggest at least a desire 
on the part of the government to work into the future constitution, 
provisions that would ensure a continuation of Ghana’s present economic 
direction. This, of course, raises a number of questions in the area of 
constitutionalism and politics. How detailed should constitutions be? 
How comprehensive should statements of economic principle be? Is it 
possible, or even desirable, to make constitutional provisions out of 
economic policies? Should particular policies or institutions, developed 
without open debate and consideration, become part of the founding 
document of a new and supposedly open democratic order? And so on...
This paper, however, remains a constitutional feasibility study. That is, 
I have not made any attem pt to evaluate the PN D C ’s economic 
m anagem ent, or to  suggest alternative econom ic paths. I have 
concentrated on source documents - specifically the 1979 Constitution, the 
Report of the National Commission for Democracy (NCD), and the White 
Paper of May 10 on ‘Evolving True Democracy5 - and relevant supporting 
texts, in an attempt to put some flesh on what I believe to be an important 
element in the government’s thinking on the next constitutional order.
A ‘Development-Oriented* Constitution ?
The title of this papier is borrowed from an article, which appeared in the 
Legon Observer of 6 April,1979. It would seem that Ghana and the 
Department of Political Science were then engaged in a similar exercise . 
In the first paragraph of that article, the Observer’s Correspondent 
mentions a proposal ascribed to Mr. Cameron Duodo, regarding the share 
of cocoa revenues accruing to farmers as an illustration of ideas being 
mooted at that time about a ’development-oriented’ Constitution.
69
If I understand the term correctly, it refers to an attempt to include 
edicts of an economic nature in what has traditionally been regarded 
as a political document. I would readily acknowledge that it is difficult 
to imagine how a constitution can promote development; but it can 
certainly define a policy framework that would prevent the economy 
from being run to the ground as it was after 1974.
The Correspondent then goes on to outline a number of proposals to ensure 
fiscal and monetary prudence on behalf of future governments, which were 
to be included in the Constitution not for their intrinsically ’developmental’ 
nature, but because first
the Constituent Assembly is more likely than the next (or any) 
government to enshrine such constraining (although prudent) 
measures; and second that Constitutional Amendments are more 
difficult to usher in than amendments to Acts.
A classic exposition of politics and constitutionalism! And, as I have it on 
the best possible authority that ’the Correspodent’ in this case was none 
other than Professor K.G. Folson, one might be forgiven for asking what 
further there is to say on the matter! I believe that what Professor Folson 
had to say in 1979 was perfectly valid, as far as the canons of ’liberal 
democracy’ go.
In a seminar paper presented at the Departmental Workshop in August 
1980, on The Financial Provisions of the Constitution of the Third Republic, 
Prof. Folson describes the 1979 Constitution as being, from the financial 
point of view, ‘in the mainstream of twentieth-century constitutionalism.’ 
He then goes on to critically analyse the Constitution against three 
‘well-tested principles’:
first, that in its financial behaviour the government is responsible to 
the people’s representatives; secondly, that the national accounts are 
well kept; and thirdly, that certain institutions which are expected to 
be ‘independent’ of the government enjoy some financial ‘autonomy’.
On the whole, the 1979 Constitution seemed to meet most of the challenges 
of Prof. Folson’s evaluation, as an instrument fashioned to, and capable of 
ensuring a more responsible and accountable system of public finance, as 
well as the independence of certain institutions regarded as necessary for 
the maintenance of freedom. But, the 1979 Constitution did not ensue from 
what I will call the ideological background of ‘radical developmentalism.’ 
It th e re fo re  ad d ressed  itse lf to the p reven tion  of the fu rth e r 
‘institutionalisation of economic crisis,’ rather than to the promotion of that
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radical social, structural, and economic transformation which provides the 
opportunities for improving the human condition, in an environment of 
equity and security, that is the current general understanding of the term 
’development’.
I believe that when the Chairman of the PNDC, Flt-Lt. J J .  Ralwings, in a 
speech at Sunyani in July 1990 talks of the need to build ‘a viable economy 
capable of providing basic necessities affordable by the people and 
suggests that it is
thoughtless to speak about political reforms without paying attention 
to the economic justice that will make such reforms meaningful;
and when the NCD in its Report of March 1991 states that
there is no political democracy without economic democracy, and 
until economic democracy, grounded in principles of resource 
generation and equitable distribution is guaranteed. There can be no 
real democracy;
then they are speaking from a markedly different perspective to that of the 
framers of the 1979 Constitution.
Furthermore, I believe that when the Chairman of the PNDC, Flt.-Lt. 
J J .  Rawlings, in his Sunyani speech propounds
the need for a national consensus about the economy; a consensus 
which will be the basis upon which the economy will have to be built 
in the future by every administration
any of which may come and go, but the health of the economy and its 
progression will have to remain the same; and the Secretary for Finance 
and Economic Planning, Dr. Kwesi Botchwey, assures a special meeting of 
businessmen in Paris, as reported in the 3-9 June issue of West Africa,
that the basic thrust of the ERP would be safeguarded in any future 
constitution since the gains of the ERP have made the evolution of a 
more viable political and economic development of the country 
possible;
then they are indicating the inclusion of something more than the systemic 
and systematic fiscal ’checks and balances’ usually built into constitutions 
based on the Western liberal tradition.
Of course, I do not believe that when the Secretary for Finance and 
Economic Planning, Dr. Kwesi Botchwey goes to a donor conference in 
Paris, or anywhere else for that matter, it would be prudent for him to
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suggest anything other than continuity and stability in the political life of 
the nation: you cannot go to the international community and say please 
give me US$800 million to pursue a particular course which I cannot 
guarantee will be the p referred  choice of the nation’s preferred  
government, perhaps from two years hence.’ It, however,seems to me that 
there is quite a major leap from this latter position to the virtually 
unqualified guarantees outlined in the Secretary’s recent press and 
television statements. But perhaps he knows something about the nation’s 
future preferred government than we do.
Looking Back and Looking Forward
From my reading of the debate on the financial/economic aspects of the 
1979 Constitution, it seems that the main emphases were on fiscal and 
monetary prudence, and the financial independence of certain key 
in s t i tu t io n s  - th e  J u d ic ia ry , th e  E le c to ra l  C o m m issio n , th e  
Auditor-General’s Department, the Press Commission, the Ombudsman, 
among others.
Looking at the text of the document itself, under the Directive 
Principles of State Policy, Article 8 (i) and (ii), outline the ’Objectives of 
Economic Policy.’ Article 8 (ii) rather diffidently requires the government 
to present to Parliament, within eighteen months, a programme to
ensu re  the p rom otion  of p lan n ed  and b alanced  econom ic 
development including planned and co-ordinated agricultural and 
industrial programmes at all levels and in all the Regions of Ghana.
The next constitution-type text available for examination is the 
Provisional National Defence Council (Establishment) Proclamation 
(Supplementary and Consequential Provisions) Law, 1982 - PNDC Law 42. 
Contained in the Directive Principles of State Policy is the language of 
radical developmentalism. A rticle 1 clearly states the ideological 
persuasions of the PNDC, although it does not specify the specific 
economic measures to be adopted in order to achieve the stated objectives. 
Of course, shortly after PNDC Law 42, the government embarked upon 
what has been described by a colleague, K. Jonah, as ‘the closest and 
perhaps longest the period of collaboration between the Fund (IMF) and 
any one regime in Ghana’s history.’
I have already quoted an extract from the NCD Report, ‘Evolving a 
True Democracy’. Scattered throughout its pages are references to 
economic democracy, decentralisation and local accountability, balanced 
development between the rural and urban areas, and equitable resource
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distribution. Notwithstanding all this, in Chapter 6, ‘Concluding 
Remarks,’ the NCD states:
Though economic issues are not the direct purview of the NCD, they 
form such an intrinsic part of the development of a true democracy 
that we should be failing in our duty if we do not mention some of the 
landmarks of the Economic Recovery Programme (ERP).
There then follows a discussion of these landmarks which presumably may 
or may not become entrenched aspects of the new constitution: ’growth’ 
levels of 3%-4%, massive subventions from the international donor 
community, exchange rate and trade liberalisation, diversification into the 
mining and timber industries,infrastructural rehabilitation, reform of 
public sector finance and investment programmes, anti-inflationary 
money-supply meaures, state divestiture, etc.
In its statement on the NCD’s Report, the government did not feel that 
the NCD had gone far enough in this area, and therefore took pains to 
further elaborate on PNDC thinking as in the People's Daily Graphic, of 11 
May, 1991.
There is no doubt that the continued improvement of the national 
economy is a necessity for ensuring the stability of the new 
constitutional order. There can also be no doubt that the modest but 
important gains that have been made in the economy would need to 
be consolidated and the directions of the Economic Recovery 
Programme continued to enable further improvements to be made in 
the lives of the ordinary people. Accordingly, the pertinent issues 
relating to the national economy and measures to sustain and enhance 
it will be placed before the Consultative Assembly for deliberation.
The government’s statement naming the appointed membership of the 
Committee of Experts also stated that the committee would look at 
proposals to ‘ensure participatory democracy and the sound management 
of the national economy.’ This, I believe, has put the matter firmly and 
definitely on the agenda of the constitutional debate. What is to be done? 
Having provided t ie  historical genesis of the issue, I would like to explore 
some of the ideas and concepts which, I believe, have informed it.
I do not entirely share the cynical viewpoint that much of what is being 
proposed and debated presupposes the transformation of the PNDC into 
the first government of the new constitutional order, although the PNDC 
should perhaps see the Ortega experience as a cautionary tale, the 
argument being that since there is no transitional government, and the 
parameters of the debate are being established by the PNDC, there is bound
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to be a certain bias in the proposals, discussions, and possibly even in the 
outcome, which reflects the advantage of incumbency. If this indeed is the 
case, then there really is little more to be said or done in the whole matter.
Neither do I entirely share the view that the PNDC has begun to accept 
unthinkingly the praises of the international community with regard to the 
manner in which the ERP has been established and pursued over the years, 
no matter how seductive those praises may seem. Nethertheless, there 
seems to be a high degree of confidence in the ERP on the part of the 
government that I presume has something to do with a continuing belief 
that the ERP will in the future deliver the economic benefits and 
development, for which certain sections of the population have sacrificed 
their present.
If I were to embrace either of the above positions, I might just as well 
have ended the discussion earlier by accepting Prof. Folson’s enunciation 
of the view widely held in academic and intellectual circles that constitutions 
cannot, and indeed should not, be ’development-oriented.’ But this, too, is 
a view I do not entirely share.
This argument has developed over the last thirty or so years.lt grew out 
of the debate on the priority to be given to social and economic rights, in 
relation to the traditional civil liberties. In the early sixties, the issue was 
viewed as rather zero-sum. In a nutshell, the debate distilled down to 
whether it was possible to grant civil and political liberties, at the same time 
as nations were pursuing rapid social and economic development. What 
we have seen over the years since independence in Africa is an emphasis 
placed by politicians and African scholars on the priority of social and 
economic rights, at the expense, if  not to the total exclusion, of what are 
traditionally understood to be civil and political rights, in the interest of 
economic development. I actually found the late president, Colonel 
Acheampong, quoted by Prof. Shivji in a study on human rights as espousing 
what has been disparagingly called the ‘full-belly thesis’ of rights. As 
Acheampong had it:
One man, one vote, is meaningless unless accompanied by the
principle of ‘one man, one bread.’
Lately, as the promise of development under the largely undemocratic 
systems that have pertained in Africa has remained unfulfilled, increasing 
numbers of Africans themselves are challenging the line that other Africans 
had so convincingly sold a quarter century ago. The outgoing Chairman of 
the OAU, President Yoweri Museveni, has charged us to look at this issue 
again from the perspective that the attainment of development begins and 
ends with the guarantee of our fundamental human rights. Professor Shiyji 
in the study already mentioned seems totally condemnatory of
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the ideology of developmentalism which has been the hallmark of 
African states since independence in rationalising the depoliticisation 
and demobilisation of the African masses...
Yet, instinctively, perhaps even sentimentally, one does not want to 
throw the baby out with the bath water. If indeed some radical social, 
structural, and economic transformation which provides the opportunities 
for improving the human condition, in an environment of equality and 
security, is an acceptable definition of the current usage of the term 
‘development,’ then surely this is a concept that we should all want any 
future constitutional arrangement to em body.
My final question then simply put is ‘how do we ensure this?’
Back to the ‘Development-Oriented’ Constitution
It seems quite obvious to me that if there is to be free and open debate on 
the future constitutional arrangements, then any attempt to entrench or 
even enshrine too specific policies will probably lead to a breakdown in the 
current consultative process. Much, if not most, of the PNDC’s economic 
policy is fiercely opposed by groups from the right to the left of Ghana’s 
political spectrum. So spelling it all out is not the way forward.
Furthermore, I have to agree with John Dunn, in his essay on political 
representation, that
it would be quite unreasonable to anticipate that the cognitive grasp 
of the dynamics of the world or domestic economy enjoyed by the 
populace at large will prove systematically superior to that of their 
past or present African rulers, and correspondingly unreasonable to 
expect formulations of economic policy to improve merely because of 
a strenghtening of the system of political representation.
Although, I would add that I believe this to be equally applicable to 
those recently labelled ‘newly-emergent democracies’ of Eastern Europe, 
even to the Soviet Union. So increased popular participation, of itself, will 
not secure our objectives.
I wish to add that neither will the further proliferation of charges such 
as ‘acts tending to subvert the economy of Ghana,’ and ‘economic sabotage,’ 
nor the concurrent strengthening of parallel institutions such as the 
Economic Crimes Bureau, Citizen Vetting Committee (CVC), National 
Investigations Committee (NIC), with their tendency towards arbitrariness 
and non-accountability, ensure the attainment of our objectives. I believe 
that a ‘development-oriented’ constitution can be framed, if we address 
ourselves to the question of how we attain and maintain the quality of
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government - using the term in its widest sense - over time, so that the 
administration of our economy will promote rather than hamper the 
development of the human condition of our citizens.
Some Preliminary Recommendations
(i) All the checks and balances of the 1979 Constitution to counter
the strength of familial and other pressures on public servants
should be adcf^ted.
(ii) T here  should be a com m itted  decen tra lisa tion  with the
appropriate allocation of human and financial resources to
p ro m o te  au tonom ous local governm en t ra th e r  than  local 
administration - perhaps the allocation of a set percentage of the 
national budget for this purpose, as in the new Nigerian Constitution.
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CHAPTER 9
THE MONOPOLISATION AND MANIPULATION 
OF THE CONSTITUTION-MAKING PROCESS 
IN GHANA
Kwesi Jonah
Introduction
Since 1960 it has become an established political ritual for Ghana to fashion 
a new constitution approximately every decade. With philosophical 
calmness, Ghanaians have accepted this onerous political burden imposed 
on them by the notorious instability of their political system.
With feverish preparations under way to return the country to 
constitutional rule, the germane question which should engage our 
attention is not the speculative one of what type of constitution we are likely 
to have. What is important now is: Are procedures being adopted likely to 
result in a constitutional document which all Ghanaians can identify with 
and whole-heartedly embrace as their own? This paper attempts to answer 
this question by arguing that almost all military regimes have monopolised 
and manipulated constitution-making in Ghana through the adoption of 
techniques which exclude significant sections of the political public from 
participating in the process.
An erroneous impression which seems to have gained ground within 
certain influential political circles is that, how a constitution is arrived at is 
not as important as the constitution itself. But the making of a constitution 
is a national, and not a partisan or sectarian task which requires the 
participation of broad sections of the people. How a constitution is made 
is essential to its legitimacy. Constitution-making offers a unique practical 
opportunity for the dem ocratic participation of different political, 
economic and social interests in an important national political project. 
The way a constitution is made can secure essential political compromises 
between opposed political interests, eliminate mutual suspicions, and instil 
confidence in each other. If handled with care, tact and statesmanship, the 
process can result in a constitution that every citizen can defend with pride.
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Conflictual Origins
Post-colonial constitutions of Ghana are mainly (though not exclusively) 
the products of political conflicts that originate from dissatisfaction with 
military regimes. Political conflicts that precede the birth of a new 
constitution in Ghana are invariably a question of the legitimacy of a 
military regime. The central issues revolve around whether or not a military 
regime has acquired and used state power in ways approved by the majority 
of the people and for how long it should continue in office. The typical 
scenario is that a civilian government under the control of a political party 
would have been overthrown by the military. After the initial euphoria that 
has greeted the military take-over, the legitimacy of the regime is 
questioned by sections of the population, usually the most politically 
articulate.
To prevent its political opponents in general and the overthrown party 
in particular from coming to power in any form to take political vengeance, 
the military regime accedes to pressures for constitutional rule but devises 
every means to manipulate the process of transition to advantage. The main 
motive is either to install a friendly successor regime or at least one that 
would not be hostile and vindictive. However, if conditions were 
favourable, the regime would rather perpetuate its hold on state power by 
going through the necessary constitutional motions to legitimise its rule.
The Constitution-Making Process
Legally-minded students of constitutions have reduced to two, the broad 
stages through which the constitution-making process should pass. The 
first stage includes everything that results in a draft constitution being 
considered by a constituent assembly. The second stage includes 
everything that results in the approval or promulgation of the constitution 
after it has been drafted. To determine the views of the population on the 
type of constitution that would be suitable for the country, a constitutional 
commission is usually appointed to tour the country to collect evidence and 
receive memoranda. Collection and collation of views can also be done by 
a body other than the constitutional commission, whose role in that case is 
restricted to the production of a draft constitution. Some regimes combine 
the two functions* and assign them to one body - the constitutional 
commission.
The first stage of fashioning a new constitution is deemed completed 
after the draft constitution, submitted through the government to the 
constituent assembly, has been fully debated and dully amended. The
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constitution is then ready for promulgation. The constitution becomes the 
basic law of the land when it is promulgated either indirectly by a truly 
representative constituent assembly or directly by the people at a 
referendum.
Techniques of Manipulation
The basic technique which military governments have employed to gain 
monopoly control, over the making of a constitution is through the 
determination, and chopping up into pieces, of the constitution-making 
process by appointing a constitutional commission of experts and public 
figures to tour the country, collect views, and draft a constitution.
Some regimes break up the process and appoint an independent 
committee or government agency, in the first place, before a constitutional 
commission is appointed. Separating the stages offers enormous 
advantages to government. Government supporters are organised to 
appear before the committee or agency to present the views of ‘Ghanaians’ 
on the future constitution. Opponents of government or ‘enemies of the 
people’ are not encouraged to appear before this committee with contrary 
views or are actually stopped by direct and indirect threats and 
intimidation.
Splitting the stages also enables the military government to determine 
with absolute certain ty  the precise functions it should give to a 
constitutional commission. Furthermore, the report compiled by the 
earlier committee or agency becomes one of the main working documents 
of the constitutional commission. The appointment of the ad hoc 
Committee on Union Government and the regional fora organised by the 
National Commission for Democracy (NCD) on Ghana’s political future 
furnish excellent examples of this technique.
A political myth which military governments try to inculcate into the 
popular consciousness of G hanaians is that the m em bership of 
constitutional commissions consists of experts and notables whose work is 
guided solely by the national interest. This is not the case. To keep the 
constitution-making process under their firm control, military regimes 
appoint ‘experts and personalities’ who are broadly supportive of the 
government’s ideological and political line. The chairm an of the 
constitutional commission appointed by the National Liberation Council 
(NLC) in 1966 was also the former chairman of the government’s political 
advisory committee. Other members were largely NLC supporters. 
Members of the overthrown Convention People’s Party (CPP) regime were 
purposively excluded. In 1978 the constitutional commission appointed by
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the Supreme Military Council (SMC II) included such powerful Union 
Government advocates as the Editor of the People’s Evening News.
Even constituent assemblies are not immune to government infiltration 
and control; for military regimes always appoint their own nominees to 
them, and their representatives often constitute a significant proportion of 
total membership. Assemblies have three categories of members: local 
government or district representatives; representatives elected by other 
bodies; and government nominees. Governments have a political leeway in 
determining what proportion of assembly members should be constituted 
by each category. In this way, military governments are able to strengthen 
their hold on the making of the constitution as the following table indicates:
COMPOSITION OF CONSTITUENT/CONSULTATIVE
ASSEMBLIES IN GHANA
1968 1978 1991
Districts 49(33%) 64(53%) 117(45%)
Other Bodies 91(65%) 2(30.7) 121(46.5%)
Gov’t Nominees 10(6%) 32(24.3%) 22(8.5%)
Total 150(100%) 140(100%) 260(100%)
Sources: (a) Constituent Assembly Decree 1968 NLCD 222.
(b) Constituent Assembly Decree 1978 SMCD 203.
(c) Consultative Assembly Law, 1991 PNDCL 253.
Bodies to be represented, the number of representatives per body, and 
the total number of representatives in the assembly remain the discretion 
of military regimes which thereby derive a certain political leverage in the 
work of the assembly. Pro-govemment bodies and groups that are either 
not politically opposed to the government or are at least amenable to the 
government’s political prodding may be given a greater representation. In 
1968 and 1978 no body had more than one or two representatives. The 
Consultative Assembly law today has provided for five groups with ten 
representatives each while others have three or four and the majority have 
one.
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For m ilitary regim es, appointing politically and ideologically 
like-minded individuals to constitutional commissions and constituent 
assemblies is not enough. In addition, the commissions are given specific 
functions from which it is virtually impossible to deviate. Though all 
constitutional commissions produce draft constitutions, their terms of 
reference differ markedly from each other. The function of each 
commission is to produce a constitution broadly compatible with the 
ideological and political objectives of the regime appointing it. Therefore 
no two constitutional commissions have exactly the same functions or do 
exactly the same job.
The constitutional commission of 1966 was charged with drafting a 
constitution which would ensure separation of powers and individual 
freedoms ‘consistent with state security public order and morality.’ The 
commission was free to visit all parts of Ghana to ascertain the wishes of all 
sections of Ghanaians on the question of what type of constitution would 
be suitable for Ghana. The constitutional commission of 1978 was assigned 
the duty to produce a constitution that would ‘ensure that representation 
... shall not be based on membership of political parties.’ The constitution 
was further to guarantee to Ghanaians only those ‘fundamental human 
rights enshrined in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights’ and 
nothing more. No provision was made under the law for the commission 
to tour the country and find out the views of Ghanaians on non-party 
representation. The PNDC has directed the committee of constitutional 
experts to design a constitution which, among other things, will provide for 
a popularly elected executive president and a prime minister with 
parliamentary majority.
Ghanaian governments also gain an indirect control over the political 
transition and constitution-making through their near-total control over the 
media of communication - radio, television and the print media. The 
concrete situation varies from regime to regime but state control has 
ensured that only (or mainly) the official view on national political issues 
or officially approved views can be heard by the public. Other views are 
quietly ignored or shunted aside.
A more general control over the constitution-making process and 
transitional politics derives from the absolute monopoly by military regimes 
of all state institutions. Police and other security agencies will arrest with 
glee an opponent of the regime for even a mild criticism. They dare not 
touch a member of government even for a serious traffic offence. This and 
general disregard for human rights and civil liberties do not conduce to free 
and full participation by all citizens in the constitution-making process and 
transitional politics in general.
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Conclusion and Recommendations
We conclude, therefore, that virtually every military government has 
managed the constitution-making process in such a way as to exclude some 
sections of our people from participation. Instead of a democratic national 
exercise involving all sections of Ghanaians, governments have tried to keep 
constitution-making in their tight grip. A national political project which 
should have been turned into a practical example of democratic political 
participation has become an exercise in mutual distrust and acrimony.
Critical appraisal of current preparations towards constitutional rule 
does not suggest that attempts are being made to move away from past 
techniques and p ractices of m anipulating and m onopolising the 
constitution-making process and transitional politics. First, the collection 
of views on the country’s political future was kept under the strict control 
of the government dominated NCD. Secondly, in principle, all Ghanaians 
were free to participate in the regional fora: but in practice their doors 
were not adequately open to organisations, groups and individuals whose 
political views were fundamentally opposed to those of government.
Thirdly, without any opportunity to tour all parts of the country to 
receive independently the views of all sections of Ghanaians on the 
country’s future constitution, the committee of constitutional experts could 
be unduly influenced by the NCD report. Fourthly, the consultative 
assembly seems to be unnecessarily overloaded with pro-government 
bodies and organisations, and will therefore not be a truly representative 
assembly. Finally, the absence of a free press tends to restrict the 
opportunity for free comment and public debate on current political 
processes.
Urgent steps should therefore be taken to ensure that the present 
constitution-making process results in a true national consensus on the 
country’s political destiny and that a constitution is produced that is viable 
and durable. To do this,
(i) there is the need for a more equitable representation in the 
consultative assembly;
(ii) restrictions on the operation of a free press should be removed 
without delay;
(iii) organisations opposed to the government should be given the 
freedom to hold public meetings;
(iv) known opponents of the government should be fully involved in 
all stages of the making of the constitution; and
(v) a more conscious effort should be made by government to remove 
all obstacles to the full enjoyment of civil liberties in Ghana now.
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CHAPTER 10
THE DISTRICT ASSEMBLIES, LOCAL 
GOVERNMENT AND PARTICIPATION
Joseph R.A. Ayee
Introduction
The establishment .of the District Assemblies (DAs) is justified by the 
Provisional National Defence Council (PNDC) on the grounds that the 
D A s will p ro m o te  p o p u la r p a r tic ip a tio n  in the  p lan n in g  and 
implementation of development policies and programmes in the districts. 
For instance, paragraph 1.7 of the ‘Blue Book’ states that ‘the establishment 
of the District Assemblies is an important step in the PNDC’s programme 
of evolving national political authority through democratic process’; and 
in the National Commission for Democracy Report it is stated that ‘the new 
local government system constitutes a fulfillment of the commitment made 
by the PNDC to involve the ordinary people in the process of taking 
decisions that affect their daily lives.’ Thus to the PNDC, local democracy 
becomes a necessary condition for national democracy. For the same 
reason, the powers and functions conferred on the DAs also reflect those 
of local government units. The Assemblies, for instance, are responsible 
for (i) the overall development of the districts; (ii) the formulation of 
progrmmes and strategies for the effective mobilization and utilization of 
the human, physical, financial and other resources; and (iii) the promotion 
and support of productive activity and social development and the removal 
of all obstacles to initiative in the process of attaining this goal. For the 
efficient performance of their functions, twenty-two decentralised 
departments were created and placed under the control of the DAs. In the 
light of the foregoing, one may say that the DAs were established to function 
as local government units and to promote popular participation. In other 
words, there is a link between the DAs as local government units and their 
role as promoters of popular participation.
Our aim in this paper is to consider some of the theoretical problems 
in linking local government to popular participation. The argument of this 
paper is that although popular participation is frequently a guiding 
principle behind the introduction of a local government system, it should 
not be identified with local government.
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The paper begins by exploring the concepts of local government and 
popular participation. This is followed by a discussion of the participative 
elements of local government and some of the problems which arise when 
trying to link local government with popular participation. Finally, we 
attempt to identify some of the particular questions about participation and 
local government, which politicians and planners need to consider if they 
are concerned to introduce a system of local government primarily as an 
institutional and procedural means of increasing popular participation.
Hie Concept of Local Government
There is no precise definition of the concept of local .government, Baber, 
for example, defines it as the ‘authority to determine and to execute matters 
within a restricted area inside and smaller than the whole state.’ I would 
agree with Awa’s definition of local government as the political authority 
set up by a nation or state as a subordinate authority for the purpose of 
dispersing or decentralising political power. The act of decentralising 
pow er may tak e  th e  form  of d e c o n c e n tra tio n  or d ev o lu tio n . 
Deconcentration involves delegation of authority to field units of the same 
department. Devolution, on the other hand, refers to the transfer of 
authority to local government units or statutory bodies such as state 
enterprises.
The definitions give rise to certain characteristics of a local government 
unit. These are:
(a) A  Subordinate System: Local government implies a system of 
government which is subordinate to the central government, but 
which does not act merely as a departmental agent of the central 
government as do, for example, local offices of a ministry.
(b) Locality Principle: The areas to be grouped together to form a 
local government unit should possess, to a reasonable degree, a 
combination of common historical, geographical, sociological, 
cultural and economic characteristics or what is called ‘community 
of in te re st’ or ‘com m unity consciousness’ and should be 
reasonably large both in size and in population. The logic of social 
services demands that they be provided by a local community.
(c) Independent Budget: A local government unit must have its own 
budget, balanced estimates of revenue and expenditure, and a 
separate bank account, with the cheque book held by an employee 
of the local authority (not a central civil servant).
(d) A  Separate Legal Existence: A local government unit has a 
corporate status, often with a common seal. It has the power to
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sue and be sued. It has the power to hold land and property as its 
own (not the central government’s).
(e) Allocation o f Resources: A local government unit has the authority 
to allocate substantial resources, for example, the quantity of 
finance handled; number and qualifications of the staff employed; 
power to decide over expenditure; power to vary revenues; 
decisions over staff appointments, promotion and discipline.
(f) Range o f Different Functions: The functions of a local government 
unit can vary widely, but in general, the unit is involved in the 
adm inistration of functions that prom ote socio-econom ic 
development of the locality.
(g) Representation: In a local government unit, decisions are made by 
representatives of the local people. Different forms of election or 
appointment may serve, provided that the people of the locality 
feel that the policy making body is really representative of them.
It must be pointed out that local government represents the generally 
accepted fact of political life that all the functions of government cannot be 
run on the basis of central administration alone. It consequently 
represents both the need for participation and for administrative 
convenience, particularly with the view to fact-finding and considerations 
of local variations.
The Concept of Participation
Although participation is defined in different ways, the dominant view is to 
regard it as a strategy to improve the development process. We would 
therefore agree with the UNESCO’s definition which is as follows: a 
‘collective sustained activity for the purpose of achieving some common 
objectives, especially a more equitable distribution of the benefits of 
development.’
Emrich has clarified the meaning of participation through six axioms. 
These are (i) participation must begin at the very lowest level. There must 
be real opportunities for participative decision-making for the poorest, and 
decisions must relate to the aspirations of the poor more than to the ‘wispy 
musings’ of those who will not identify with them; (ii) participation must 
take place at all stages of the development process, from the earliest 
pre-planning exercises, to the development of plans, the design of 
implementation mechanisms and the actual implementation; (iii) it must 
be recognised that a solitary vote is not participation. If people do not 
participate as members of relatively powerful groups which serve their 
interests, then they participate only for the benefit of their masters; (iv)
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participation must have substance and usually political clubs and 
co-operatives do nbt have substance. Participative processes must deal 
with the allocation and control of goods and services related to the 
production processes; (v) participation must somehow deal with existing 
loyalties. If the result is merely to strengthen existing inter-class groupings, 
it will just strengthen existing leadership; (vi) it must be accepted that the 
development of effective participation will cause conflict in some form.
It must be noted that political aspects are often considered basic to 
participation. However, participation is a much wider concept. Politically, 
the elections held from time to time provide a mechanism to exercise 
control over institutions and resources, but such controls may prove to be 
illusive. Unless there are real opportunities for people to have a say in 
planning and implementation of development, the adult franchise alone 
may mean nothing at all. The real purpose of participation is to develop 
human capabilities for developm ent, decision-making and action. 
Participation means a kind of local autonomy in which people discover the 
possiblities of exercising choice and, thereby, becoming capable of 
managing their own development.
It is important to understand the true meaning of participation, since 
failure to do so can lead to distortions in the processes and the end-products 
of development. This danger is real as participation has now emerged as 
a p o p u la r deve lopm en t idea . P a rtic ip a tio n  is o ften  en d o rsed  
unambiguously on normative grounds even if the empirical basis is not 
clear. A real danger is that with ‘growing faddishness and a lot of lip service, 
participation would become drained of substance and its relevance to 
development programmes disputable.’ Another cautionary note is that 
‘while participation can take the form of widespread rural mobilization to 
support and implement government policy, it can also serve as an effective 
tool for government control of the rural population.’ Used without properly 
understanding all the implications, participation can work both ways: It 
could become the proverbial double-edged sword.
Local Government and Popular Participation: Myth or Reality?
We have already pointed out that local government is often justified in 
terms of its potential as a means of increasing popular participation in 
decision-making. From the planners’ point of view, participation through 
local government may be considered desirable because it is seen as a means 
of making plans more closely reflective of local needs and it may be a means 
of mobilising local support and resources for development projects. From 
politicians’ stand-points, local government may be advocated as a basic 
human right and a necessary extension of the democratic process - as a way
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of achieving ‘participatory democracy’ rather than merely ‘representative 
democracy.’
These objectives are in accord, as we have already noted, with the 
PNDC’s rationale for the setting up of the District Assemblies. However, 
the role of local government in the promotion of popular participation is 
easier said than done. While the link between the two concepts may be 
easily and frequently enumerated, the pursuit of the objective of the link is 
usually doubtful. It is to the ‘participative elements’ of local government 
that we now turn.
Local Government and Political Education
One of the values of local government is the promotion of political 
education which is an important participative element. In the words of 
Alexis de Tocqueville, ‘town meetings are to liberty what primary schools 
are to science: they bring it within the people’s reach, they teach men how 
to enjoy it.’ This point was re-echoed by John Stuart Mill in his book, 
Representative Government. Mill recommended local government on the 
ground that it provides extra opportunities for political participation both 
in electing and being elected to local offices, for people who otherwise 
would have few chances to act politically between national elections. One 
of the underlying themes of Representative Government is the educative 
effect of free institutions, and Mill’s belief was that ‘the local administrative 
institutions are the chief instruments of this operation.’
The role of local government in the enhancement of political education 
has also been a recurring theme in discussions of political development. 
For instance, the objective of local government is to foster ‘healthy political 
understanding.’ The citizen learns to recognize the ‘specious demagogue’, 
to avoid electing the incompetent or corrupt representative, to debate 
issues effectively, Jo relate expenditure to income, and to ‘think for 
tomorrow.’
The problem about local government and its promotion of political 
education is not so much whether local government does or does not 
educate, but how many it educates. In modern Britain where the only 
remaining survival of direct democracy is the parish meeting, the role of 
local government as political educator can only touch a tiny fraction of the 
population. According to official estimates, about 43,000 people were local 
councillors in England and Wales in 1968. If co-opted members, the 
non-participant and local authorities were added, participation within the 
parishes in any meaningful sense is confined to a minority. It may be 
contended that the 43,000 extend the educative process by carrying the 
message of democracy to the wider public, although it is difficult to envisage
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this in practice. If it does happen, however, there is very little evidence that 
the wider citizenry are very ‘attentive pupils.’
There are, in any case, aspects of the educative value of local 
government that raise one or two doubts about its complete acceptability 
in a modern democracy. The first, according to Sharpe,is its powerful 
overtones of ‘paternalism.’ It derives in essence from a rather pessimistic 
view of human nature directly descended from A quinas’ view of 
self-government as a means of subjecting individuals’ ‘irascible and 
concupiscable powers to the royal and politic rule.’ If this sounds a bit 
far-fetched, the modern variant still has a distinctly ‘Gladstonian, school 
masterish tone’ that sees the special task of local government as being that 
of teaching the ‘great unwashed that money does not grow on trees.’
Linked with this paternalist element is the fear, again stemming directly 
from Mill, that those who are to receive the direct benefits of training in 
democracy are ‘petty poor stuff anyway. The low calibre of councillors 
was, for Mill, the ‘greatest imperfection of popular institutions.’ He places 
great emphasis on how important it is for ‘the very best minds of the locality5 
to be on local councils so that they may confer on the lower grade minds ‘a 
portion of their own more enlarged ideas and higher and more enlightened 
purposes.’ In this instance, there is widespread unwillingness to accept the 
full consequences of democracy where it involves the man in the street 
actually taking part-in government. At the parliamentary level, this attitude 
is not nearly so evident because the ‘fine sieve’ of selection procedures 
eliminates most ‘manual workers’ irrespective of party; and even where 
members of parliament from working class backgrounds are elected, they 
seldom reach ministerial rank in Britain before becoming absorbed in the 
wider political ruling group. Local government, on the other hand, seems 
not to have such ‘screening’ devices, hence apparently the concern about 
the calibre of its representatives.
Local Government as a Training Ground for Political Leadership
A further participatory value that is claimed for local government is its role 
as a training ground for national legislators. Mackenzie traces this idea 
back to Bentham’s vision of a ‘sub-legislature’ constituting ‘a nursery for 
the supreme legislature: a school of appropriate attitude, in all its branches 
for the business of the legislature.’ Harold Laski similarly claimed that ‘if 
members were, before their candidature, legally required to serve three 
years on a local body5, they would gain the ‘feel of institutions so necessary 
for success.’ This claim has been exhaustively examined so far as Britain is 
concerned by Brian Smith but it does not emerge as a very significant one. 
Much depends on the emphasis placed on the difference between the
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respective roles of local councillors and MPs and equally on the extent to 
which private politics are seen as providing a comparable training to local 
government units. Nevertheless, after a careful examination of the 
available evidence Smith’s conclusion is that ‘local government experience 
then, is relevant to central government practices because it is political 
experience (but) we should not overestimate the value of local political 
experience for national legislators and leaders.’
Local Government and Political Stability
The remaining aspect of participation as a justification of local government 
is that which sees local government not so much as a training ground for 
civic virtue or for the national legislature - the ‘breeder of better individuals’ 
as it were - but as the essential element for establishing ‘a stable and 
harmonious national state, the breeder of better societies.’ For Tocqueville 
and Mill, these two aspects of participation are closely linked. It is only by 
participating in and learning the art of self-government at the local level 
that the individual has a stake in and comes to appreciate the virtues of free 
government at the national level. Local government is also seen by Warren 
as reconciling class, religious and sectional interests.
There are many objections and reservations that can be made to this 
way of thinking. First, local community interests do not necessarily 
coincide with individual interests, nor do they with national interest. 
Self-government may or may not nurture civic virtue, but if it does, there is 
no guarantee that this will always enhance the citizen’s perception of the 
national interest more than it is likely to enhance local loyalties.
Second, it is possible for the main elements of a stable democracy to be 
achieved nationally before dem ocratic local government has been 
established locally. In Britain, for instance, democracy in the ‘one man one 
vote’ sense was achieved nationally before it was locally realised; because 
many parts of rural England were bereft of any local representative 
institutions until 1888. As Keith-Lucas has reminded us, the local 
government franchise was not finally assimilated to the parliamentary 
franchise in Britain until 1948. Similarly Langrod asserts that ‘when a state 
has long since passed from the absolutist age to that of the constitutional 
regime, local government has often remained (for example, in Austria from 
1866 to 1918) as a veritable fortress of anachronistic privilege.’ In other 
words, local government may be viewed as being possible only where there 
already exists national cohesion and sense of national identity, if not 
democracy. Such a distinguished authority as Fesler is also inclined to this
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view. This view, however, contradicts that of the PNDC, which holds that 
local democracy, as enshrined in the District Assemblies, should precede 
national democracy.
Conclusion
From what has been said so far, one is tempted to say that local government 
and popular participation may be incompatible. In other words, local 
government does not necessarily promote popular participation. It is 
interesting to note that even in countries like Britain, France and the United 
States, where local democratic institutions existed for some time and local 
democracy or popular participation is considered to be the root of national 
dem ocracy, considerable doubt is expressed regarding the truly 
participative nature of local government. A striking example is offered by 
the 1969 M aud C om m ittee R eport on the M anagem ent of Local 
Government, which considered the operation of local government in 
Britain to be often highly undemocratic and non-participative. Community 
power structure studies carried out in the United States have sometimes 
led to similar conclusions.
These findings may induce people to question the validity of popular 
participation as an argument for reforming local government. In any case, 
local government is not of necessity identical with popular participation, as 
the PNDC has made us to believe, and that special measures must be taken 
to ensure that local government is participative.
When considering alternative methods of achieving participation, three 
different issues need to be addressed. First, it is essential to enquire about 
the objectives which participation is (and is not) designed to achieve; that 
is, its perceived or proposed rationales or functions. Thus at one extreme, 
participation may be intended as no more than a means of improving 
information available to decision-makers at the national level or merely 
convincing local inhabitants of the desirability of certain national policies 
or programmes. At the other extreme, it may be associated with the 
achievement of political power, the incorporation of deprived sectors of 
the population into the national economy or the development of community 
solidarity and self-esteem. The achievement of these objectives requires 
radically different approaches, and often different groups have differing 
views and expectations about even the primary purposes of any particular 
effort to achieve participation.
Second, it is also important to consider which individuals, groups or 
parties can, should or are intended to be involved as channels or agents of 
com m unication in the process of p artic ipa tion . Thus achieving
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participation through local government councillors raises very different 
issues and problems from those which would arise if the concern was with, 
say, traditional leaders, extension workers, cadres and youth movements. 
Yet recourse to, and action involving, any or all these people may be seen 
as the means of enhancing participation.
Third, it is necessary to consider the methods or procedures which 
individuals and groups may use in their efforts to achieve participation. 
Thus, to take just one example, the effectiveness of local government 
councillors will depend on their access to, and their ability to use, a variety 
of methods - including those which determine the way in which they relate 
to their electorates (such as electoral procedures, formal ward committee 
structures and informal relations with people in the electorate) and those 
which affect their impact on outside events (such as their role in making 
and implementing council decisions and the impact of the council on 
regional or national issues). And this in turn will depend on the formal 
structure of the local government system, the councillors’ status in the 
community, their individual aptitudes and integrity.
It must be emphasised that there is the need to examine the details of 
any local government reform programme - including its historical roots and 
its current objectives, its formal structure and the environment in which it 
has to operate - before attempting to predict or evaluate its impact in 
relation to popular participation. In the same way, it is not possible to make 
d e ta iled  recom m endations for im proving p rocesses of popu lar 
participation without thorough knowledge of existing and potential future 
modes of participation. Detailed local-level studies should thus be an 
essential part of the design of a local government reform programme which 
is intended to enhance popular participation in the development process.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Awa, E.O. ‘The Theory of Local Government’. Quarterly Journal of Administration. Vol. 
XV. Nos.l and 2 October-January 1981 pp. 3-15.
Ayee, J.R.A. ‘Local Government Reform in Ghana: Some Reflections on the 1988 Local 
Government Law5. Indian Journal o f Public Adm inistration. Vol.XXXV. No.4, 
October-Decemben 1989 pp. 954-966.
Ayee, J.R.A. ‘The Functions and Financial Resources of District Assemblies under the 1988 
Local Government Law in Ghana’. Journal of M anagement Studies  3rd Series. Vol.6, 
January-December? 1990 pp.46-55.
Ayee, J.R.A. An A n a to m y  o f  P u b lic  P o lic y  Im p le m e n ta tio n :  The C ase o f  
Decentralisation Policies in Ghana. Unpublished Ph.D. Dissertation, The Hebrew 
University of Jerusalem. January, 1991.
92
Baber, M. P. Local Governm ent 3rd edn. London: MacDonald, 1974.
Chambers, Robert Rural Development: P utting the Last First. London: Longman, 1983.
Cheema, G.S. and Rondinelli, D.A. (eds) Decentralisation and Development: Policy  
Implementation in Developing Countries Beverly Hills: Sage, 1983.
Conyers, Diana ‘Decentralization and Development: A Framework for Analysis’. 
C om m unity Development Journal. Vol.21. No.2, April 1986: pp. 88-100.
De Tocqueville, Alexis. Democracy in Am erica  New York: Vintage Books, 1945.
Emrich, K.R. ‘Participation: Cure or Whitewash?’ in Inayatullah, F.E. (ed). Approaches to  
Rural Development: Some Asian Experiences. Kuala Lumpur. APDAC/347-373 1979.
Fesler, J.W. ‘Approaches to the Understanding of Decentralization.’ Journal of Politics. 
Vol.27: 1965 pp.536-566.
Fesler, J.W. ‘Centralization and Decentralization’ in International Encyclopaedia of the 
Social Sciences: London: MacMillan, 1965.
Ghana, Republic of. D istrict P olitical A u th ority  and M odalities fo r  D istrict Level 
Elections Accra: Ghana Publishing Corporation 1987. Ghana, Republic of Ghana, 
LocalGovemment Law. 1988 PNDC Law 207:
Ghana, Republic of. Evolving a True Democracy: Summary of NCD’s Work Towards the 
Establishing of a New Democratic Order. Tema: Ghana Publishing Corporation, 1991.
Gran, Guy People b y  Development. New York: Praeger, 1983.
Greenwood, R. and Stewart, J.D. ‘The Institutional and Organizational Capabilities of Local 
Government’. Public Administration. Vol.64 (Spring): 1986 pp. 35-50.
Gow, D.D. and Vansant J. Beyond the Rhetoric of Rural Development P articipation  
Washington, D.C.: Development Alternatives, 1981.
Keith-Lucas, B. The English Local Government Franchise. London: Blackwell, 1952.
Kent, George ‘Community-Based Development Planning’. Third World Planning Review. 
Vol.3 No.3 August 1981 pp. 313-326.
Korten, D. and Klauss (eds)People-C entered Development: Contributions toward Theory  
and Planning Frameworks. West Hartford: Kumarin Press, 1984.
Langrod, G.(1953) ‘Local Government and Democracy’. Public Adm inistration  Vol.3. 
(Spring) 1953.
Laski, Harold. A Grammar of P olitics London: Allen and Unwin, 1931.
Leemans, A F. Changing Patterns o f Local Governm ent The Hague: International Union 
of Local Authorities, 1970.
Mackenzie, WJ.M. Theories of Local Government. Greater London Papers No.2. 
London:. Greater London Group. 1961.
Maddick, H. Democracy, Decentralization and D evelopm ent Bombay: Asia Publishing 
House, 1963.
Mawhood, P. (ed) Local Government in the Third World: The Experience o f Tropical 
A frica  Chichester Wiley and Sons, 1983.
Mill, J.S. Representative Government Everyman edn. London: Dent, 1931. (Originally 
publisheld in 1861.)
93
Olowu, Dele ‘Local Institutes and Development: The African Experience.’ Canadian 
Journal of African Studies. Vol.23. No.2. 1989 pp.201-231.
Royal Commission on the Management of Local Government in Britain (Redcliff - Maud 
Committee), 1969.
Sharpe, LJ. ‘Theories and Values of Local Government’:. Political Studies. Vol.XVIII 
No.2 1970 pp. 153-174.
Sharpe, L.J. ‘Theories of Local Government’, in Feldman, L.D. (ed) Politics and 
Government in Urban Canada. London: Methuen, 1981.
Smith, B.C. ‘The Justification for Local Government’ in Feldman L D . and Goldrick, M.D. 
(eds). Politics and Government of Urban Canada. London, Methuen 1972.
Smith, B.C. Decentralization: The Territorial Dimension of the State. London: Allen and 
Unwin, 1985.
Syed, Anwar The Political Theory of American Government New York: Random House, 
1966.
United Nations, Popular Participation in Decision-Making for Developm ent New Y ork: 
UN Department for Economic and Social Affairs, 1975.
UNESCO, M eeting of E xperts on the Institutional Problems of Participation in the 
Strategies of Integrated Rural Development, Lima, Peru, 4-8 September 1978. Paris: 
UNESCO, Division for the Study of Development 1979.
Uphoff, N. and Esman, M J. Local Organizations for Development: An Analysis of Asian 
Experience  Ithaca, NY: Cornell University ,1974.
Verba, S. Sm all Groups and Political Behaviour. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
1961.
Warren, J.H. InDefenceofLocalDemocracy. London: Conservative Political Centre, 1957.
Wraith, R.E. Local Adm inistration in West A frica  London: Allen & Unwin, 1972.
94
Part IV
TOWARDS A DEMOCRATIC 
ORDER
CHAPTER 11
CONSTITUTIONALISM AND THE RULE OF LAW 
THE BEDROCK OF CONSTITUTIONAL RULE
F. K. Drah
Introduction
The purpose of the paper is two-fold. It tries to, first, explain in general 
and simple terms the ideas of constitutionalism and the rule of law which 
are basic to constitutional rule. For, the latter is not merely rule by civilians; 
it is also the very opposite of military rule as such. Secondly, the paper 
offers a few suggestions for the consideration of the constitution-makers. 
It is important to state that the paper is based on the assumption that our 
current search for a new political order will result in devising the building 
blocks for the evolution of a stable and durable constitutional order. The 
assumption is crucial because there are in our midst a sizeable number of 
people (both military and civilian) who are hostile to the very ideas of 
constitutionalism and the rule of law. Since they see themselves as the prime 
and indispensable movers of national transformation, they must always 
have their own way; and, thererefore, there should be no legal and other 
checks on their actions; while their programmes should be exempted from 
public scrutiny.
The Meaning of Constitution
It is obvious that the term constitutionalism is derived from the word 
constitution. However, to know what is a constitution is not necessarily to 
know what is constitutionalism.
According to K.C. Wheare, there are two main different meanings of 
the word constitution: the one is general and the other is specific. In its 
general meaning, a constitution stands for the whole system of the 
government of a country. It is the collection of rules, legal and non-legal, 
which establish and regulate the organs of government. The legal rules 
which are embodied in statutes are recognised and applied by the law 
courts. On the other hand, the non-legal rules which take the form of 
usages, understandings, customs and conventions are not recognised by the 
courts as strict laws; even so they are no less than the legal rules effective
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in regulating the institutions of government. It is significant to note that all 
these legal and non-legal rules are not embodied in a single document. 
When one speaks of the constitution of Britain, this is the normal, if not the 
only possible, meaning which the word has.
In its specific meaning, the word constitution is used to describe not 
the whole collection of legal and non-legal rules but rather a selection of 
these rules often embodied in a single document or in a few closely related 
documents. And it is worth noting that such a selection is nearly always 
that of strictly legal rules only. In its specific sense, then, the word 
constitution is a selection of rules, almost always legal, which regulate the 
government of a country and which have been embodied in a document. 
This is the meaning of the word which is most common in the world today. 
It may be added that the two meanings of the word constitution identified 
here correspond approximately to the popular distinction between an 
‘unwritten constitution’ and a ‘written constitution.’
It is popularly assumed that where a government rules in accordance 
with a documentary constitution, constitutionalism automatically operates 
or is acknowledged in principle. This is not necessarily so. There is a 
significant sense in which the constitution of a country may itself be 
‘unconstitutional.’ For, although government may be conducted according 
to the terms of the*constitution of a country, this constitution may do no 
more than lay down the institutions of government and leave them (or some 
of them) free to act as they like - that is, give them unlimited discretion. For 
example, according to the Soviet constitution of 1918: ‘The basic task of 
the constitution is the establishment of the dictatorship of the city and 
village proletariat.’ It is also arguable that Ghana’s first republican 
c o n s ti tu tio n , to g e th e r  w ith its su b se q u e n t am en d m en ts , was 
‘unconstitutional’ because it gave the president virtually unlimited 
discretion.
Nor is it correct to argue that constitutionalism does not operate in a 
particular country just because its constitution, which is not documentary, 
seems to put no limitations on the legislative arm of government, for 
instance. The reason is that it may well happen, on further scrutiny, that 
the ordinary laws of the country, together with usages, conventions etc, 
provide those checks and balances which the law of the constitution does 
not provide - as it is the case in B ritain . A nd this shows that 
constitutionalism operates even where there is not a written constitution in 
the sense already indicated.
The Meaning of Constitutionalism
What, then, is constitutionalism? It is hoped that some idea of what it is 
has emerged from the preceding paragraphs. In thought and practice,
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constitutionalism consists in the belief that there must be a set of rules, 
procedures and institutional arrangements which effectively limit the 
exercise of governmental power and authority in order to safeguard such 
fundamental values as political stability, individual and group liberty, as 
well as justice. In fact, the kind of government constitutionalism insists on 
is limited government. In the literature on the subject, limited government 
is also termed ‘moderate’ or ‘constitutional government.’ A state with such 
a government is called the constitutional or free state.
Now, to state the obvious, limited government is the very opposite of 
arbitrary government. Predictability of action is the basic rule of 
constitutionalism; while capriciousness or unpredictability is the mark of 
tyranny or dictatorship. (In this respect, military government, however 
benevolent it may be, is by definition arbitrary government.) It is clear, 
then, that limited or constitutional government means freedom from 
capricious or unpredictable and, therefore, arbitrary rule. All this is 
another way of saying that, for the constitutionalist, not all things are lawful 
to the rulers; hence they should not have unlimited powers.
Thus conceived, constitutionalism entails the fundamental principle of 
the accountability or responsibility of the rulers for their policies and 
actions to the ruled. Authority given to rulers and their subordinates is not 
a legal privilege to be exercised at their absolute discretion; instead it is 
authority for the exercise of which these public officials are accountable. 
To be responsible or accooutable is to be answerable for one’s actions to 
another person. One must be able to answer questions like: ‘Why did you 
do this?’ ‘Why did you fail to do that?’ or ‘By what authority did you do 
this?’ To ensure that such questions are almost always asked of public 
officials, the citizens must have the right to criticise and assess the decisions 
and actions of such officials. Unless this is so, government can never be 
truly responsible to the citizenry.
Cosntitutionalism also emphasises conciliation, compromise, and 
self-restraint: the ability and willingness to make just decisions that take 
into consideration the interests of the various groups in the society; the 
ability and willingness to undertake many-sided and often prolonged 
negotiations while respecting and considering the other person’s point of 
view; and the ability and willingness to employ the means at one’s disposal 
to achieve one’s objectives without overstepping the bounds of the law - 
without recourse to violence.
Constitutional Limitation and Constitutional Criticism
There are two broad ways whereby the belief that a government should not 
enjoy unlimited powers can be realised in practice. On the one hand, given
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that not everything is lawful to a government, one may proceed to lay down 
in a documentary constitution some of those things which are considered 
unlawful. It is acknowledged, though, that it is not always possible to spell 
out precisely what the bounds of lawful authority are. Even so one might 
specify what could be termed ‘outside’ limits to the powers of government. 
This principle was embodied in the American Constitution by its Founding 
Fathers, as well as in the second and third republican constitutions of 
Ghana by the constitution-makers. This is the principle of Constitutional 
Limitation. On the other hand, one may not commit oneself in advance to 
these ‘outside’ limits. Instead, one may decide to hold in reserve the right 
to criticise at any time the decisions or actions of the governmental 
authorities as being ‘unconstitutional’ or ‘not in accordance with the spirit 
of the constitution.’ This is what may be called the principle of 
Constitutional Criticism; and it is the underlying principle of British 
constitutional practice.
Of course, these two broad ways of ensuring limited or responsible 
government need not exclude each other; in fact, in a country like the 
United States of America, both operate side by side and reinforce each 
other. It is common knowledge that some African countries, including 
Ghana in 1969 and 1979, have tried to follow the American example by 
deliberately adopting the principle of Constitutional Limitation in the hope 
that in the course of time, the principle of Constitutional Criticism might 
evolve.
Devices of Constitutionalism
A written constitution is, in modern times, considered one of the major 
devices or institutional arrangements for ensuring limited or constitutional 
government. It sets out in more or less clear terms the legal limitations on 
the powers of government. But, as already indicated, the very fact that a 
constitution is written does not mean necessarily that it upholds the idea of 
limited government. On the contrary, it is possible for such a constitution 
to be the very embodiment of arbitrariness. Therefore, in the modern era, 
especially, if a written constitution is to be regarded as ‘constitutional’ at 
least in theory, then it must contain a number of the crucial devices or 
procedural rules whereby limited government can be ensured in practice. 
W ithout these devices, no w ritten constitution can be considered 
‘constitutional.’
Some of the well known crucial devices are: the separation of powers, 
the independence of the judiciary and judicial review, an entrenched bill of 
rights, popular represen ta tion  and free elections, an en trenched 
amendment procedure, and the rule of law. For our purposes, the rule of
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law is discussed fairly extensively in the following section; while a couple or 
so of the others are treated briefly in a later section devoted to ‘suggestions’.
The Rule of Law
It is indisputable that constitutionalism demands legality which in turn 
requires laws. The laws must be laid down in advance and published. They 
direct public officials with regard to whatdecisions they must make and how 
to make those decisions, and the citizens with regard to what the legal 
consequences of their actions will be. The laws once passed are supreme; 
and all, including the public officials, must obey them. This, in a nutshell, 
is legality: that is, strict adherence to the letter of the law.
In the popular understanding, the rule of law does not go beyond 
legality: the two are the same. However, for the constitutionalist, the matter 
is much more complex than this. It is not accidental that, historically 
speaking, the rule of law, as indeed the very idea of constitutionalism, has 
been connected closely with the idea of Natural Law. But so vast and 
complex is this idea that it cannot be discussed extensively here. For our 
purposes, it is enough to state, in the most simplified way, a basic tenet of 
the various classical theories of Natural Law. It is that there are certain 
principles of human conduct, discoverable by human reason, to which 
man-made laws must conform if they are to be valid and obeyed.
Many critics have stressed the vagueness of the various versions of 
Natural Law. For us here, however, the importance of the idea of Natural 
Law is its underlying assumption that man-made laws are not necessarily 
just laws; therefore, they cannot be considered supreme once they are 
passed.
In his formulation of the rule of law, the constitutionalist also proceeds 
on a similar assumption. For him the rule of law articulates the fundamental 
belief of constitutionalism which, to repeat, is that not all things are lawful 
to government. On this view, the rule of law is concerned as much with the 
form of the law as with its substance. In other words, the rule of law 
constitutes a limitation both on how the authorities may reach a decision 
and on what they may do. Thus the rule of law is used in two senses - specific 
and general.
In the specific sense, it stipulates certain rules of procedure which must 
be followed scrupulously by the authorities. Some of these rules are: (i) the 
authorities should hear both sides of a case; (ii) they should not be judges 
in their own cause; (iii) they should consider all the relevant factors of an 
issue; (iv) they should not be biased by fear, or favour, or private interest;
(v) not only shall justice be done, but it shall be seen to be done; and (vi) 
good reasons should be given for decisions reached.
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These procedural rules are known as rules of natural justice. Although 
they have been formulated with legal adjudications primarily in mind 
instead of any other sort of public dispute, these rules should not be seen 
to be limited to disputes which only the law courts decide. They are meant 
for the administrative, security and legislative authorities as well. And they 
are designed both to safeguard the citizens against abuse of power and to 
make the authorities open to the influence of reason.
There are other procedural rules. Some provide safeguards concerning 
arrest and detention pending trial, thereby protecting the individual from 
arbitrary arrest and imprisonment or detention without trial. Others 
provide for speedy trial of accused persons and adequate judicial control 
over police methods of securing confessions from accused persons. 
Moreover, no person shall be found guilty of an offence which is not 
specifically laid down in some criminal prohibition established prior to the 
date when the offence was alleged to have been committed. Thus penal 
legislation which is restrospective is abominable.
In the general sense, the rule of law has to do with the substance of what 
the authorities may do. This is because not everything is lawful to them. 
They are not entitled to make any decisions or laws they like. If, for 
example, the laws they make are to be effective, then the laws must be 
considered just by the citizens as a whole. But if they are far removed from 
the values held in common by the citizens, then they will not command the 
respect of the citizens.
Accordingly, the rule of law in the general sense is expressed in such 
broad principles as freedom, justice and humanity which are expected to 
guide the authorities. These principles must be regarded as guidelines of 
political and legal arguments - rather than as rigid rules - in terms of which 
the substance of legislation and decisions by the authorities are criticised 
and assessed. It is in this sense that the rule of law is considered to be 
som ething more than legality, and hence an invaluable device of 
contitutionalism. Perhaps this may explain why some people have gone so 
far as to equate the rule of law with consitutionalism.
Some Suggestions
The 1979 Constitution
Like its predecessor, the 1969 constitution, on which it was largely based, 
the main body of the 1979 constitution is a constitutionalist’s constitution. 
It places reasonable limitations on the powers of government by providing 
for the rule of law, the independence of the judiciary and judicial review, 
fundamental human rights (including press freedom), an elaborate
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amendment procedure, popular representation, a competitive party sytem 
and free and fair elections, as well as the separation of powers of the 
American variety. Essentially, therefore, the main body of the constitution 
embraces constitutionalism. Accordingly, it is suggested here that with 
some modifications, due alterations of detail, and a few additions, the 1979 
constitution should be re-enacted.
Separation o f Powers
In constitutional thought and practice, considerable importance is attached 
to the manner in which the broad powers and functions of government - 
executive, legislative, and judicial - are at once divided and inter-related. 
This is well executed in the 1979 constitution. Although the chief executive 
enjoys considerable powers, the constitution provides mechanisms for 
controlling his use of those powers. The executive presidency should be 
retained, for reasons given below.
As is well known, the National Commission for Democracy (NCD) and 
the Provisional National Defence Council (PNDC) have recommended a 
modification of the executive presidency. It involves, one may conjecture, 
a division of the executive power between an executive president and a 
prime minister - French style. The president should appoint and dismiss a 
prime minister who should command a majority in the legislature.
It has been observed that this modification harbours the seeds of 
instability because of possible conflicts between the two. Even if both of 
them belong to the same majority party, they may turn out to be highly 
strong-willed people who are likely to clash on policies or on the manner 
of their implementation. Besides, the strong possiblity of buck-passing and 
recriminations in the event of failed policies cannot be ruled out. 
Dismissals are likely to result in a political stalemate; and, in our 
circumstances, their consequences can only be imagined. Worse still, 
suppose the president’s own party fails to win a majority of seats in the 
general election? What then? Will the president appoint as prime minister 
the leader of another party with a majority of seats and a different 
programme?
It may be countered that even under the sole executive presidential 
system, the president’s own party may be in the minority in the legislature 
as happens sometimes in the United States of America. But, then, the issue 
of appointing a prime minister hardly arises in this case. It is possible, 
though, that under the proposed presidential-prime-ministerial system, in 
the event of a stalemate, a sort of accommodation will be worked out. All 
the same, the possibility of a stalemate must not be self-inflicted.
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TheNCD-PNDC proposal raises another fundamental issue. To split 
the executive power poses a grave danger to effective governance, which 
is not so in the unified executive presidency. The latter most admirably 
expresses the basic unitary nature of executive power. For, in virtue of this 
feature, it acts as a single entity with a fairly clear direction. And when 
things go wrong, the blame will be put where it belongs. To say all this is 
not to ignore, to repeat, the possibility of the president’s own party being 
in the minority in the legislature.
Judicial Independence and Review
In whatever way the powers of government may be divided or shared, it is 
now clear from our own experience that the judicial arm of the state must 
be considerably independent of the legislature and the executive. The 
independence of the judiciary is a cardinal requirement of constitutional 
government; and it is demanded by the rule of law in the strict sense, at 
least.
It is important to state the argument for the independence of the 
judiciary. First, in discharging the responsibility of interpreting the laws, 
judges should not be subject to such pressures as would make them change 
or distort the meanings of the laws to suit the whims and caprices of those 
affected by them, or of their patrons. Secondly, in finding out what are the 
‘facts’ of a case, judges should not be influenced by considerations of 
expediency. Thus conceived, the independence of the judiciary is clearly 
necessary to the maintenance of that predictability and stability of the laws 
which are at the very heart of constitutionalism and the rule of law.
Fortunately, judicial independence is amply protected in chapter 12 of 
the 1979 constitution. It should be retained. It is further suggested that the 
next constitution should empower parliament to establish a special fund for 
the efficient and smooth operation of the judiciary. Disbursement of 
monies from the fund should be administered by the chief justice with the 
support of a competent accounting staff. He should be accountable for 
such administration, not to the president, but to parliament through the 
Auditor-General. This will give it financial independence.
Judicial review of the constitutionality of acts of government and its 
officials is another significant device of constitutionalism, especially in a 
developing country like Ghana. Since the constitution specifies the limits 
of governmental powers, there must be a body to decide whether or not the 
public officials have exceeded these limits. And since these are essentially 
legal, only a competent and impartial body like the judiciary can discharge 
this crucial function of judicial review. It is suggested that no body other 
than the judiciary should undertake this task.
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Fundamental Human Rights
For the constitutionalist, as already mentioned, limited government 
necessarily entails the citizens’ enjoyment of fundamental civil and political 
rights like the freedom of expression (including press freedom), of 
association, of the person, of assembly, of conscience, etc etc. Of course, 
these rights are not absolute; for liberty is not licence. But there is no doubt 
that without such rights, the government cannot be subjected to effective 
criticism, and minorities cannot make themselves heard; in short, the 
citizens as a whole cannot be safe against their rulers - as Ghanaians know 
all too well.
Accordingly, these fundam ental civil and political rights, with 
reasonable and civilised m odifications, are secured through their 
entrenchment in a Bill of Rights in constitutions by constitution-makers 
whose sincere goal is limited government. Hence, such rights are not mere 
declarations of intent but are made justiciable and enforceable by the 
courts. Any citizen who feels that any of his or her civil and political rights 
has been infringed, especially by the action of the government and its 
subordinate authorities, can take the matter to court. This further shows 
why the judiciary should be independent of the executive and the legislature 
if it should adjudicate such actions impartially. The 1979 constitution’s 
provisions on this subject should be retained.
On the other hand, the economic and social rights including the rights 
of women, children, and the handicapped, unlike the civil and political 
rights, cannot be made justiciable and enforceable by the courts. For 
instance, how can one take the government to court for being unemployed? 
But one can do so if one is illegally arrested and detained by the military 
police, and then only, of course, in a constitutional state. That is why these 
other rights are provided for in Directive Principles o f State Policy, as for 
example in chapter 4 of the 1979 constitution. They serve as a kind of guide 
to the government in its effort at economic and social development for the 
benefit of all citizens, especially for the poor and deprived members of the 
society. However, the constitu tion-m akers may provide for the 
establishment of national commissions to promote and protect the special 
interests and rights of women and the handicapped.
Commission on Civil and Political Rights
It is well known that in civilian and military regimes (although particularly 
so in the latter), a great number of the personnel of the security services, 
whether or not on the instructions of higher authorities, have trampled on 
the civil and political rights of a sizeable number of individuals. They have 
harassed, intimidated, beaten, maimed, arrested and detained without trial
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for long periods, or even murdered, many individuals on the slightest 
suspicion of having allegedly committed crimes against the state, etc etc.
It is true to say that the judiciary, as already indicated, and perhaps the 
Ombudsman, perform the useful role of protecting the liberty of the 
individual. But such a role is limited in scope; they can deal only with cases 
brought before them.
Therefore, it is suggested that it is high time a special national body on 
fundamental civil and political rights was established. It must be tasked to 
monitor the activities of the major public organisations - including the 
security services - which impinge directly on such rights and take the 
appropriate remedial measures. The constitution-makers must provide for 
this by mandating parliament to set it up. It must be independent like the 
judiciary. Parliament may invite experts to help it work out the details 
including its functions and powers. But irrespective of the establishment 
of such a national body, parliament should itself form a standing committee 
on human rights and the security services.
A Second Chamber
Although a bicameral (two-chamber) legislature is not necessarily a device 
of constitutionalism, our present circumstances demand it. The reasons 
will be given soon.
In its  Report of 1949, the Coussey C onstitu tional Com m ittee 
recommended, by a majority of 20 votes to 19, the establishment of a second 
chamber of the legislature. Unfortunately, the colonial government vetoed 
the recommendation in favour of a unicameral (one-chamber) legislature. 
Since then the persistent demand for a second chamber by certain 
individuals and o rganisa tions has been rebuffed  by subsequent 
governments aided and abetted by constitutional commissions and 
constituent assemblies. It is hoped that our constitution-makers will not 
follow suit.
The NCD, in its Report of 1991, remarks that: T h e  general opinion was 
that there should b$ a unicameral legislature.’ Only a few people suggested 
a bicameral legislature; and some thought it should be ‘an alternative to a 
Council of State.’ But, the NCD concluded interestingly, ‘... it is proper for 
the merits of such a chamber as an avenue for mature contribution to public 
affairs to be considered.’ Has the NCD broken new grounds ? It will be 
recalled that the Constitutional Commissions of 1968 and 1979 also 
considered the issue and reported negatively.
The case against a second chamber may be summarised briefly here. A 
second chamber, it is argued, will not only be financially expensive; it will 
also duplicate the functions of the first chamber. The legislative power, as
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one of the significant powers of government, should rest with the 
democratically elected representatives of the people. Therefore, such a 
pow er shou ld  not be sh ared  with w hat will m ost likely be an 
undem ocratica lly  e lec ted  body. B esides, to  try to subject the 
democratically elected representatives to the judgment of another 
undemocratic body is likely to end in conflict, thereby creating crises of a 
political and constitutional nature ‘which may be as unnecessary as they 
surely will be subversive of the good order and progress of the country’ as 
the Constitutional Commission of 1978 put it. Finally, it is an anachronism 
in this era of the explosion of ‘participatory democracy5 world-wide.
This is a powerful case; and the serious nature of the issues raised must 
not be underestimated, much less ignored. But it may be observed that 
these are not ordinary times. Our expectations of a better life have been 
raised sky-high; and we are a people in a hurry. There is also the ‘military 
factor’ to be reckoned with; we should remember 24 September, 1979. 
And, to repeat, Ghana has its fair share of people - call them desperadoes 
if you will - who are fairweather friends of constitutionalism and the rule 
of law.
In these circumstances, any party which hopefully forms the next 
government is likely to be tempted to do too many things in a rush in order 
to satisfy a population, which, as a whole, has for so long suffered severe 
deprivations. And then things may turn sour ... It is precisely at this point 
that democratic impatience will need to be tempered with sobriety.
Fortunately, Ghana has the experienced elder statesmen of wisdom, 
expertise, patience, and dispassion to perform just this task. Besides, it will 
be most unfortunate to let them go to seed by failing to make a demand on 
their services when and where these are most needed. A second chamber 
will play the normal role of advising and restraining, typical of second 
chambers elsewhere. By reviewing bills passed by the first chamber and its 
other decisions, the second chamber will serve as a beneficial check on hasty 
legislation and decisions. This will enable emotional issues to be 
considered dispassionately and in a calmer atmosphere than will otherwise 
often be the case in the first chamber. It should delay financial bills for only 
one month, and other bills for between three and six months, depending on 
the degree of their controversial nature. It should also have equal power 
with the first house in such critical areas as the amendment of the 
constitution, judicial independence, protection of fundamental rights, the 
vetting and approval of the relevant presidential appointments, and the 
impeachment of the president, etc.
Membership of the second chamber should be fixed in order to avoid 
its being too large, and should be drawn from elder statesmen (including
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women, of course) of various occupational backgrounds. One-third of it 
may be reserved for chiefs and their nominees. In addition to the fixed 
number, all ex-Heads of State and ex-Chief Justices, who retired 
honourably, should be made life-members. Other members may not serve 
more than one eight-year term. There should be no government nominees, 
for obvious reasons.
Its members may be elected through electoral colleges. For the chiefs, 
the regional houses of chiefs are already in place. The non-chiefs may be 
elected on a regional, but non-party, basis through special colleges 
comprising a specified number of the representatives of identifiable bodies 
in each region. Parity of regional representation in the chamber must be 
ensured.
It is suggested, then, that the next constitution must provide for a 
bicameral legislature. The nation should be prepared to absorb the 
financial cost of the invaluable services a second chamber of eminent elder 
statesmen will certainly render.
Electoral Commission
Constitutionalism, we have seen, insists on the accountability of the rulers 
for their actions and policies to the ruled. In modern times, free and fair 
elections as well as a competitive party system (rather than a nebulous 
no-party system) are two of the cardinal devices for making this a reality. 
These two devices afford the citizenry the opportunity to vote out the 
incumbent rulers and vote in a new set of rulers - if they so choose. These 
devices also make possible the peaceful change of rulers without recourse 
to violence. Indeed, these devices ensure that civil disobedience carried to 
the point of violence will be unnecessary.
It is suggested that an electoral commission should replace the present 
NCD to take charge of the electoral process. Its composition, appointment, 
functions, and status, etc. must be the same as are provided in chapter 7 of 
the 1979 constitution. To avoid a repetition of the wrangle over funds 
between the electoral commission and the president during the Limann 
administration, parliament should be mandated to institute a special fund 
for the running of the commission. The commission must be accountable 
for the uses to which it puts the fund to parliam ent through the 
Auditor-General. It is suggested also that the commission should be given 
the additional function of instituting measures for the education of 
Ghanaians on their*rights and duties not only as voters but also as citizens. 
It cannot be overemphasised that its independence must be guaranteed.
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Conclusion
Constitutionalism, it has been seen, is the belief in limited government. 
Without certain devices, including the rule of law, it cannot be realised in 
practice. It goes without saying that constitutionalism is difficult to evolve; 
it cannot be had for the mere asking. No wonder, in most developing 
countries, it is non-existent. And this, according to some commentators 
(especially the Marxist socialists), is precisely because constitutionalism is 
incompatible with rapid economic development which is what these 
countries must achieve. What they need most are governments armed with 
unlimited powers. Such a claim would appear to be based on the belief that 
rapid economic development is necessarily promoted by a government with 
unlimited powers. This belief is not borne out by our own experiences and 
those of the erstwhile Eastern European communist countries.
What happens more often than not is that a government with unchecked 
powers ends up being more incompetent, inefficient and corrupt. The level 
of the development that takes place is not matched by the huge price the 
people pay in giving up their rights.
On the other hand, constitutionalism simply affirms that the framework 
of government must be such that the effort to satisfy material needs will be 
made in certain ways which do not rule out individual freedom. If some 
people in tensely  dislike the necessarily  restric tive ch a rac te r of 
constitutionalism, that is largely because freedom is not a value they cherish. 
Of course, one may legitimately talk about the extent of limitations on 
government imposed by a particular constitution; but this is different from 
saying that there should be none at all.
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CHAPTER 12
A PESSIMISTIC VIEW OF THE SPLIT EXECUTIVE 
PROPOSED FOR GHANA’S FOURTH REPUBLIC
Amos Anyimadu
Introduction
In this paper, I want to concentrate attention on the major proposals and 
instructions that have so far been made concerning the nature of the 
executive in the post-PNDC government in the Fourth Republic for Ghana. 
I would argue that the proposals and instructions so far made on the 
executive, particularly with regard to the intended division of powers 
between a President and a Prime Minister, deserve a very pessimistic look. 
The views of both the NCD and the PNDC on the executive propose a kind 
of split form of executive that is unprecedented in the constitutional history 
of this country. I would try to argue that this is fundamentally wrong-headed 
and can have very significantly bad effects on the nature of the post-PNDC 
regime that we are likely to have.
I would try to address three basic concerns. First, I would attempt to 
highlight the recommendations of the NCD and the PNDC on the 
executive. Second, I would briefly go through some notions of the executive 
that we have had in our constitutional history and also address some 
relevant international experiences. Finally, I shall seek to make my 
particular argument that we have to be very pessimistic about a split 
executive for Ghana.
The NCD-PNDC Recommendations on the Executive
The relevant text in the NCD report is quite precise and can be quoted at 
length. It is stated in Chapter Five of the report, which raises ‘main issues 
for Consideration by the Consultative Assembly5 that:
Opinion was overwhelmingly in favour of an Executive Presidency... 
There were also views that government machinery headed by a Prime 
Minister be instituted to be responsible directly to the Executive 
President who should appoint and dismiss the Prime Minister and his 
Cabinet. The Prime Minister also receives approbation from the 
National Assembly or its committee delegated to do so.
I l l
In its White Paper on the NCD report, the PNDC promises that:
The constitutional proposals will make provision for an Executive 
President to be elected on the basis of universal adult suffrage. 
Provision will also be made for a Prime Minister who must command 
a majority in the National Assembly.
Accordingly, in the decree establishing the Committee of Experts the 
PNDC instructed the Committee to provide for an Executive President as 
well as a Prime Minister.
From the above, it appears that the critical decisions on the executive 
were made by the NCD, based on the submissions made to it. However, 
these points, especially the latter, are by no means clear-cut. For instance, 
what exactly is the relationship between the ‘overwhelming’ opinion the 
NCD reports in favour of an Executive Presidency and the views ‘also’ 
expressed in favour of a Prime Minister as the head of ‘government 
machinery5? Unfortunately the NCD report is of very little use in answering 
such a query mainly because the Commission surprisingly made ‘a 
deliberate attempt not to numerically weight the views and ideas expressed 
at the regional seminars.’ From a close following of the regional seminars, 
I, myself, do not recall any significant call for a sharing of executive power 
between an Executive President and a Prime Minister. Indeed there was 
overwhelming support for an Executive Presidency. But these were calls 
for a traditional, that is American or Ghana Third Republic, type Executive 
Presidency. Thus, in an ‘Executive Summary of Report on Regional 
Seminars,’ which is an appendix to the NCD report, all that is said on the 
aspects of the executive that is of interest is that there was a consensus on 
the need to have an Executive Presidency; there is no mention of a Prime 
Minister. It is therefore reasonable to suggest that on this issue, the NCD 
was, to a significant extent, using its own discretion. This is not surprising. 
As Kwesi Jonah points out in his paper (in this volume), whenever such an 
official committee is established, it has very significant discretion in the 
scheme of things. However, when such discretion is exercised on significant 
issues, it is fair to expect that it would be clearly stated.
The PNDC’s White Paper on the NCD’s report seems to make 
significant modifications to the NCD’s suggestions. The different ways in 
which the relatioifchip between the Prime Minister and the National 
Assembly is described in the NCD report and in the PNDC White Paper 
deserves particular attention. The NCD recommends that the Prime 
Minister should receive ‘approbation from the National Assembly or its 
committee delegated to do so’, whilst in its White Paper, the PNDC 
suggests that the Prime Minister ‘must command a majority in the National
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Assembly.’ It appears to me that the PNDC assumes that the Prime Minister 
would be part of the National Assembly whilst the NCD leaves this in the 
air. Perhaps it even implies that the Prime Minister would not be part of 
the National Assembly. Luckily, even within the confines of the decree 
setting it up, the Committee of Experts would have to pronounce on this.
The proposals and instructions surveyed above clearly point towards a 
split or bi-cephalous executive. In most constitutions, the executive power 
is exercised by more than one person. In this regard, the American 
constitution, (and those it has strongly influenced), is a significant exception 
in that executive power is expressly vested in the President who is not even 
required to share it with a Cabinet. There are peculiar reasons explaining 
this. Normally, there is a Head of State, who may be a hereditary monarch 
or an elected citizen, and a Head of Government. The executive is split or 
bi-cephalous when the Head of State is more than a figurehead. The latter 
would of course be a relative judgement. However, if the President in 
Ghana’s Fourth Republic is going to be elected by universal suffrage, if he 
is going to have real powers to ordinarily appoint and dismiss the Prime 
Minister who is in charge of the government machinery, then the President 
is going to be much more than a figurehead in any reckoning and our 
executive would therefore be split.
Ghana’s Experience
We have had instances of the split executive in our history. In Prof. Manu’s 
paper, he dilated on the immediate pre-independence period when there 
was a division of executive power between a Leader of Government 
Business (later Prime Minister) and the Governor. As Prof. Manu 
explained, this division, or ’dyarchy,’ was a convenient, tem porary 
arrangement which somewhat reflected the contemporary division of 
power between the colonial government and the nationalists. In our 
post-independence period, the most important period when a split 
executive was discussed for this country was in 1968/1969 when the 
A k u ffo -A d d o  C o n s ti tu tio n a l C o m m issio n  re co m m en d ed  an 
unambiguously split executive. Although some basic features of a 
Westminister government were recognisable from its recommendations, 
the Head of State, the President, was given unusually significant powers of 
appointment. For example, the President was to have significant personal 
discretion in appointing the Governor of the Bank of Ghana, the 
Attorney-General and some other crucial public officials. The proposed 
splitting of the executive was very controversial, and so failed to pass at the 
Constituent Assembly stage. In the end, the 1969 Constitution of Ghana’s
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Second Republic was indeed a clear Westminister/Cabinet Government 
constitution, that is, without a split executive. The governmental order 
established by the creation of the Supreme Military Council in 1975 also 
created some kind of split executive. Similarly to the extent that the PNDC 
published decrees proclaiming itself, its governmental arrangements 
exhibit some features of a split executive.
The French Example
In Comparative Government, the most important example of a split 
executive is the present French Constitution of the fifth Republic which 
was passed in 1958. Thus Dr. S.K.B. As ante, the Chairman of the 
Committee of Experts, has cited this constitution in connection with the 
instruction to his committee to provide for a split executive. As is well 
known, the French Fifth Republican Constitution was quite tailor-made for 
General Charles de Gaulle. In fact, the split executive in France is very 
controversial. The Communist Party of France, which has been very strong, 
never really accepted it. The Socialist Party of President Mitterrand very 
grudgingly accepted it. I suspect that quite a significant section of informed 
opinion in France is even today very sceptical about the split executive. But 
it appears to have remained part of the republican constitution because 
General de Gaulle intensely disliked the rough and tumble of politics. He 
had no parliamentary experience and he did not like the instability of the 
French fourth Republic which was mainly the result of political manoeuvres 
in parliament. Thus, for the Constitution of the fifth Republic, the post of 
President, which was crafted with General De Gaulle firmly in mind, 
ensures that the occupant could ‘arbitrate’ above normal politics.
The emerging governmental arrangements in now liberalising Eastern 
and Central Europe also confirm that the main attraction of a split executive 
is the opportunity that it gives a powerful Executive President to appear to 
be above politics. In the USSR, the difficulties that have emerged between 
President Gorbachev and the various Prime Ministers he has appointed 
appear to have been caused mainly by the former’s desire to appear as a 
statesman, rather than a politician. In Poland, which has the first written 
constitution in Europe, there is now an interesting row on the merits of a 
split executive between Constitutional Committees established by the two 
houses of parliament. The Upper House, which with President Walesa, 
favours a French-style presidency (that is a split executive), argues ‘that this 
is the most stable solution for the difficult economic and social conflicts 
facing Poland. Such a system would reconcile democratic government with
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President Walesa’s charismatic style of leadership and would provide a 
stronger national image abroad.’
The Cost of the Split Executive
I suspect that elements of the argument that have been raised in support of 
a split executive in Poland would appear, most probably on their own force, 
in Ghana soon. However, we have to reckon, at least, with two general costs 
of a split executive.^ First, a split executive generally makes the ownership 
of public policies unclear. Second, a split executive is likely to weaken the 
legislature.
A government has to be seen to own its policies: it has to be seen to be 
responsible for the public policies it devises and/or implements. No matter 
how clearly the distribution of powers is between the President and a Prime 
Minister, it is likely that differences between them on public policy would 
publicly surface. If these develop to a head, it can result in the nasty 
showdowns that have been recorded in history between Presidents and 
Prime Ministers. Perhaps even more sinister, the conflict can simmer for 
a long time, not show itself well enough for resolution processes to be 
activated, but can have the terrible effect of making government tardy and 
messy.
Our political history clearly shows that one of the biggest hurdles to 
responsible government is the absence of a strong legislature. Our 
legislatures have often been too weak a link in our governmental apparatus. 
It would therefore appear clear that a major aim of any attempt at 
constitutional-engineering in this country must be to ensure a strong 
legislature. I am convinced that a split executive in this country would result 
in a very weak legislature. In our Third Republic, the separation of the 
lelgislature from the executive in an Executive Presidential system resulted 
in a weak legislature.
As noted above, the exact relationship envisaged between the executive 
and the legislature in the proposed split executive is unclear. It is, however, 
clear that the legislature could become even worse than it would under a 
proper Executive Presidential system. It would be recalled that the 
ambiguity is about whether the Prime Minister would be part of the 
legislature- Now, if it turns out that the Prime Minister and his government 
are not made part of the legislature, the situation would be relatively similar 
to what prevails under an Executive Presidency, except that in trying to 
exact executive accountability, the legislature would suffer in its 
relationship with the Executive President himself, who does need the 
legislature’s approbation or majority support. The legislature’s situation
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would only slightly improve if it turns out that the Prime Minister and his 
government would be made part of it. The subordination' of the Prime 
Minister to the Executive President, and the association of the Prime 
M inister with the legislature would rub strongly against the latter. 
Controversial executive Issues would (as the division of executive powers 
between the President and Prime Minister are also bound to be murky) be 
pushed to the Presidential sector of the executive to escape the legislature’s 
serious scrutiny.
Conclusion
In sum, I would say that the splitting of the executive is an unnecessary 
encumbrance on Ghana’s Fourth Republic. We do not need a president 
who would have to pretend to be above politics but an executive. We do not 
need a president who may have to be prancing around, playing God, 
perhaps even stoking fires whilst a poor Prime Minister carries the burden 
of government with insufficient powers but powerful enough to smoulder 
a precious but structurally weak legislature.
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CHAPTER 13
SAFEGUARDING HUMAN RIGHTS 
IN GHANA’S FOURTH REPUBLIC
Kumi Ansah-Koi
Introduction
In this era of worldwide and activist pursuit of people’s rights, and 
especially given the ideological and unabashedly partisan  often 
propagandist, thrust of such pursuits, it will be helpful to define the term 
‘human rights.’ Human rights may be defined as ‘universal moral rights, 
something which all men, everywhere, at all times ought to have, and 
something of which no one may be deprived without grave affront to justice. 
Something which is owing to every human being simply because he is 
human.’ In Osita C. Eze’s formulation, ‘human rights represent demands 
or claims which individuals or groups make on society, some of which are 
protected by law and have become part of ex lata while others remain 
aspirations to be attained in the future.’ Human rights inhere in human 
beings simply by virtue of their humanity alone. They are neither privileges 
nor contingent upon a prior performance of any duties. The most widely 
recognised statement of human rights remains the United Nations’ 
Universal D eclaration of Hum an Rights which was adopted  and 
proclaimed by the General Assembly of the United Nations on December 
10,1948. That Declaration, together with the International Convenant on 
Civil and Political Rights and the International Covenant on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights, constitute the so-called International Bill of 
Rights. Together with their Optional Protocols, they define the scope and 
content of contemporary conception of human rights.
The present paper focuses on proposals and other measures which, 
when put in place, would ensure the uninterrupted promotion and 
safeguarding of human rights in Ghana.
Historical Review
The struggle for human rights and allegations of their violation are 
perennial issues in Ghanaian politics. Concrete historical instances can be
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cited to bear up the claim. The pre-colonial social formations in what 
constitutes the modern state of Ghana had definite but varying conceptions 
of human dignity, human worth, and human rights.
For example, the right to self-determination and the quest for civil and 
political rights fuelled the nationalist agitation against British colonial rule. 
As the nationalist paper of the Convention People’s Party (CPP), The Accra 
Evening News, put it variously on its masthead, ‘we have the right to live as 
men’; *we prefer self-government with danger to servitude in tranquility’; 
and V e have the right to govern ourselves.’ Such slogans could not have 
been motivated by economic and material interests alone. Surely the 
struggle for independence from colonial rule was a quest for human rights. 
Similarly, in as much as the intense rivalry which erupted within the ranks 
of nationalists during 1951-1959 concerned the alleged incipient 
dictatorship of the CPP government, that rivalry was about the need to 
safeguard the basic human rights.
Ghana’s Independence Constitution, based largely on the Westminster 
model of government, went to great lengths to lay out explicit constitutional 
provisions which were meant to ensure civil and political liberties. In the 
best traditions of the departing colonial authority, Ghana’s Independence 
Constitution provided for ‘limited government,’ ‘rule of law,’ and ‘judicial 
independence’ with a view to safegurading civil and political liberties and 
providing the institutional framework for the promotion of human rights in 
general. It anticipated the now increasingly accepted notion of ‘group 
rights’ - a facet of human rights through its provisions on the Regional 
Assemblies. Those provisions afforded creative constitutional mechanisms 
to resolve any political impasse involving national versus group rights.
The 1960 Republican Constitution also had provisions geared at 
promoting and safeguarding human rights. The provisions included a ‘Bill’ 
of Rights which was later declared to be non-justiciable.
The military-cum-police juntas which have ruled the country since 1966 
also espoused, at least verbally, human rights and related issues. The 
National Liberation Council (NLC) presented itself as marking the 
termination of an epoch of human rights abuses and infringements of civil 
liberties, and further as being single-mindedly committed to the restoration 
of rights and the institution of the rule of law. And so did the Supreme 
Militry Council (SMC), the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC) 
and the Provisional National Defence Council (PNDC). When Nkrumah’s 
regime was ousted, there was the parading of a caged Boye Moses, an 
Nkrumah assistant, who had come from exile in Conakry ostensibly to 
subvert the regime, through some of the principal streets of Accra.
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An outstanding feature of the Second Republican Constitution was its 
explicit concern with the promotion of human rights and its meticulously 
designed recommendations directed against tyranny and arbitrary rule. As 
was the case with succeeding regimes, the pursuit of rights in particular 
and human rights issues in general were at the fore of politics in Ghana 
during the Second Republic. The constitutional and political crises over the 
so-called Apollo 568 episode, (especially the related Salla case), are 
illustrative of that fact.
On the fall of the Second Republic, human rights issues remained at the 
fore-front of national politics in Ghana. The 1972 coupists presented the 
economic choices and policies of the supplanted Busia regime as asphyxiac, 
as being intolerably suppressive of the economic rights and aspirations of 
Ghanaians in general; and as offering more than an adequate justification 
for their forceful and unconstitutional seizure of power. In addition, that 
regime’s Charter of National Redemption made claims and assertions most 
of which bordered on rights.
The succeeding short-lived AFRC regime, in a similar vein, kept the 
tradition alive. Supporters of that regime stressed economic rights, rather 
than the purely civil or political. The rights and interests of socially 
disadvantaged groups and the mass of the populace were emphasised at 
the expense of legality and relatively privileged elite groups.
The Third Republic was similarly marked by contentions and struggles 
relating to rights. Thus it also kept the tradition alive. Following the 
example of India and Ireland, for instance, the Third Republican 
Constitution had ’Directive Principles of State Policy’ which sought to let 
the state mandatorily pursue the promotion of economic and social rights.
Perhaps the most significant of these regimes on the question of human 
rights is the incumbent PNDC. In this regard, we may point at the 
establishment of such institutions as the National Commission on Children, 
the 31st December Women’s Movement, the Committees for the Defence 
of the Revolution and the Public Tribunals. These bodies each either has 
to promote one aspect or the other of fundamental human rights as its basic 
concern, or advance the interests and rights of socially disadvantaged and 
unprivileged groups. The government has also enacted the Marriage 
Registration Law, the Family Head and Accountability Law, and the 
In testa te  Succession Law which advance the rights of relatively 
disadvantaged social segments.
Allegations of human rights violations have also been a perennial 
problem in G hanaian politics. The July 1958 Preventive Detention Act and 
the numerous arrests and detentions that followed it earned the Nkrumah 
regime considerable notoriety as far as its human rights record went. That
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regime was also accused of undue and improper interference with the 
judiciary, harassment of political opponents, and the suppression of 
dissent. The NLC also passed a ten-year disqualification law against a 
particular section of the population for belonging to the CPP. The 
NRC/SMC epoch was also marred by numerous violations of civil, political, 
and other rights. Some of the violations were so severe that they drew the 
attention of such human rights groups as Amnesty International and Africa 
Watch. The AFRC and the successor Limann administration of the Third 
Republic were no exception.
In contrast with achievements, the incumbent PNDC regime has been 
also cited by some as offering the worst record of human rights violations 
thus far. Specific instances include reports of physical abuse and 
mistreatment of suspects, offenders, dissenters, detainees; intereference 
with the judiciary, supression of political dissent, and impairment of the 
freedom of conscience and of belief. As Ghana stands on the threshold of 
yet another attempt at constitutional rule, there is an urgent need to 
consider appropriate constitutional arrangements which would safeguard 
human rights in the country.
Safeguarding Human Rights in Ghana's Fourth Republic
Like liberty, which really constitutes only an aspect (though a significant 
aspect of the notion of rights), human rights have to be fought for; and when 
won, steadfastly guarded and maintained with eternal vigilance. Besides, 
human right prescriptions need be situated historically and socially; for, 
notwithstanding their universal applicability and dimensions, institutional 
perspectives and socio-economic variables considerably mediate their 
realisation.
In the present socio-economic and historical circumstances of Ghana, 
I wish to offer the following proposals. I consider them to be requisite if 
human rights goals are not to remain elusive.
Constitutional and Institutional Proposals
The Fourth Republican constitution should carry explicit provisions 
safeguarding human rights. These provisions should form part of the 
entrenched clauses of the constitution. In particular, the so-called first 
generation of rights encompassing civil and political rights and meant to 
ensure liberty against tyrannical and arbitrary rule, should be enshrined in 
the constitution. The time-tested procedures and institutions for realising 
human rights - such as the independence of the judiciary, due process of
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law, judicial review of legislative and executive acts, a free press and an 
independent ombudsman - should also be entrenched in the constitution; 
and parliament should have no powers to enact retrospective legislation.
The provisions on the Directive Principles of State Policy contained in 
the 1979 Constitution should be inserted in the next constitution to ensure 
that due regard is given to economic and social rights. Besides, the 
executive organ of state must be constitutionally required to present annual 
reports to parliament on specific measures it has taken to promote human 
rights.
It is conceded that most of these institutional and constitutional 
proposals have been tried before in Ghana. However, the appalling record 
of human rights in the country suggests that they do not constitute sufficient 
conditions for the promotion of human rights. It is in the light of this that 
the following additional proposals are made.
Statutory Requirements
All public officials should be statutorily required to take an oath to promote 
human rights and to refrain from subverting the constitution. All public 
officials should take this oath within a month of the coming into force of 
the constitution. All subsequent appointees into public service should be 
required to take it as a condition of their appointment.
Parliament should be debarred from passing legislation which would 
make newspaper registration or licensing mandatory; or which would 
empower government to ban political organisations. Existing laws of libel, 
slander and sed ition  should constitu te  adequate checks against 
irresponsible conduct in the public domain.
Public Education
It is erroneously assumed that only governments or agents of the state are 
capable of human rights violations. Human rights violations could 
characterise private inter-personal or inter-group relations. Furthermore, 
it is often assumed that individuals become almost not only intuitively aware 
of human rights but also of thier violations.
Part of the problem of human rights awareness arises from the 
controversy surrounding the interpretation of what constitute human rights 
- e.g. ‘the right to life.’ While some contend that it is tantamount to 
disapproval of capital punishment in all its forms and under whatever 
circumstance, others do not regard judicial execution as a breach of this 
right. The point is that the meaning of rights is rarely cut and dry.
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Consequently there is an urgent need for continuing public education 
regarding human rights. This need is particularly strong in countries like 
Ghana where aspects of popular culture and traditional beliefs and 
assumptions occasionally clash with aspects of contemporary notions of 
rights. To illustrate: popular culture finds nothing wrong with a thief being 
severely abused physically if caught in the act. Traditionally, women are 
not regarded as the equals of men. Given such realities, which are further 
complicated by the staggering rate of illiteracy in the country and the 
complexity of modern government, there is the need for constant civic 
education to enhance human rights awareness.
Given the political prejudices, acrim ony and suspicions which 
surrounded the activities of the Centre for Civic Education, it is proposed 
that the function of public education should be assigned to the University 
of Ghana’s Institute of Adult Education. This Institute already has a net 
work of offices spread through the length and breadth of the country. To 
ensure that the Institute is not starved of financial and logistical support for 
undertaking this task, a fixed percentage of the annual defence budget (five 
percentum, it is proposed) should be statutorily set aside for the Institute. 
Further to this, human rights education should be incorporated in the 
curricula and syllabi of all educational institutions in the country.
External Relations
Human rights issues cannot, and should not be confined to the domestic 
relations of the state. As the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) daily 
makes evident, and as the issue of sanctions against apartheid South Africa 
and Iraq illustrates, the state’s external relations offer a powerful field for 
the pursuit of human rights objectives. The potential of that arena should 
not be lost on Ghana as it seeks to promote human rights. The country can 
take the following measures.
There should be a constitutional provision mandating parliament to 
investigate and publicly make known its findings on any adverse report, 
internal or external, regarding the human rights situation in the country. In 
this regard, it should be the statutory responsibility of Ghana’s missions 
abroad (and the patriotic duty of all Ghanaians) to report on the content 
and nature of such reports. Reports of such human rights monitoring 
groups like Amnesty International, Africa Watch and PEN as well as the 
USA Congressional and State Department Reports on human rights, 
should be given serious attention and investigated.
Finally, the promotion of human rights should be part of Ghana’s 
foreign policy objectives; and the state should take a principled stand on
122
human rights matters at the UN and other international fora. In fact the 
country’s government should be constitutionally obliged to actively work 
for human rights issues and considerations. In that regard, Ghana should 
not enter into bilateral economic, cultural, diplomatic or political alliance 
with states guilty of gross human rights violations.
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